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Abstract 
The illusion of control refers to the overestimation of the probability of a win 
following a personal action in a gambling game. This thesis identifies gaps in the body 
of literature on factors influencing the illusion, uses a theoretically motivated 
methodology to address them, and tests the theory underlying the methodology. 
The thesis consists of a literature review and three papers. The review focuses 
on factors found to influence the illusion – factors such as the number of response 
options available in the gambling task, the degree of need for money, the average 
frequency of successes/wins in a sequence of rounds, and success-slope (i.e., whether 
wins are concentrated at the beginning or end of the sequence). The review draws 
attention to problems with the way the illusion of control has been measured in studies 
of success-frequency and success-slope. This observation, in turn, raises questions as 
to whether success-frequency and success-slope are, indeed, factors that influence the 
illusion.  
The review goes on to discuss the psychological processes underlying the 
effects of various influencing factors. Two relatively unexplored arguments are 
advanced. The first is that people in gambling tasks engage in problem-solving. 
Problem-solving involves searching for actions that bring about the desired outcome, 
which, in gambling settings, is a substantial monetary win. The greater the number of 
available response options and the need for money, the more likely the player is to still 
be searching for effective actions at the time that her perceived control is measured. 
Such a player is, in turn, less likely to report having „no control‟ over the task. A 
second and related argument is that the actions people consider during problem-solving 
are influenced by their beliefs about the task at hand. In gambling, beliefs in the 
gambler‟s fallacy (Oskarsson et al., 2009) and beliefs about supernatural agents such 
as luck and God (Atran & Norenzayan, 2004) are particularly relevant. In line with 
terminology used by Rothbaum, Weisz and Snyder (1982), it is proposed that the 
illusion of control has two variants, primary and secondary, influenced by the 
gambler‟s fallacy and beliefs in supernatural agents respectively. 
The first two papers describe re-examinations of the effects of success-
frequency (N = 97) and success-slope (N = 334) using a methodology consistent with 2 
 
the above explanation. Like most studies of these two factors, the experiments 
involved a gambling session under a particular success-frequency or success-slope 
condition, followed by a post-experimental questionnaire about the degree of perceived 
control over task outcomes. The novel aspects of the methodology included, for 
example, the separate measurement of the illusion‟s two variants. Success-frequency 
was found not to influence the illusion of control when it was measured in this way, 
while the influence of success-slope was confirmed, in that an „ascending slope‟ (a 
concentration of wins at the end of the sequence) was found to be associated with 
higher illusory primary control. The finding regarding success-slopes suggests that 
people expected to learn the correct way of playing through trial-and-error, which is 
consistent with the above argument that people engage in problem-solving when 
gambling. 
The third paper describes a confirmatory factor analysis of a survey about 
erroneous gambling-related beliefs (N = 329). Items were based on interviews with 
people who gamble regularly, and, therefore, represented illusions of control – 
problem-solving solutions based on some playing experience. Consistently with the 
second argument presented above, the factor analysis showed that the items could be 
described in terms of two latent factors reflecting the gambler‟s fallacy and beliefs 
about supernatural agents, respectively.  3 
 
CHAPTER 1: Introduction and literature review 
Games of pure chance, by definition, involve no causal contingency between actions 
and the desired outcome; that is, they do not allow for personal control (e.g., Jenkins & 
Ward, 1965). In light of this, the behaviour Langer (1975) documented in some early 
studies of lotteries did not appear rational. Lottery participants behaved and answered 
post-task questions as though they perceived some personal control over the lottery‟s 
outcome. In one study, participants who chose their ticket nominated a re-sale price 
higher than that nominated by participants who were simply given a ticket by the 
experimenter. This suggested that participants believed there to be a causal relationship 
between their choice of ticket and the lottery‟s outcome. In another study, participants 
whose tickets were labelled with a letter as opposed to a technical symbol were more 
reluctant to trade their ticket for a ticket in a lottery with better odds. This suggested 
that participants were acting as they would in a skilled game, developing more 
strategies when stimuli were familiar and therefore perceiving more control in those 
circumstances. In a third study, participants who spent more time thinking about the 
lottery as a result of receiving their ticket number one digit at a time over the course of 
three days expressed greater confidence of winning than participants who were 
immediately notified of their three-digit ticket number. This finding again suggested 
that participants were strategising as they would in a skilled game, developing more 
strategies when more time for thinking about possible strategies was available. 
Langer labelled action-outcome contingency perceptions in games of chance an 
illusion of control and interpreted her findings as evidence that the illusion arises 
because games of chance possesses features of skilled tasks. Skilled-task features 
include the factors found to influence the illusion in Langer‟s experiments: opportunity 
for choice, familiar stimuli, and greater time for thinking about possible actions and 
outcomes. According to Langer, skilled-task features in games of chance signal to 
players that they should act as they would in a skilled task. This means “engaging in 
overt and covert behaviours to maximise the probability of success: [behaviours such 
as] thinking about the task to arrive at possible strategies that may be employed” (p. 
313). The more skilled-task features a game of chance possesses, the more likely it is 
to be confused for a skilled task and give rise to strategising. 4 
 
Subsequent research on the illusion of control has sought to replicate Langer‟s 
findings and show that the effects she observed generalise to a variety of gambling 
tasks (e.g., roulette and slot machines). Most of these studies confirmed Langer's 
findings. Studies have also sought to identify other factors influencing the illusion of 
control. Frequently-investigated factors not originally examined by Langer include 
success (i.e., win) frequency, and success-slope, which refers to whether wins are 
concentrated at the beginning or end of a gambling session with multiple trials. 
A problem with the body of literature on factors influencing the illusion relates 
to the psychological explanation of the effects. Although numerous explanations have 
been advanced, none have been entirely successful in accounting for the results 
observed across the majority of studies. Langer's explanation above is an example. It 
proposes that choice, stimulus familiarity and thinking time are influential because 
they are characteristics of skilled tasks and therefore encourage strategising in games 
of chance. However, the extent to which this explanation accounts for the effects of 
choice and other skilled-task features in lottery tasks is questionable. When a slot 
machine game is imbued with additional choices (e.g., a lever for stopping the 
spinning reels), it is feasible to propose that participants might attempt to look for a 
way exert influence over the outcomes (e.g., Ladouceur & Sevigny, 2005). However, 
the simple lottery tasks in Langer‟s experiments did not allow for the same range of 
different responses as a slot machine, even when opportunities for choice, familiar 
stimuli, and increased thinking time were introduced. Further explanation is, therefore, 
needed of why participants in Langer‟s lottery studies did not consider all possible 
responses and quickly come to the conclusion that no particular response could 
improve their chances of winning. 
A central aim of this thesis is to propose a more comprehensive explanation of 
the psychological processes underlying the illusion of control and causing it to be 
influenced by certain factors (choice, stimulus familiarity, etc.) in a variety of 
gambling tasks. This first chapter provides a review of the literature on influencing 
factors (Section 1), describes the sense in which existing explanations of underlying 
psychological processes have failed to account for some relevant studies (Section 2), 
and outlines the explanation that forms the basis for this project (Section 3).  5 
 
The thesis has the further aim of addressing problems with the methods used in 
identifying success-frequency and success-slope as influences on the illusion. The 
problems are described in Section 1, with Section 4 then describing specific research 
questions motivated by these problems and the presented explanation of psychological 
mechanisms underlying the illusion. The subset of questions pursued in the current 
project is specified in a final section. 
1. Influences on the illusion of control 
Studies of influences on the illusion of control have typically used experimental tasks 
involving randomly generated outcomes. Following one or more trials of the task 
under a condition where a hypothesised influence is absent or present (e.g., choice vs. 
no choice), the degree of the illusion of control is inferred based on behavioural or 
self-report measures. The opening of the chapter described three of the five  influences 
investigated by Langer. This section will describe research on all five influences, as 
well as research on influences investigated by other authors. All the contributing 
studies are listed in Table 1.1.  
1.1. Opportunity for choice and physical involvement 
Langer‟s experiment on the effects of opportunity for choice was described at the start 
of this chapter. Half the participants in an office lottery chose their tickets, while the 
other half were simply given tickets by the experimenter. On the morning of the 
drawing, participants were asked to name the price for which they would be willing to 
re-sell their ticket to a latecomer. Those in the choice condition demanded an average 
of $8.67 – over four times the $1.96 quoted by participants in the no-choice condition. 
Langer replicated the result in another office lottery (Langer, 1975, Experiment 3), 
where participants who chose their tickets were found to be more reluctant to exchange 
their ticket for one in a lottery with better odds. 
Since opportunity for choice is difficult to disentangle from degree of physical 
involvement (degree of physical contact with aspects of the task), most replications of 
Langer‟s „choice‟ finding have tended to combine the two factors (see Table 1.1). 
Originally, however, Langer (1975, Experiment 4), examined the effects of physical 
involvement separately. At the centre of the task was a never-before-seen apparatus 6 
 
with three electronic paths. The participants were informed that, on each trial, the 
machine randomly selected a winning path, following which activated a buzzer. The 
participants‟ task was to guess which path was the winning one, and the stylus was 
then moved to determine whether they were correct. In the „no involvement‟ condition, 
the experimenter and not the participant moved the stylus. Physically involved 
participants exhibited higher pre-trial confidence that they had selected the winning 
path, and, after a single successful trial, rated themselves higher on a scale where 1 
indicated that they were much worse on the task than a champion chess player and 10 
indicated that they were much better. 
The effects of choice and physical involvement have been replicated in a 
variety of gambling tasks. For example, Ladouceur and Mayrand (1987) investigated 
the effects of physical involvement in a roulette task. Over 40 trials, participants in the 
„involvement‟ group personally threw a ball onto the roulette wheel after betting on a 
colour or number. For those in the „no involvement‟ group, the bet was still chosen by 
the participant, but it was the experimenter who threw the ball onto the wheel. The 
involvement group tended to bet more on riskier options (e.g., a single number), which 
suggested that they were more confident of winning. 
1.2. Stimulus familiarity 
Also briefly described in the opening of this chapter was Langer‟s experiment on the 
effects of stimulus familiarity. Lottery participants whose tickets were labelled with a 
letter as opposed to an unknown symbol displayed a greater reluctance to trade their 
ticket for one with better chances of winning. A replication of the effect followed 
(Bouts & Van Avermaet, 1992). Participants played a card game round against the 
experimenter, betting on whether the card they selected from a deck would be higher. 
Bet amounts were lower when the deck contained cards of an unconventional length-
to-width ratio and with Egyptian symbols rather than patterns inscribed on the back.  
These findings do not necessarily suggest that the illusion of control is 
strengthened when stimuli are familiar. The effect being observed could also be one of 
the suspicion associated with unfamiliarity. That is, playing familiar games (lotteries, 
cards) with odd stimuli might have made participants suspicious about whether the 
games were really fair. Such suspicion could have, in turn, lowered perceived control. 7 
 
Table 1.1. Studies identifying influences on the illusion of control 
Influencing factor  Associated studies 
Choice  Langer, 1975, Expts 2 and 3 
Gilovich & Douglas,1986 
   
Physical involvement  Langer,1975, Expt 4 
Wortman, 1975 
Ladouceur & Mayrand, 1987 
Fleming & Darley, 1990 
   
Choice and physical 
involvement 
Ayeroff & Abelson, 1976 
Benassi, Sweeney & Drevno, 1979 
Ladouceur et al., 1984 
-- 
Koehler, Gibbs & Hoggarth, 1994 
Budescu & Bruderman, 1995 
Dixon, 2000 
Wohl & Enzle, 2002 
Ladouceur & Sevigny, 2005 
   
Stimulus familiarity  Langer, 1975, Expt 3 
Bouts & Van Avermaet, 1992 
   
Decision time  Langer, 1975, Expts 5 and 6 
   
Opportunity for 
practice 
Langer, 1975, Expt 4 
Ayeroff & Abelson, 1976 
Benassi, Sweeney & Dreveno, 1979 
   
Success-slope  Langer & Roth, 1975 
Ladouceur & Mayrand, 1984 
Burger, 1986 
Matute, 1995 
Coventry & Norman, 1998 
   
Opportunity for 
competition 
Langer, 1975, Expt 1 




   
Success-frequency  Jenkins & Ward, 1965 
Alloy & Abramson, 1979 
Tennen & Sharp, 1983 
Benassi & Mahler, 1985 
Letarte, Ladouceur & Mayrand, 1986 
Vasquez, 1987 
Mikulincer, Gerber & Weisenberg, 1990 
Rudski, Lischner & Albert, 1999 
Thompson et al., 2004, 2007 
Blanco, Matute & Vadillo, 2011 




Associated studies (cont.) 
Need for the outcome  Friedland, Kienan & Regev, 1992 
Biner et al., 1995  
Biner, Huffman, Curran & Long, 1998 
Thompson et al., 2004 
Biner, Johnston, Summers & Chudzynski, 2009 
Gino, Sharek & Moore, 2011 
   
Strength of belief in 
luck 
Wohl & Enzle, 2002 
Wohl & Enzle, 2009 
   
Foreknowledge  Strickland, Lewicki & Katz, 1966 
Wortman, 1975 
Ladouceur & Mayrand, 1987 
   
Locus of control  Strickland, Lewicki & Katz, 1966 
Benassi, Sweeney & Drevno, 1979 
-- 
Tennen & Sharp, 1983 
-- 
Hong & Chiu 1988 
Rudski, Lischner & Albert, 1999 
   
Desirability of control  Burger & Cooper, 1979 
Burger & Schnerring, 1982 
Wolfgang, Zenker & Viscusi, 1984 
-- 
Burger, 1986 
   
Depression  Alloy & Abramson, 1979 
Tennen & Sharp, 1983 
Benassi & Mahler, 1985 
Vasquez, 1987 
Mikulincer, Gerber & Weisenberg, 1990 
Blanco, Matute & Vadillo, 2009 
   
Anxiety  Friedland, Kienan & Regev, 1992 
   
   
-- No effect 
 
1.3. Thinking time 
The length of time spent thinking about actions and outcomes within a task was 
examined by Langer (1975, Experiments 5 and 6) but not in any subsequent studies. In 
one of Langer‟s studies, participants in the „longer thinking time‟ group were given 
their three-figure lottery numbers at a rate of one per day, rather than all at once, as in 
the control group. Confidence in winning (on a 10-point analogue scale) and reluctance 
to trade tickets for a lottery with better odds were higher in this group. 9 
 
1.4. Opportunity for practice 
Another skilled-task feature identified by Langer as an influence on the illusion of 
control is opportunity for practice. In the same experiment that investigated the effects 
of physical involvement, Langer manipulated whether or not participants had two 
minutes to inspect the path apparatus and practice moving the stylus. Pre-trial 
confidence ratings and ratings of competence relative to a chess player were higher 
among the more practiced participants. 
The effects of practice were later replicated in two studies involving 
psychokinesis tasks. One study (Benassi, Sweeney & Drevno, 1979), for example, 
involved a machine that electronically released a die. The die had three red sides and 
three green sides. Participants were asked to choose a colour and concentrate on it 
coming up for 20 trials. Those who practiced for 10 trials as opposed to one trial prior 
to the session provided higher ratings in response to the post-session question: “How 
much do you feel that your concentration influenced what colours came up?” 
A difficulty with investigating the relationship between practice quality and the 
illusion of control is that instructing participants to practice or to practice more (e.g., 
for 10 trials as opposed to one trial) could have demand effects. Specifically, it could 
cause participants to believe that the experimenter considers the task a controllable one 
in which practice is effective. In recognisable chance tasks like psychokinesis, this 
could result in participants answering post-experimental questions about controllability 
more affirmatively than they otherwise would have, so as not to offend the 
experimenter. In less recognisable tasks (e.g., a slot machine with a never-before-seen 
reel-stopping lever), the experimenter could, in issuing the instruction to practice, 
come to be viewed as having inside knowledge that the task is, in fact, controllable 
(e.g., via the lever). 
1.5. Opportunity for competition 
Langer‟s final investigation concerned the influence of competition. Participants 
played a card-drawing game (who draws a higher card?). One group played against a 
competent „dapper‟, while another faced a dishevelled „schnook‟. Across four trials 
participants facing the weaker opponent bet more. Langer took this finding as evidence 
in support of her postulation that illusory perceptions of control emerge due to the 10 
 
presence of skilled-task features. Competition, she argued, is a typical feature of 
skilled tasks. A problem with this interpretation is that the manipulated variable was 
not opportunity for competition, but competition quality, levels of which vary 
independently of whether a task is skilled or not. Subsequent studies genuinely 
concerned with opportunity for competition (i.e., its mere presence) failed to show 
significant effects (Budescu & Bruderman, 1995; Rudski, 2001). 
1.6. Success-frequency 
Since Langer‟s original study series, researchers have sought to not only replicate 
identified influences, but suggest additional ones. Among these additional suggested 
influences is success-frequency – the number of successes experienced during multiple 
trials of a task. The illusion of control has consistently been found to increase with 
increasing success-frequency.  
Almost all studies of this effect have used an experimental task and procedure 
developed by Alloy and Abramson (1979) (see Table 1.1 – the exceptions are Rudski 
et al., 1999, and Letarte et al., 1986). The task was a novel, custom-built one, 
involving a single switch and a light. The accompanying instructions explained that the 
aim of the task is to discover whether light onset was controllable through pressing: 
[T]here are four possibilities as to what may happen on any given trial: 1) you press 
[the single available button] and the green light does come on; 2) you press and the 
green light does not come on; 3) you don't press and the green light does come on; 4) 
you don't press and the green light does not come on. Since it is your job to learn how 
much control you have over whether the green light comes on, as well as whether the 
green light does not come on, it is to your advantage to press on some trials and not on 
others, so you know what happens when you don't press as well as when you do press. 
(Alloy & Abramson, 1979, p. 451). 
Participants then experienced a series of trials (e.g., 40), in which the frequency of 
light onset was varied between groups (e.g., 25% vs. 75%). The dependent measure 
was a post-session analogue scale rating of the “degree of control your responses 
exerted over the light”.  
Due to the type of dependent measure used in these studies, research on 
success-frequency effects is potentially affected by the confounding of perceived 11 
 
control with remembered success-frequency. As demonstrated by Jenkins and Ward 
(1965), the problem stems from the use of the word „control‟ in the dependent 
measure. Jenkins and Ward found that ratings of „control‟ on an analogue scale 
correlated highly with experienced success-frequency
1 but failed to correlate with 
answers to less transparent questions about action-outcome contingency – questions 
not explicitly referring to „control‟. This finding suggests that people at least 
sometimes interpret „control‟ to mean „frequency of attainment of the target outcome‟. 
Furthermore, most of the control scales in success-frequency research have been 100-
point scales. The scale potentially prompts participants to indicate the percentage of 
times they obtained the desired outcome. Thus, studies purporting to demonstrate that 
beliefs about action-outcome contingency are strengthened with increasing success-
frequency might, in fact, only show that experiencing a higher success-frequency leads 
people to recall more successful outcomes.  
1.7. Success-slope 
In a study that attracted three direct replication attempts, Langer and Roth (1975) 
examined the illusion of control as a function of the slope of successes in the 
experimental session. Participants had the task of predicting the outcomes of a coin 
toss over 30 trials. Unbeknownst to them, the correctness feedback provided after 
every trial followed a predetermined order, with successes concentrated at the 
beginning (descending success-slope), evenly dispersed (flat success-slope), or 
concentrated at the end (ascending success-slope). When compared to participants in 
the two other groups, those who experienced a descending slope remembered being 
successful on a larger number of trials, judged themselves to be better at the task, and 
expected to be more successful on future trials.  
This finding was replicated almost exactly in three further studies (Burger, 
1986; Coventry & Norman, 1998; Ladouceur & Mayrand, 1984). One of these studies 
(Burger, 1986), in addition, found the „descending‟ slope to result in higher ratings on 
a more direct measure of perceived control – a scale enquiring about the extent to 
                                                 
1 Jenkins and Ward found this to be the case regardless of whether there was an actual action-outcome 
contingency, but Alloy and Abramson (1979) did not observe the correlation in a task with actual 
contingency. 12 
 
which participants believed their correct predictions to be the result of their ability to 
anticipate events (Burger, 1986).  
The effects of success-slope remain contested, however. In part, this is due to 
the fact that an investigation by Matute (1995) produced the opposite pattern: greater 
certainty in an illusory playing strategy following exposure to an ascending success-
slope. Another reason is that, in all but Matute‟s study and the study by Burger (1986), 
perceived control was expressed in terms of remembered success-frequency even 
though success-slope is a factor that potentially affects perceived control and 
remembered success-frequency differently. Perceived control might be higher in the 
late-successes (ascending slope) condition because that condition produces an 
impression of learning (Matute, 1995). Meanwhile, for remembered success-
frequency, the early-successes (descending slope) condition could give rise to the 
highest estimates as part of what research on memory terms the „primacy effect‟ . The 
effect refers to the consistent finding that items presented early in a list are 
remembered better (see Davelaar et al., 2005, for a debate on why the effect occurs). 
Among the studies that observed greater perceived control amidst early successes, only 
one (Burger, 1986) included a dependent measure not related to remembered success-
frequency. The dominant finding in the set of studies on success-slope could, therefore, 
be a replication of the primacy effect, rather than a finding relating to perceived 
control. 
The primacy effect has often been observed in conjunction with a „recency 
effect‟ involving better memory for last items (again, see Davelaar et al., 2005, for an 
explanation). It is then puzzling that better memory and the associated higher success-
frequency estimates were not also observed in the ascending success-slope condition. 
One explanation for this is that the recency effect is easily disrupted by interference 
tasks (e.g., thinking about something else; e.g., Glanzer & Cunitz, 1966). In this case, 
interference might have occurred between the end of the experimental session and the 
time when the success-frequency questions were answered.  
1.8. Need for the outcome 
The effects of need for the outcome were established in a series of lottery-based 
experiments by Biner and colleagues (see Table 1.1). In one of these (Biner, Huffman, 13 
 
Curran & Long, 1998), the high-need group were instructed to fast (skip breakfast and 
lunch), thus arriving hungry to a lottery game in which the prize was a hamburger. 
Analogue scales administered prior to the lottery drawing showed that hungry 
participants were more confident of winning and thought that a greater degree of skill 
was involved in the lottery. Other studies have shown that greater degrees of 
controllability on an analogue scale are reported when target outcomes are linked to 
monetary rewards as opposed to intangible „points‟ (Gino, Sharek & Moore, 2011; 
Thompson et al., 2004), and when target outcomes are linked to no consequences as 
opposed to electric shocks (Friedland, Kienan & Regev, 1992). 
1.9. Strength of belief in luck 
In a number of experiments Wohl and Enzle (2002, 2009) showed that confidence of 
winning in gambling tasks was influenced by degree of belief in the power of luck, in 
interaction with certain situational factors. One experiment (Wohl & Enzle, 2002), for 
example, showed that scores on the Belief in Good Luck scale (Darke & Freedman, 
1997) interacted with opportunity for choice in influencing confidence of winning in a 
lottery. That is, greater confidence was reported when the opportunity for choice 
combined with strong beliefs in luck.  
Another experiment – one in a series of similar experiments (Wohl & Enzle, 
2009) – began with a confederate describing herself as extremely lucky or, in the 
control group, not commenting on her luckiness. The experimental task involved 
choosing a scratch-and-win lottery ticket from a set displayed on the shelf, and 
participants had the option of letting their partner, the confederate, choose it for them. 
In the „lucky partner‟ group, 10 of 15 participants selected this option, compared to 
only four in control group. Ratings of confidence in winning were obtained, as were 
ratings of how strongly one believed their partner to be a lucky person. Stronger beliefs 
in the partner‟s luckiness led to the greatest confidence in choosing a winning ticket 
when the partner described herself as lucky. Thus, an interaction was observed 
between the availability of a task partner who claimed to be lucky and strength of 
belief that this claim means something.   14 
 
1.10. Foreknowledge 
Foreknowledge refers to whether bets are placed prior to the outcome‟s determination, 
as opposed to afterwards. In one of the three studies observing this factor‟s influencing 
effects, Strickland, Lewicki and Katz (1966) found that participants were more risk-
seeking and bet more in a dice-throwing task when betting before rather than after 
throws. In explaining the finding, the authors argued that, compared to postdiction, 
foreknowledge allows for more magical thinking and talking to the dice, thus 
enhancing perceived control. An alternative explanation is that foreknowledge is a 
typical feature of gambling tasks, so its absence caused participants to become 
suspicious that the game was rigged in some way. Suspicion would have, in turn, 
resulted in less risk-seeking. 
1.11. Personality factors 
Another extension of Langer‟s original work has involved investigating whether 
certain personality factors or individual differences make some people more prone to 
the illusion of control. One proposal has been that individuals differ in their 
susceptibility to the illusion because of differences in locus of control, the extent to 
which people believe to have personal control across a variety of situations (Rotter, 
1966). In defining the locus of control, it was proposed that people with a more 
„internal‟, as opposed to „external‟, locus of control believe desired outcomes to be 
more controllable. A number of instruments have been designed for locating people on 
the internal-external continuum and there has been some debate about their validity 
(Lefcourt, 1966). These debates aside, hypotheses and findings regarding the effects of 
the locus of control on the illusion of control have been mixed. The dominant 
hypothesis has been that internal individuals are more susceptible to the illusion of 
control, but only two of the four associated studies produced supporting evidence (see 
Table 1.1). Hong and Chiu (1988), in fact, hypothesised and observed the opposite 
effect. 
Another trait variable investigated in relation to the illusion of control is 
desirability of control, the degree to which control is generally attractive. After 
developing a measure of the trait (Burger & Cooper, 1979), Burger and colleagues (see 
Table 1.1) found that only people in whom this trait is more pronounced were 15 
 
susceptible to the standard effects of foreknowledge and stimulus familiarity. 
However, with respect to foreknowledge, Wolfgang, Zenker and Viscusi (1984) did 
not replicate this finding. Given the inconsistency and paucity of this research, the 
extent to which the desirability of control is an enabling factor for the illusion of 
control remains highly questionable. 
1.12. Depression 
It has been suggested that depression inhibits the illusion of control (e.g., Alloy & 
Abramson, 1979), but the disorder has so far only been established as an inhibitor of 
the effect of higher success-frequency on the illusion. The evidence comes from the 
same set of studies that identified high success-frequency as a cause of the illusion 
(among non-depressed individuals), so the body of work on the inhibitory effects of 
depression is substantial. However, if depression is an inhibitor of the illusion of 
control, people with depression should be found not to experience higher levels of the 
illusion of control in response to increases in other known influencing factors – factors 
such as choice and physical involvement. 
1.13. Anxiety 
Finally, just as depression has been suggested to be an inhibitory factor for the illusion 
of control, anxiety has been suggested to have an enhancing effect. The associated 
experiment was concerned the effects of temporary anxiety. Friedland, Kienan and 
Regev (1992) administered a survey about hypothetical lottery situations to a group of 
airforce cadets at a relatively relaxed stage of a flying course (low anxiety) and to a 
group about to undertake a decisive practical exam (high anxiety). All survey items 
related to whether the respondent preferred to choose a lottery ticket himself or have 
the ticket chosen through another mechanism (e.g., random-number generator, friend‟s 
selection). The high-anxiety group showed a stronger preference for personally 
choosing the ticket, which implied that they considered their actions more effective. 
Further replications of this effect are required. 
1.14. Summary 
Over a dozen influences on control perceptions in tasks with random outcomes have 
been identified based on empirical results. Findings concerning the effects of choice 16 
 
and physical involvement appear particularly robust, as is also the case with need for 
the outcome and depression in interaction with success-frequency. The effects of 
personality factors and anxiety, on the other hand, have received considerably little 
attention, partly because, within Langer‟s overarching paradigm, the illusion of control 
is considered a general effect. The extent to which the other identified influences are 
real also requires further investigation, since all have been investigated in only a 
handful of studies. 
Success-frequency and success-slope stand out as factors whose effects remain 
ambiguous. The ambiguity is due to the potential confounding of perceived control 
with remembered success-frequency, and, in the case of success-slope, there is also the 
issue of conflicting findings. For stimulus familiarity and foreknowledge, there is the 
question of whether their presence increases the illusion of control, or whether their 
absence gives rise to suspicion, which, in turn, lowers perceived control levels. The 
effects of opportunity for practice are also ambiguous because, in being instructed to 
practice, participants could come to think that the experimenter believes or knows the 
task to be controllable. 
2. Psychological processes: attempted explanations 
As noted earlier, Langer (1975) proposed that the illusion of control increases with the 
amount of choice, physical involvement, stimulus familiarity, thinking time, practice 
and competition because these are features of skilled tasks that encourage strategic 
thinking and behaviour when present in games of chance. A limitation of this 
explanation is that it is unclear why participants in Langer‟s lottery-style experimental 
tasks did not conclude that no effective strategies exist, regardless of their 
experimental condition. After all, in lotteries, the number of possible actions is highly 
limited. Research on factors influencing the illusion of control has formed the basis for 
other explanations of the psychological processes underlying the illusion. This section 
summarises the rationales and limitations of these explanations. 
Langer provided a supplementary „motivational‟ explanation of her findings, 
arguing that people ignore the chance elements of all tasks (not just games of chance) 
because broader ego-protective mechanisms motivate people to generally perceive 
actions as being effective in obtaining a desired outcome. Langer did not make clear 17 
 
why the motivation for control should result in greater neglect of chance features in the 
presence of particular task features (choice, physical involvement, etc.), but subsequent 
theorists made a suggestion in this respect (Cummins & Nistico, 2002; Friedland, 
Kienan & Regev, 1992; Leotti, Iyengar & Ochsner, 2010). These theorists point out 
that lotteries of the kind investigated by Langer offered no opportunities for action, 
except through ticket choice. Thus, the ego-protective mechanisms operated only in the 
choice group, giving rise to an illusion of control in that group. The theorists have 
gone further in pointing out that, although Langer distinguished between opportunity 
for choice and other factors, many of the factors she investigated were, in fact, vehicles 
for action in the same way that choice is. Extra physical involvement, stimulus 
familiarity, thinking time, practice, competition and foreknowledge all provide 
opportunities for action where none exists. Unfortunately, a key limitation of this 
explanation is that some of Langer‟s lotteries and many other experimental tasks 
permitted some action before the introduction of choice and related factors. For 
example, physical involvement had an effect in a roulette task where participants could 
already choose numbers to bet on (Ladouceur & Mayrand, 1987). In other words, 
giving people an opportunity to take actions might increase the likelihood of control 
being inferred via motivational mechanisms, but motivational mechanisms cannot 
account for why the number of action alternatives also influences perceived control. 
Another explanation of influencing factors that focuses on Langer‟s original 
lottery studies attributes participants‟ reluctance to exchange tickets for ones with 
better odds to anticipated regret if an exchanged ticket were to win (Bar-Hillel & 
Neter, 1996; van de Ven & Zeelenberg, 2011). Being allowed to choose the lottery 
ticket, in turn, makes the anticipated regret and subsequent degree of reluctance to 
trade even stronger (Risen & Gilovich, 2007). Problematically, this explanation applies 
only to the limited range of Langer‟s original experiments that used preparedness to 
exchange tickets as the dependent variable. 
An alternative explanatory approach has focused on the success-frequency 
effect and its disappearance among depressed individuals. According to this approach, 
the success-frequency effect is an instance of causal learning (Crocker, 1981; Jenkins 
& Ward, 1965). Causal learning involves forming a conclusion about whether a 
candidate cause and an outcome are causally related. The conclusion is made following 18 
 
some experience with a sequence of the events occurring together and separately. In 
laboratory experiments, the conclusion is made based on presented information (e.g., 
in a table) about the number of times the candidate cause and effect co-occur, the 
number of times they are mutually absent, and the number of times they occur 
separately. When, objectively, there is no causal relationship between the candidate 
cause and effect (i.e., when their co-occurrence rate is equal to the rate at which the 
effect occurs on its own), people have still been found to infer a causal relationship, 
with stronger inferences accompanying increasing co-occurrence frequency.  
Several explanations of this judgement pattern have been developed – and all 
suggest that it is a by-product of broader adaptive ways in which people reason about 
causal relationships (Griffiths & Tenenbaum, 2005; Oaksford & Chater, 1994, 2001). 
In a similar vein, the effect of success-frequency has also been described as a 
conditioning effect (e.g., Matute, Vadillo, Vegas & Blanco, 2007; Rudski, Lischner & 
Albert, 1999). Whatever the exact etiology of the success-frequency effect, its non-
occurrence in depressed individuals may be influenced by the depressed participants‟ 
disinterest in responding in the button-and-light task. Depressed participants press the 
button fewer times, and therefore experience fewer instances of press-light co-
occurrence, which drives both causal learning and conditioning (Blanco, Matute & 
Vadillo, 2009; Matute, 1996).  
Finally, a recent „control heuristic‟ explanation of the illusion of control 
proceeds from the assumption that the illusion is a bias resulting from the use of a 
specialised heuristic for judging the degree of personal control over an outcome 
(Thompson, Armstrong & Thomas, 1998). The explanation posits that, whenever a 
judgement of control is required, contingency judgement patterns combine with ego-
protective considerations in driving the judge to look for confirming evidence of his 
effectiveness as an agent. The chief problem with this explanation is that it does not 
specify when judging the degree of personal control is an adaptive task for the 
cognitive system to perform (Chase, Hertwig & Gigerenzer, 1998). As a result, the 
explanation is silent on why participants in chance tasks make control judgements 
unless they are in an experiment and are asked to do so in a post-experimental 
questionnaire. Indeed, in most of Langer‟s studies and many other studies, explicit 
judgements of control were not required. The degree of illusion of control in these 19 
 
studies was extrapolated based on behavioural indices, such as bet amounts and 
preparedness to swap a lottery ticket for one with better winning odds. The control 
heuristic explanation does not account for why participants in these tasks were 
necessarily assessing their degree of control, with the degree of perceived control then 
being reflected in their behaviour.  
At any particular moment in time, behaviours and questionnaire-based control 
judgements in games of chance could reflect motivational processes, anticipated regret, 
causal learning, and certain heuristics. However, alone, each of these constructs is 
relevant to explaining only one or two of the factors found to influence the illusion of 
control. Moreover, the explanations often do not extend to particular experimental 
tasks. In the next section, we propose that a large proportion of the experimental 
findings relating to influences on the illusion of control can be accounted for if it is 
recognised that people engage in problem-solving as they try to obtain a gambling win. 
3. Psychological processes: a proposed explanation 
The explanation of the illusion of control advanced in this thesis expands on Langer‟s 
(1975) original explanation, and, in particular, Langer‟s proposal that people in 
gambling tasks engage in strategic thinking and behaviour. Langer suggested that the 
presence of certain task features (choice, physical involvement, etc.) results in an 
increased likelihood of strategic behaviour in gambling tasks. According to Langer, 
this is because choice, physical involvement and the other factors she investigated are 
features of skilled tasks and cause confusion as to whether the gambling task at hand 
might involve some skill. The explanation provided here draws on cognitive-science-
based research on problem-solving in making an alternative suggestion. According to 
the present explanation, in all tasks, including gambling, additional opportunities for 
choice, physical involvement, stimulus familiarity, thinking time, practice, 
competition, and foreknowledge imply an increase in the range of actions available for 
trial during strategising. This leads to more protracted strategic behaviour (Section 
3.1). The argument is then made that, to account for why increases in choice, physical 
involvement and so on, lead to substantial strategising even in lotteries, the influence 
of „background beliefs‟ on problem-solving needs to be recognised (Section 3.2). It is 
further argued that background beliefs of particular relevance in gambling settings are 20 
 
beliefs about supernatural agents such as God and luck (Section 3.3) and the gambler‟s 
fallacy, the widespread expectation that random outcomes self-correct even in the short 
term (Section 3.4). Thus, the proposed explanation accounts for findings relating to a 
wide range of influencing factors across a variety of experimental tasks. The explained 
findings include those relating to strength of belief in luck.  
3.1. The illusion of control as problem-solving 
It is possible that findings on some of the factors that influence the illusion of control 
reflect problem-solving in games of chance. Problem-solving is a search for an action 
that satisfies a goal or brings the goal state closer, and where action alternatives are 
evaluated through direct trial or mental simulation (e.g., Anderson, 1993). In a game of 
chance, the goal state is a sizeable win (Walker, 1992b). There are no effective action 
alternatives in games of chance, but increases in the number of different response 
alternatives can lead to increases in the number of actions that need to be evaluated 
before concluding that this is the case. Thus, amidst greater choice, all other things 
being equal, there is a longer period during which players continue to search. If 
measures of perceived action effectiveness (e.g., bet amounts, post-experimental 
judgements) are obtained at a point when participants with fewer action alternatives 
have exhausted their search, there is some likelihood that participants with more action 
alternatives are still in the process of searching. Participants still in the process of 
searching may then display greater relative perceived control because they are unsure 
about the effectiveness of a number of possible actions instead of being sure that no 
action is effective. Physical involvement, stimulus familiarity, thinking time, practice, 
competition and foreknowledge might also broaden the number of apparent action 
alternatives. Presumably, also, the length and thoroughness of the search for effective 
actions increases with increasing need for the outcome.  
A real-world illustration of the effect of adding action alternatives is provided 
by the scenario of two slot machine players. The players use slot machines that are 
identical in every respect, except in that one has a „progressive jackpot‟ feature 
(Delfabbro & LeCouteur, 2003). This feature is a stand-alone screen that displays a 
monetary figure that gradually increases over the course of play. Specifically, a small 
percentage of the player‟s bet amount in each round is added to the total. Winning the 
jackpot requires reaching a randomly-determined trigger point – that is, a particular 21 
 
monetary figure. After 100 rounds, the jackpot has not been won, neither player has 
won substantial money, and both players have exhausted the search for effective slot-
machine playing actions. The players are asked about the degree of control they 
perceive over the game. The player with the jackpot feature is likely to provide higher 
control estimates, as he is more likely to still be in the process of trialling the action of 
persevering so as to reach the jackpot trigger point.  
The problem-solving approach can also account for the effects of success-
frequency and Matute‟s (1995) isolated finding of greater perceived control following 
an ascending success-slope (i.e., late successes). As features of the experienced 
sequence of outcomes, success-frequency and success-slope serve as feedback on the 
effectiveness of chosen actions. Actions contiguous with high success-frequency 
could, thus, come to be considered problem solutions. A concentration of successes 
late in the session could come to be judged a result of successful action search in 
which ineffective alternatives were discarded over time. 
3.2. The role of background beliefs 
Although accounting for the majority of identified influences on the illusion of control, 
the problem-solving explanation is, in its present form, unable to account for why the 
illusion occurs in tasks where players have to evaluate few action alternatives. 
Langer‟s lotteries are a case in point. The only possible action in one of these lotteries 
was choosing a ticket with a particular symbol. After mentally simulating the effects of 
this action on the lottery result, why did participants not discard it as being ineffective?  
The answer may have something to do with the beliefs people hold about 
lotteries. In the problem-solving literature, background beliefs are defined as theories 
of the world that generate action alternatives for evaluation (Chi, Feltovich & Glaser, 
1981; Murphy & Medin, 1985; Tenenbaum, Griffiths & Niyogi, 2007; Thagard, 1992). 
Due to the influence of beliefs, generated alternatives can vary in type, number, or both 
simultaneously. Chi et al. (1981) demonstrated this in an experiment in which they 
varied background beliefs. Trained physicists were compared to novices in how they 
categorised a set of physics problems. Physicists created a small number of categories 
based on the Newtonian Laws required for solving the problems, whereas novices 
created a large number of categories on the basis of the problems‟ surface features, 22 
 
such as whether they referred to inclined planes. Thus, background beliefs influenced 
both the type and number of generated alternatives. In a lottery setting, background 
beliefs could cause the one available action alternative (e.g., choosing a ticket) to be 
considered effective. Alternatively, the beliefs could cause the action to be seen as 
more than one action, with the search between action alternatives therefore being more 
extensive. The beliefs could be common to all participants or differ across individuals, 
as in the physics example.  
Thus, to provide a more complete account of the illusion-of-control findings, 
the problem-solving explanation needs to incorporate a notion of generative 
background beliefs. To then make claims about the number and type of action 
alternatives generated by the beliefs, the explanation also needs to incorporate a notion 
of what the relevant beliefs might be and whether they differ across individuals. 
Potentially relevant beliefs are considered in the next two sub-sections.  
3.3. Beliefs about luck and the illusion of ‘secondary’ control 
Up to this point, the illusion of control has been defined as the perception of action-
outcome contingency following problem-solving in games of pure chance. As 
problem-solvers, gambling participants search among action alternatives for one that 
increases the probability of a profitable outcome. It is puzzling that the search persists 
even in lotteries, where there seem to be very few action alternatives. However, in 
problem-solving, the set of action alternatives is generated in line with background 
beliefs. Thus, to explain the illusion of control in a lottery environment, it might be 
necessary to explore the beliefs people bring to lottery settings.  
Empirical evidence that beliefs about luck are one type of belief people bring to 
lotteries is among the body of findings relating to the illusion of control. Wohl and 
Enzle (2002) noticed that lotteries are peculiar not only in that participation in them 
involves few actions, but also in that there is no physical mechanism connecting the 
actions to game outcomes. The researchers concluded that participants must believe in 
a non-physical connecting mechanism – „luck‟. Wohl and Enzle (2002, 2009) 
speculated that luck is non-physical in that it is believed to be a personal quality.  
One of Wohl and Enzle‟s experimental findings was consistent with this 
proposal. The presence of a gaming partner who described herself as lucky caused 23 
 
participants to ask her to choose a lottery ticket on their behalf and, subsequently, to 
have greater confidence in winning (Wohl & Enzle, 2009). Another of Wohl and 
Enzle‟s findings, however, did not rule out the possibility that luck is also believed to 
be a force external to the individual. In the relevant study (Wohl & Enzle, 2002; Study 
1), manipulating the degree for choice in a lottery task had more effect on people with 
higher scores on the Belief in Good Luck scale, a measure of degree of belief in the 
power of luck as an external force (Darke & Freedman, 1997). It is also possible that 
participants appreciated ticket choice because they saw the choice as an opportunity to 
make use of personal luckiness.  
In a sense, Wohl and Enzle‟s findings are consistent with literature review 
work by Rothbaum, Weisz and Snyder (1982), who argued that that there are two types 
of illusion of control. The first, an illusion of „primary‟ control, is any attempt to bring 
about gambling wins through actions physically connected to them, whereas the 
illusion of „secondary control is the attempt to bring about gambling wins with the aid 
of non-physical “larger” forces, such as luck (p. 11). According to this view, people 
believe luck to be but one non-physical mechanism that could connect actions and 
outcomes. Other non-physical forces people might believe in are divine intervention 
and astrology. In effect, people attempt to influence outcomes by “aligning” 
themselves with these forces (p. 17). Alignment often involves some form of ritual 
(Wohl & Enzle, 2002). It follows, therefore, that providing people with greater 
opportunities for action in a task may allow for a greater range of magical beliefs to be 
applied and for a greater range of ritual actions to be performed. Rothbaum and 
colleagues argued that, in lotteries, stimulus familiarity and greater thinking time have 
exactly this effect. 
Rothbaum and colleagues acknowledged that stimulus familiarity and thinking 
time broaden opportunities for action in lottery tasks, facilitating magical actions 
aimed at alignment with larger non-physical forces. Meanwhile, Wohl and Enzle 
(2002; Studies 2 and 3) demonstrated this to be the case for physical involvement. For 
example, in one experiment, the numbers of a wheel-of-fortune were displayed on 
halves of ping-pong balls, and the game involved betting on one of the numbers by 
drawing a numbered ball from a bowl. The ball could then be brought back to the 
table, on which three other objects – a clipboard, a pencil, and an elastic band – were 24 
 
already positioned, as if by accident. Manipulated within subjects, across ten spins, 
was the outcome at stake. On half the spins it was one‟s own; on the other half it was 
one‟s opponent‟s. Video tapes of the participants‟ hands revealed that the ping-pong 
ball was handled significantly longer during the player‟s own turns and that this 
behaviour was not displayed towards the other objects. Thus, the opportunity for 
physical involvement – the opportunity to be in physical contact with the ping-pong 
ball while sitting at the table – facilitated magical actions that would not have been 
possible otherwise. 
In summary, a theoretical proposal by Rothbaum et al. (1982) and the recent 
work of Wohl and Enzle (2002, 2009) suggest that people have background beliefs 
concerning the influence of larger non-physical forces. These beliefs generate a 
number of action alternatives in lottery tasks, which, otherwise, appear to involve no 
action alternatives apart from ticket choice. Due to background beliefs in luck and 
God, praying for a win and performing devotional rituals are believed by some to be 
possible action alternatives in a lottery without ticket choice. The ability to make one‟s 
own ticket choices affords additional opportunities, including the exercise of personal 
luck and the ability to select from a range of lucky numbers or symbols. Beliefs could, 
further, dictate that alignment with these putative forces requires praying or 
performing rituals before choosing the ticket. Alignment could also involve using 
lucky signs to guide choice. With these additional action alternatives to consider, 
participants with ticket choices engage in more extensive problem-solving than those 
without. The same has been shown to be the case for participants with extra physical 
involvement. 
One might question whether such clearly erroneous beliefs are widespread 
enough to cause an effect as general as the illusion of control. But there is strong 
anthropological and archaeological evidence to suggest that such beliefs are a common 
feature of human societies (e.g., Felson & Gmelch, 1979; Risen & Gilovich, 2007). 
Indeed, it is likely that such beliefs have evolutionary or functional explanations. 
Although many beliefs are culture-specific or even specific to individuals, the wider 
literature on the nature of background beliefs suggests that beliefs varying across 
situations and individuals can still have communalities that derive from more abstract 
belief structures. These structures evolve directly or as side-effects of evolved 25 
 
cognitive capacities (Atran, Estin, Coley & Medin, 1997; Dennett, 1987; Wellman & 
Gelman, 1992). In fact, the literature defines a hierarchy of beliefs, with abstract belief 
structures common to all humans at the top, and highly situation-specific beliefs at the 
bottom. The abstract belief structures generate and constrain more situation-specific 
ones. For example, an abstract theory of mind is generally necessary before one is 
likely to start making inferences about the possibility of an opponent‟s bluffing in 
poker. Atran and Norenzayan (2004) identified an abstract belief structure that may 
generate beliefs about non-physical, or „supernatural‟
2, phenomenon. Moreover, these 
authors explained how such a structure might emerge as a side-effect of evolved 
emotional and cognitive capacities. The structure itself has three interacting 
components: (a) beliefs in omniscient supernatural agents (gods, ghosts, angels, luck 
etc.); (b) beliefs that these agents can avert death and other cataclysms; and (c) beliefs 
about rituals that can be used to appeal to the agents. Religious beliefs, superstitions, 
beliefs in lucky numbers, and beliefs in good luck being a personal quality of good 
people are all examples of less abstract beliefs constrained by this belief structure.  
A problem with this line of explanation is that it hinges on a theoretical rather 
than empirically supported proposal by Rothbaum and colleagues. Qualitative 
evidence of gamblers‟ appeals to luck and rituals is abundant (e.g., Henslin, 1967; 
King, 1990), but formal evidence for the existence of two illusory control variants is 
limited. The available evidence comes from factor analyses of two surveys in which 
respondents indicated their degree of agreement with statements expressing erroneous 
beliefs about gambling (Steenbergh, Meyers, May & Whelan, 2002; Wood & 
Clapham, 2005). The statements corresponded to expressions of the illusion of control, 
since they were sourced from interviews in which people who gamble regularly 
described the actions they considered effective when gambling. In both studies, two 
factors were uncovered, with one containing statements about non-physical 
phenomena – statements such as “I believe that fate is against me when I lose” and “I 
can improve my chances of winning by performing special rituals”. However, analyses 
of other surveys of this type did not uncover the same two-factor structure (Jefferson & 
Nicki, 2003; Raylu & Oei, 2004). To compare and evaluate the obtained factor 
                                                 
2 Atran and Norenzayan‟s (2004) formal definition of a supernatural entity is as an entity not directly 
classifiable as a „person‟, „plant‟, „animal‟, or „substance‟. That is, under this definition, supernatural 
entities are „counterintuitive‟ with respect to categories of ordinary ontology. The notion of an entity 
that can part seas without being physically solid is counterintuitive in this sense. 26 
 
structures, further insight into the nature of the illusion of primary control might be 
needed. Rothbaum and colleagues‟ proposal, as discussed so far, amounts to the 
proposal that the illusion of secondary control is a conclusion about action 
effectiveness in games of chance, driven by an abstract set of beliefs about 
supernatural phenomena. By implication, the illusion of primary control must be 
driven by belief structures about non-supernatural phenomena. It might be useful to 
consider whether the illusion is better defined simply as being driven by all belief 
structures about non-supernatural phenomena, or whether some belief structures are 
particularly relevant. This topic is discussed in the next sub-section. 
3.4. The gambler’s fallacy and the illusion of ‘primary’ control 
In a bid to explain the illusion of control in lotteries specifically, the preceding sub-
section concerned itself with beliefs about luck. It was concluded that that both theory 
and evidence point to these beliefs being very likely influenced by more abstract belief 
structures relating to supernatural agents such as God and fate. Attempts to work out 
how to succeed in the task (problem-solving) could, therefore, be informed by any of 
these beliefs and lead to the development of a particular kind of illusory of control – 
the illusion of secondary control. Can the same logic be applied to the illusion of 
primary control? That is, can abstract belief structures influencing it be identified? This 
thesis argues that one strong candidate belief structure is the well-known gambler‟s 
fallacy. The fallacy is the expectation that random sequences tend to self-correct even 
in the short-term, producing a „head‟ after a series of „tails‟ in a coin toss game, a „red‟ 
after a series of „blacks‟ in roulette, and a win after a series of losses on slot machines. 
The gambler‟s fallacy is likely to be a defining feature of the illusion of primary 
control because, as argued below, it is an abstract belief about gambling and random 
sequences that is not directly concerned with supernatural agents. 
One reason that the fallacy can be considered an abstract belief about gambling 
is that a large number of studies point to it being unavoidable in tasks where outcomes 
are described to participants as random. Specifically, over 40 laboratory studies on the 
identification and production of random binary sequences (e.g., sequences of Heads 
and Tails) have shown that people associate randomness with a long-run outcome 
alternation probability of .6, even though, objectively, random binary sequences have 
an alternation probability of .5. For example, in randomness-identification tasks, 27 
 
people label less-alternating strings such as HTHHHHHH non-random. The 
association between randomness and alternation is not so strong that perfectly 
alternating strings such as HTHTHTHT are judged to be random. Rather, people 
display an expectation of negative recency – that is, an expectation that the probability 
of alternation increases with each repetition (for reviews, see Nickerson, 2002, and 
Oskarsson, Van Boven, Hastie, & McClelland, 2009). The universality of a negative 
recency expectation for random sequences is further corroborated by studies of 
gambling activity. In lotteries, drawn-out numbers have been found to drop in 
popularity (Clotfelter & Cook, 1991, 1993; Terrell, 1994). Blackjack players have 
reported that they prefer playing on two „boxes‟, as they expect poor outcomes on one 
to be balanced out by favourable outcomes on the other (Keren & Wagenaar, 1985). 
When participants were asked to speak aloud their thoughts during laboratory 
gambling sessions on slot-machines, roulette and blackjack, approximately 60 percent 
reported expecting a certain outcome because „it hadn‟t come up lately‟ (Baboushkin, 
Hardoon, Derevenky & Gupta, 2001).  
The gambler‟s fallacy is also implied to be unavoidable, and, therefore, 
abstract, by theories of why it arises. Estes (1964) proposed the fallacy to be a product 
of a more abstract rational belief that many real-world outcomes follow a law of 
sampling without replacement. A harvested crop, for example, contains only a finite 
number of defective specimens. Tversky and Kahneman (1974) suggested that the 
gambler‟s fallacy is a product of a belief in the fairness of long-run random sequences. 
This belief is not fallacious, but a fallacy arises through the largely inevitable 
(heuristic) reasoning that smaller samples (in this case, shorter random sequences) 
possess the essential properties of the parent population (in this case, longer random 
sequences). According to a still different proposal by Hahn and Warren (2009), the 
gambler‟s fallacy is an inevitable result of having a limited working memory and only 
ever experiencing finite sequences of random events (e.g., 20 rolls of a die in a board 
game). Notably, the last two explanations pre-suppose that random sequences are 
identified to people through formal instruction, which is likely to occur only in 
developed societies (Aubert, 1959; Bork, 1967). Nevertheless, all explanations attest to 
the gambler‟s fallacy being unavoidable amongst participants in Western games of 
chance. 28 
 
As an abstract (i.e., unavoidable) belief in gambling settings, the gambler‟s 
fallacy could engender the illusion of control in a similar manner to how abstract 
beliefs about supernatural forces make people prone to the illusion of secondary 
control. That is, it could generate beliefs about what lottery numbers to choose (ones 
that have not been drawn out for some time), what slot machines to choose (ones that 
have not produced a win for some time), how long to play for, and so on. These beliefs 
could, in turn, generate specific action plans to be evaluated during problem-solving.  
As a belief about chance, a non-supernatural phenomenon, the gambler‟s 
fallacy is an obvious candidate for being one of the belief structures underlying the 
illusion of primary control. Up to this point, the illusion of primary control has been 
defined as an action-outcome contingency perception informed by all beliefs except 
beliefs about supernatural agents and forces. With the gambler‟s fallacy added as an 
explanatory construct, the illusion of primary control can now be defined as a 
perception of action-outcome contingency arising from the gambler‟s fallacy or other 
non-supernatural beliefs in a game of chance. Examples of control perceptions 
informed by the gambler‟s fallacy have been discussed throughout this section, and 
include beliefs in the effectiveness of selecting lottery and roulette numbers that have 
not been drawn out recently, and playing on two boxes in blackjack in expectation that 
they will „balance‟ each other out. An example of control perceptions informed by 
other beliefs about physical phenomena is the belief that slot machines should not be 
played during „peak‟ gambling times such as public holidays because the machines are 
programmed to pay out less on such days (Livingstone, Wooley & Borrell, 2006).  
The previous sub-section concluded with the suggestion that insight into the 
nature of the illusion of primary control could represent a step forward in formally 
testing Rothbaum and colleagues‟ proposal that the illusion of control has two variants. 
Some existing factor analyses of surveys where items express the illusion of control 
have revealed two underlying factors (Steenbergh et al., 2002; Wood & Clapham, 
2005), but others have not (Jefferson & Nicki, 2003; Raylu & Oei, 2004). Given the 
present additional clarification regarding the nature of the illusion of primary control, it 
might be possible to explain why some surveys did not lend themselves to a two-factor 
structure. For example, in Jefferson and Nicki‟s (2003) survey, most items reflected 29 
 
the gambler‟s fallacy, so it is unsurprising that a factor analysis identified only a single 
factor.  
The present additional clarification regarding the abstract beliefs underlying the 
illusion of primary control might also make some of the structures produced by factor 
analyses of erroneous-beliefs surveys more interpretable. For example, Steenbergh and 
colleagues (2002) uncovered a two-factor structure in which one factor was defined by 
statements reflective of the illusion of primary control (e.g., “My knowledge and skill 
in gambling contribute to the likelihood that I will make money”) and the other was 
defined by beliefs about „luck‟ and the value of „perseverance‟. On the face of it, luck 
and perseverance do not seem related. Beliefs in luck reflect the illusion of secondary 
control, whereas beliefs in the value of perseverance seem to follow from the 
gambler‟s fallacy and hence reflect the illusion of primary control. However, under the 
present explanation of the illusions of primary and secondary control, it is possible 
that, as an abstract belief, the gambler‟s fallacy might combine with beliefs about the 
supernatural in informing some aspects of the illusion of secondary control. Namely, it 
might combine with abstract supernatural beliefs in shaping the belief that luck, a 
supernatural force associated with games of chance, acts in accordance with supposed 
laws of chance, never allowing cycles of bad or good outcomes to continue for long. 
This belief in the cyclical nature of luck has been widely documented (e.g., Duong & 
Ohtsuka, 2000; Keren & Wagenaar, 1985). The „Luck/Perseverance‟ factor identified 
by Steenbergh and colleagues might capture this belief in the cyclical properties of 
luck alongside other beliefs about the supernatural elements of games of chance. 
3.5. Summarising the proposed explanation 
According to the present explanation for the body of findings on the illusion of control, 
some of the findings can be explained simply by assuming that judgements and 
behaviours indicating control perceptions are preceded by a problem-solving process. 
At the time the judgements and behaviours are assessed, the problem-solving process, 
a process of searching for an effective action, is not necessarily complete. If at the time 
of measurement the participant is still in search of an effective action, or believing to 
have found it, her judgements and behaviours convey a perception of control. Choice, 
physical involvement, thinking time, practice, need for the outcome, and 
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action alternatives available for the search. Participants experiencing higher levels of 
these factors are more likely than the comparison group to still be searching for an 
effective action at the time of control perception measurement. Other factors – namely, 
success-frequency and success-slope – can enhance the perceived effectiveness of the 
alternative being trialled at the time of control perception measurement. Participants 
experiencing high success-frequencies or an ascending success-slope are more likely 
than the comparison group to believe in having found an effective action at that point. 
Additional constructs – namely, belief constructs – are needed to explain the 
observed effects of choice and other action-broadening factors in lotteries. It is difficult 
to see how search length could vary substantially across groups in these contexts 
because they appear to allow for few actions on the participant‟s part. The present 
explanation proposes that people have an evolved set of beliefs about supernatural 
phenomena, which cause them to see numerous action alternatives in lotteries. The 
beliefs also inform problem-solving in other gambling tasks and outside the gambling 
context (e.g., common superstitions). In gambling tasks, there is also an unavoidable 
belief in the negative recency of chance outcomes – the gambler‟s fallacy – and this 
can drive people to recognise selecting numbers/options that have not won in some 
time as a potentially effective action. Beliefs about other non-supernatural phenomena 
(e.g., computer technology) can also influence the actions considered during gambling 
problem-solving. The illusion of control is, therefore, in line with a proposal by 
Rothbaum, Weisz and Snyder (1982), defined as having two variants – primary and 
secondary. If the actions considered and not discarded during action search are based 
on non-supernatural beliefs, including the gambler‟s fallacy, an illusion of primary 
control is captured by the perceived control measures. If, at the time of control 
perception measurement, some of the actions being considered are informed by 
supernatural beliefs, there is an illusion of secondary control. The two illusions can 
occur simultaneously or in isolation.  
4. Research directions 
The empirical findings on factors influencing the illusion of control leave open a 
number of research questions, summarised in Section 1.14. This section outlines these 
research questions in some detail (Section 4.1) before specifying methodological 31 
 
guidelines for addressing them – guidelines based on the proposed psychological 
explanation of the illusion of control (Section 4.2). As a final possible research 
direction, Section 4.3 discusses possible approaches to testing the psychological 
explanation‟s hypotheses regarding the problem-solving and abstract beliefs 
underlying the illusion of control.  
4.1. Influences on the illusion of control 
As indicated in Section 1.14 above, the main questions raised by the body of research 
on factors influencing the illusion of control relate to the effects of success-frequency 
and success-slope. In relation to success-frequency, the question is whether the factor 
is an influence at all. In the studies that have demonstrated increases in perceived 
control with increasing success-frequency, perceived control has consistently been 
measured using a direct reference to „control‟, a term that has been found to be 
interpreted to mean „rate of success‟ (Jenkins & Ward, 1965). The finding of 
increasing control estimates with increasing success-frequency, therefore, potentially 
reflects simply a greater number of remembered successes with increases in the 
objective success rate. To assess whether inferences of control are affected by success-
frequency, it is necessary to compare different success frequencies on a perceived 
control measure that does not directly refer to „control‟.  
In relation to success-slope, conflicting findings create uncertainty not only as 
to whether success-slope is an influence, but also as to which success-slopes result in 
greater perceived control. Four studies have suggested that it is the „descending‟ slope 
(early successes), whereas a study by Matute (1995) points to the „ascending‟ slope 
(late successes). A problem with the former set of studies is that they used estimates of 
remembered success-frequency as proxies for perceived control. The studies might 
have, therefore, found evidence of a memory-based primacy effect, rather than 
evidence of the „descending‟ slope‟s augmentation of perceived control. To determine 
whether success-slope is an influence on perceived control and whether perceived 
control increases following a „descending‟ slope, „ascending‟ slope, or both, further 
studies need to be conducted using a dependent measure capturing perceived control. 
For most other identified influences, the associated evidence of their effects is 
so scant that there is a need for studies aimed at replicating the effects. Studies 32 
 
concerned with the effects of stimulus familiarity, foreknowledge and practice would 
have additional issues to consider. For example, investigations of stimulus familiarity 
and foreknowledge could additionally explore the role of suspicion about the game‟s 
fairness, whereas investigations of practice could seek to minimise the potential 
demand effects associated with issuing instructions to practice or practice more 
extensively.  
Broadly speaking, there is a need for research that uses appropriate dependent 
measures in replicating existing findings about the factors that influence the illusion of 
control.  
4.2. Underlying psychological processes: methodological 
implications for research on influencing factors  
Most of the research questions discussed above call for further studies into whether 
certain factors (e.g.., success-frequency and success-slope) indeed influence the 
illusion of control. The present explanation of the psychological processes underlying 
the illusion of control (see Section 3) has a number of implications for how any such 
study should be designed to elicit and measure both variants of the illusion. The 
explanation‟s main methodological guideline has to do with the recognisability of the 
experimental task and the associated instructional set. Experimental studies of factors 
influencing the illusion have differed in terms of task recognisability, such that, for 
example, in the set of studies on success-slope effects, four studies featured an 
experimental task with a recognisable gambling format (coin-tossing), while one 
featured a novel task in which it was explained to participants that they might be able 
to terminate an unpleasant noise by pressing the correct combination of keyboard keys 
(Matute, 1995). Instructions explaining the purpose of the task are an essential feature 
of novel experimental tasks. Arguably, any such instructions limit the extent to which 
participants apply beliefs about supernatural forces and the gambler‟s fallacy – beliefs 
that are, according to the present psychological explanation, defining features of the 
illusion‟s two variants.  
To expand on this argument, three kinds of designs have been used in studies 
of the illusion‟s influencing factors: (a) designs featuring experimental tasks with a 
recognisable gambling format (e.g., lotteries, roulette, slot machines), (b) designs 33 
 
featuring novel experimental tasks and „outcome-seeking‟ instructions, and (c) designs 
featuring experimental tasks and „contingency-detection‟ instructions. Instructions 
specify the participant‟s goal in the experimental task. In a recognisable gambling task, 
instructions are not necessary because the goal is clearly to obtain the target outcome – 
a match between one‟s ticket and the drawn-out ticket, for example. In novel tasks, 
such as those involving a box with a switch or a never-before-seen computer program, 
the goal of the task requires specification. „Outcome-seeking‟ instructions define the 
aim of the task as the maximisation of a target outcome. Alternatively, „contingency-
detection‟ instructions introduce the task as one in which the participant should seek to 
accurately determine the degree of control he possesses over some aspect of the 
apparatus
3. Contingency-detection instructions have been used only in success-
frequency studies, and the instructional set quoted in describing those studies is an 
example (see Section 1.6). The following is an example of outcome-seeking 
instructions:  
From now on, imagine that numbers 1, 2, and 3 are the only keys in the keyboard. 
From time to time, a loud tone will come on for a while. Try to find the way to stop it. 
You may either type a number or do nothing. If your response is a number, it can have 
1 or 2 digits, but the same digit cannot appear in it twice (Matute, 1995, p. 146; for 
other examples, see Blanco, Matute & Vadillo, 2009, 2011, and Rudski, Lischer & 
Albert, 1999). 
The problem with outcome-seeking instructions is that they tend to imply that the 
experimental task is designed around a definite strategy for obtaining the target 
outcome. To the extent that participants interpret the instructions this way, they 
proceed to try to solve the problem without entertaining the possibility that outcomes 
are chance-based. Thus, outcome-seeking instructions result in participants being less 
likely to apply gambler‟s fallacy logic or beliefs about supernatural forces. Since, as 
was argued in Section 3, the gambler‟s fallacy and beliefs about supernatural forces are 
defining components of the illusion of control, participants who receive outcome-
seeking instructions might not display the illusion of control in any meaningful sense. 
Contingency-detection instructions have the same effect as a result of defining the task 
very explicitly, specifying the method by which control might be achieved (e.g., a 
                                                 
3 Alternative terms for the outcome-seeking and contingency-detection instructional sets are 
„naturalistic‟ and „analytic‟, respectively (Matute, 1996).  34 
 
single button press; see Section 1.6). Overall, the present explanation suggests that task 
instructions should be avoided, and this can be achieved through the use of 
recognisable task formats.  
Another methodological issue brought to light by the present explanation of 
psychological processes underlying the illusion of control is that single-scale measures 
of perceived control, such as Langer‟s question about performance relative to a 
champion chess player (see Section 1.4), might have been conceptually confusing for 
participants. If people have abstract deep-seated beliefs about possible supernatural 
actions, this possibility has to be acknowledged by measuring the illusions of primary 
and secondary control separately. Where measures have not referred to action-outcome 
contingency, relying instead on self-report-based or behavioural measures of 
confidence in winning, construct validity would not be such a problem. 
The present explanation of the psychological mechanisms underlying the 
illusion of control also proposes that people adopt a problem-solving orientation in 
gambling tasks. The methodological implication of this proposal for studies on factors 
influencing the illusion is that post-experimental questions about the effectiveness of 
various listed action types (e.g., Hong & Chiu, 1988; Rudski, Lischner & Albert, 1999) 
are more intuitive to answer than questions requiring single global judgements about 
the task‟s controllability (e.g., Burger, 1986). If people evaluate numerous action 
alternatives throughout the session and are still in the process of searching at the 
moment the post-experimental questionnaire is presented, the listing format should 
more closely match the contents of the participants‟ working memory at that moment. 
4.3. Underlying psychological processes: testing the present 
explanation 
The present explanation of the psychological processes underlying the illusion of 
control presented in Section 3 is only speculative. To properly justify the 
methodological guidelines discussed above and provide a genuine test of the advanced 
explanation, more research consistent with a number of the arguments developed in 
Section 3 is needed. Firstly, there is a need for evidence which shows that gambling 
involves problem-solving. Secondly, it remains to be shown that the illusion of control 35 
 
has two variants, reflecting abstract beliefs about supernatural agents and the 
gambler‟s fallacy, respectively.  
A piece of supporting evidence for the first proposal would be a finding of 
greater perceived control in the ascending success-slope condition relative to one or 
more other conditions. Such a finding would suggest that games of chance are believed 
to be problem-solving environments in which it is possible to learn the correct 
response through trial-and-error. 
For the explanation‟s second proposal, a proposal about the two variants of the 
illusion of control, a testing procedure was discussed in Sections 3.3 and 3.4. The 
procedure involves factor-analysing a survey about erroneous gambling-related beliefs 
– that is, a survey in which items reflect (illusory) problem-solving solutions arrived at 
by people who gamble regularly. If the proposal is correct, it should be possible to 
classify each survey item with regard to whether it reflects (1) the gambler‟s fallacy, 
(2) other non-supernatural beliefs (e.g., about venue operators intervening with slot 
machines), (3) beliefs about luck and other supernatural agents, or (4) a meaningful 
combination of these (e.g., the belief that luck is cyclical; see Section 3.4). Various 
factor-analytic techniques can be used to determine the category membership of each 
item. 
5. This research programme 
One of the central aims of the research programme described in this thesis was to 
develop a research methodology consistent with the theoretically-motivated 
methodological guidelines discussed above. Accordingly, we designed a computerised 
experimental task with recognisable slot-machine features but also some novel features 
that would make findings more generalisable to other gambling tasks. In addition, we 
developed a method for measuring the illusions of primary and secondary control 
separately using the recommended „listed actions‟ approach. The methodology was 
then applied to re-examining the contentious effects of success-frequency (Paper 1) 
and success-slope (Paper 2). The investigation of success-slope effects was also 
expected to provide a partial test of the theoretical explanation underpinning the 
methodology. A finding of greater perceived control following an increasing success 36 
 
rate (ascending success-slope) would support the explanation‟s hypothesis that people 
engage in problem-solving and trial-and-error learning in gambling contexts. 
A third paper tested the explanation‟s other hypothesis, the hypothesis that the 
illusion of control has two variants: the illusion of primary control, driven by the 
gambler‟s fallacy, and the illusion of secondary control, driven by abstract beliefs 
about supernatural agents. The test involved the factor-analysis of a survey of 
erroneous gambling-related beliefs. Figure 1.1 summarises the relationship between 
the literature on factors influencing the illusion of control, our explanation of the 
psychological processes giving rise to these findings, and the present research 
programme. 
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Figure 1.1. The present research programme in the context of findings on factors 
influencing the illusion of control 
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CHAPTER 2: Exegesis 
Chapter 1 reviewed existing findings on the illusion of control, focusing largely on 
factors that are thought to influence the strength of the illusion. Since some of the 
investigated factors have been shown to exert influence in only a handful of studies, 
further studies are needed in many cases. In particular need of replication are studies 
identifying increases in the strength of the illusion with increasing success-frequency 
and a descending success-slope. Not only are more studies needed to confirm these 
findings, but success-frequency and success-slope both have an effect on the 
remembered number of successes, a phenomenon different from perceived control yet 
typically measured as a proxy for perceived control in studies of all potential 
influencing factors. Notably, the influence of choice and physical involvement and 
need for the outcome has been confirmed in a substantial number of studies. In the 
later parts of Chapter 1, these findings were used as a basis for making hypotheses 
about the psychological processes underlying the illusion of control. It was proposed 
that (a) people very likely adopt a problem-solving orientation when gambling, and (b) 
that the illusion of control very likely comprises two variants: one in which problem-
solving is driven by beliefs about supernatural forces such as luck (the illusion of 
secondary control) and another in which problem solutions are informed by other prior 
beliefs, including expectations about the sequencing of outcomes in line with the 
gambler‟s fallacy (the illusion of primary control). This explanation of the 
psychological processes underlying the illusion of control is a source of 
methodological guidelines for replicating the effects of any identified influence. For 
example, it implies that the illusions of primary and secondary control should be 
measured separately. 
This exegesis begins with an outline of an experimental procedure developed to 
meet the aforementioned methodological guidelines (Section 1). As the subsequent 
sections describe, the procedure was then applied in investigating the effects of 
success-frequency (Paper 1) and success-slope (Paper 2). Paper 2 served the additional 
purpose of testing the psychological-process explanation‟s first hypothesis that people 
adopt a problem-solving orientation when gambling. The third paper, described in 
Section 4, concerned itself with finding evidence for the explanation‟s other hypothesis 
that the illusion of control has two variants reflecting two different abstract belief 39 
 
structures – the gambler‟s fallacy and beliefs about supernatural agents and forces. As 
recommended in Chapter 1, the test involved administering a survey about erroneous 
gambling-related beliefs and then analysing relationships between types of items 
within that survey. Two broader constructs corresponding to the illusions of primary 
and secondary control were expected to emerge, with items reflecting the gambler‟s 
fallacy and beliefs in supernatural phenomena, respectively. The final section of this 
exegesis (Section 5) highlights minor theoretical and terminological discontinuities 
across papers. 
1. The theoretically-motivated methodology of Papers 1 and 2 
The explanation of the illusion of control outlined in Chapter 1 offers three 
methodological guidelines for investigating influences on the illusion of control. The 
first is that the hypothesised influence should be manipulated within a recognisable 
gambling task, since task instructions accompanying novel tasks can severely limit 
problem-solving and the extent to which problem-solving might be informed by the 
gambler‟s fallacy and beliefs in supernatural forces. The second methodological 
guideline is that the illusions of primary and secondary control should be measured 
separately in any self-report-based measures of perceived control. The explanation‟s 
third methodological implication also relates to the measurement of perceived control. 
It is the recommendation that the measure consist of multiple items, each enquiring 
about the effectiveness of a particular action possible within the gambling task. This 
section describes an experimental task, perceived control measure and experimental 
procedure designed to accommodate these methodological constraints. 
1.1. Experimental task: recognisable with novel elements 
A computerised experimental task was designed to be recognisable as a slot-machine-
type game. Slot machine gaming involves betting a certain number of „credits‟ on the 
possibility that some spinning card reels will produce a line of identical card faces 
once they stop. Players have the option of adjusting the number of lines they bet on, 
while also receiving free spins for certain symbol combinations. Some machines also 
feature „bonus games‟, which offer players additional choices, with free spins and 
jackpots as rewards. For example, in a bonus game on the Queen of the Nile machine, 40 
 
the participant can double any win by guessing the colour of a card. The win can be 
quadrupled by guessing the card‟s suit (Williamson & Walker, 2000). 
In the designed experimental task, each trial involved placing a bet on a 
pictured soccer player scoring from a free kick, with an animation showing whether 
the kick resulted in a goal or a miss. Upon confirmation of the outcome and adjustment 
of the credit count, the participant commenced the next trial. Figure 2.1 illustrates the 
first trial of the game, showing the game‟s interface on a series of „screens‟. On this 
first trial, the participant was required to choose the identity of the kicking player from 
four possible „player profiles‟ (Screen 1). This choice (which could be changed at any 
time), and the kick direction choices that were compulsory in each trial (Screen 3) 
resembled the choices required in slot-machine bonus games. Another respect in which 
the task resembled a slot machine is that participants had the option of betting on the 
results of multiple trials, betting on the player scoring once in the next two trials, for 
example (Screen 2). The analogous feature in slot-machine gambling is being able to 
bet on varying numbers of lines. Repeated sounds of applause (accompanying every 
goal and „welcoming‟ the new player onto the field after a player profile change) were 
designed to mirror the sounds heard during slot machine play. Furthermore, slot 
machines are designed to feature high rates of „near wins‟ – situations where only one 
reel has a different card face from the others. Correspondingly, in this task, the 
animations of the kick‟s result were designed in such a way that outcomes involving a 
miss were more often close misses saved by the goalkeeper than far misses falling 
outside the goalposts. In a final point of correspondence, outcomes were randomly 
determined, with bet and win-amounts for each betting option being calibrated to 
provide a long-term return rate of -10%, the return rate on South Australian slot 
machines. That is, for any bet participants could place, the win-amount was 10% less 
than it should have been if the game were completely fair.  
While being analogous to slot machine play in many ways, the task was 
partially novel in that it did not literally feature spinning card reels. The novelty 
enabled any problem-solving engaged in during the task to be more independent of 
beliefs formed during prior experiences with slot-machine gambling. The results were, 
therefore, more generalisable to other gambling tasks. 41 
 
Figure 2.1. The first trial of the experimental task 42 
 
1.2. Measure of illusory primary and secondary control 
As outlined in Chapter 1, it follows from the developed explanation of the illusion of 
control that any questions about perceived control administered at the end of the 
experimental session should (a) enquire about the illusions of primary and secondary 
control separately, and (b) provide a list of possible action alternatives, enquiring about 
the effectiveness of each one. To meet these constraints, a list of possible actions in the 
experimental task was compiled, and participants‟ ratings of the actions‟ effectiveness 
were factor-analysed to determine whether pooled ratings for primary-control-type 
actions could be obtained separately from pooled ratings for secondary-control-type 
actions. In other words, participants‟ ratings of the effectiveness of various action 
alternatives served as observed variables in a factor analysis aimed at extracting 
measures of illusory primary and secondary control. This sub-section describes the list 
of actions and the factor analysis procedure. 
The list of actions comprising the post-experimental perceived control measure 
consisted of references to strategies and practice, references to interaction with the 
physical features of the experimental task (computer, player profiles, the goalkeeper 
etc.), and references to luck and deservingness, drawn from interviews with people 
who gamble regularly (Henslin, 1967; Keren & Wagenaar, 1985; King, 1990). The 
exact statements presented to participants are listed below. Participants rated each 
statement on a scale from 0 to 10 to indicate whether they considered it a description 
of the reason for successes obtained in the task:  
I got better with practice. 
I developed a logical strategy for playing the game. 
Experience at playing computer games 
My skill in playing the game 
I learned how to predict the movements of the goalkeeper. 
My knowledge of soccer 
The player(s) I chose 
The kick directions I chose 
The bet options I chose 
I deserved to win. 
I took advantage of moments when my luck was good. 
I've always been a lucky kind of person. 43 
 
A certain lucky way of playing just seemed to work for me. 
I knew how to make luck go my way.  
It was all chance. 
 
Statements relating to strategies and physical game features (Statements 1-9
4) were 
intended to provide an opportunity for expressing the illusion of primary control, while 
statements about luck and deservingness (Statements 10-14) were designed to gauge 
the illusion of secondary control. The objectively accurate statement “It was all 
chance” (15) was included to indicate to participants that they were not necessarily 
expected to account for successes in terms of personal control.  
The factor analysis aimed at creating dependent measures of illusory primary 
and secondary control was preceded by a screening procedure. As part of this, each 
statement was examined for whether it received a disproportionately high number of 
zero ratings compared to other statements. In both Paper 1 and Paper 2, no statements 
were problematic in this regard. The second part of the screening involved examining 
each statement for whether non-zero ratings on it correlated with responses to other 
statements. This part of the procedure was directed at identifying invalid (i.e., poorly 
worded) statements while taking into account the high number of „zero‟ ratings 
provided by any participants who agreed with only a small selection of the statements. 
Statements whose non-zero ratings correlated with responses on few other statements 
were excluded from subsequent factor analysis, although, in Paper 1, the „It was all 
chance‟ statement was retained despite the fact that it fulfilled these exclusion criteria. 
This oversight did not occur in Paper 2 and, for Paper 1, was corrected in Appendix 3B 
(see Section 5.1 for further comments). For the retained statements, exploratory factor 
analysis involved using the mineigen, scree test and parallel analysis methods to 
determine how many factors to extract (e.g., Hayton, Allen & Scarpello, 2004). Broad 
support for a two-factor solution reflecting the illusions of primary control and 
secondary control was obtained in both papers, such that statements 1-4 (about 
practice, strategy use, computer games and skill) consistently loaded on one factor 
while statements 10-14 (about luck) loaded on another. For statements defining each 
factor, ratings were pooled to create measures of illusory primary and secondary 
control. 
                                                 
4 Statements 8 and 9 were only added to the set in Paper 2. 44 
 
1.3. Experimental procedure 
The developed task and measure constrained the experimental procedure in a number 
of ways. Firstly, to ensure that the partially novel experimental task was recognisable 
as a game of chance, task instructions had to emphasise that the task operated on the 
same principles as a slot machine (for exact wording, see Appendix 4A.2).  
Secondly, given the task‟s slot-machine elements and soccer theme, it was 
necessary to control for existing beliefs about gambling and soccer when examining 
perceived control across experimental conditions. These beliefs were measured in a 
pre-experimental questionnaire, using the Drake Beliefs About Chance Inventory 
(DBC; Wood & Clapham, 2005) and a five-point soccer interest scale (see Appendix 
4A.1). With scores on these measures as covariates in the main analyses, it was 
possible to account for variance in perceived control due to, for example, strong prior 
beliefs in the uncontrollability of all games of chance – beliefs that would lower 
ratings on all items of the perceived control measure. By the same token, it was 
possible to at least partially account for variance due to knowledge that the top left 
would have been the optimal kicking direction in a real soccer game where the 
goalkeeper and kicking player were in the pictured starting positions. 
A further requirement for the experimental procedure was that participants 
were adequately debriefed regarding the mechanisms governing slot-machine 
operation – namely, the random generation of outcomes and negative return to players. 
This information had to be conveyed to ensure that experiencing the task‟s novel 
soccer features did not lead participants to expect that, in slot-machine gambling, there 
exists the equivalent of choosing the „correct‟ player profile, „correct‟ kick direction, 
or both. The debriefing information provided to participants is detailed in Appendix 
4E. 
2. Success-frequency: Paper 1 
The first paper applied the described methodology in investigating whether success-
frequency is indeed an influence on the illusion of control. Existing findings that 
identify success-frequency as an influencing factor are problematic in two respects. 
First, there is a possibility that the measures of inferred control used in the contributing 45 
 
studies have, in fact, gauged remembered success-frequency. Second, from the point of 
view of a presented explanation of the illusion of control, the studies‟ novel 
experimental task format and „contingency-detection‟ instructional set restricted the 
extent to which beliefs responsible for the illusion of control (supernatural beliefs and 
the gambler‟s fallacy) could be brought to bear on problem-solving. The experimental 
task, perceived-control measure and experimental procedure described above 
overcome both of these past methodological limitations and it was, therefore, 
necessary to examine whether the success-frequency effect holds when they are 
applied.  
Participants (N = 96) played the soccer-themed gambling game under one of 
five success-frequency conditions (one goal per 16 trials, 8 trials, 4 trials, 3 trials or 2 
trials). The playing session lasted for 100 trials, and, upon its conclusion, perceived 
control was assessed using the newly-developed measure. The study also included a 
perceived control measure similar to the one used in previous studies of success-
frequency: “Using the scale below, how would you describe your level of control over 
the game‟s outcomes? [0 = Non-existent, 3 = Moderate, 6 = Complete]”.  
3. Success-slope: Paper 2 
The newly-developed measure and methodology were next applied in re-examining the 
effects of success-slope, which refers to win rate over time within a playing session. 
The illusion of control has typically been found to be strongest following a descending 
slope (i.e., early successes followed by few successes), but, as with findings relating to 
the influence of success-frequency, this finding could reflect the confounding of 
perceived control with remembered success-frequency. In three of the four studies that 
produced the finding, the chief dependent measures gauged remembered success-
frequency (e.g., “How many successes did you have on the 30 trials?”). The finding, 
thus, potentially reflects a memory-based „primacy effect‟ rather than success-slope-
driven variation in perceived control. A fourth study (Burger, 1986) did include a more 
direct measure of perceived control, but another study that did the same (Matute, 1995) 
observed higher perceived control following an ascending success-slope (i.e., a 
concentration of successes at the session‟s end).  46 
 
In investigating the success-slope effect using the newly-developed 
methodology, the main aim was to determine whether the effect exists and, if so, what 
success-slopes produce the strongest illusory control inferences. An additional aim was 
to examine the effect of success-slope on estimates of remembered success-frequency. 
Another, implicit, aim of the paper related to the psychological-process explanation 
developed in Chapter 1. The aim was to test the explanation‟s hypothesis that the 
illusion of control can be considered a by-product of the problem-solving people 
engage in when gambling. The hypothesis would be supported if the „ascending‟ 
condition is found to produce higher perceived control. In other words, a finding of 
this nature would suggest that participants approached the gambling task as one in 
which the means to obtaining wins could be discovered through learning, which is a 
component of problem-solving (Anderson, 1993).  
Participants (N = 334) experienced 48 trials of the soccer-themed task under 
one of four success-slope conditions: descending (early successes), ascending (late 
successes), flat (evenly-distributed successes) and U-shaped (early and late successes). 
Dependent measures, administered in a post-session questionnaire, consisted of the 
primary and secondary illusory control indices produced by factor-analysing the 
newly-developed measure of perceived control. Also included were two success-
frequency estimates analogous to those featured in past success-slope studies: “What 
percentage of the shots you kicked resulted in goals?” and “If you were allowed to kick 
another 100 shots, on how many of those do you think you would score a goal?” 
4. Two variants of the illusion of control: Paper 3 
Following the application of a theoretically-driven methodology to the re-examination 
of two long-standing problems in the literature, the underlying theory – the 
psychological-process explanation presented in Chapter 1 – was subjected to further 
testing. The test focused on the explanation‟s proposal that there are two variants of the 
illusion of control – a primary, emerging from the gambler‟s fallacy and other beliefs 
about non-supernatural phenomena, and a secondary, emerging from abstract beliefs 
about supernatural agents and forces. The raw data consisted of responses to a survey 
about erroneous gambling-related beliefs. Survey items were statements of erroneous 
beliefs and participants were required to express their degree of agreement or 47 
 
disagreement with each one. Since the items were based on interviews with people 
who gamble regularly, it was assumed that they represented illusions of control – 
problem-solving solutions entertained by people in gambling settings. The proposal 
being tested was, thus, whether the items would form two broader categories reflecting 
the relevant abstract beliefs (supernatural beliefs and the gambler‟s fallacy). 
The study‟s first step was the compilation of a survey broad enough to cover 
most of the problem-solving solutions people have reported in gambling settings. It 
was also crucial that the survey was not too focused on particular types of solutions 
(e.g., the illusion of primary control only). To achieve these aims, survey items were 
drawn from both existing surveys and qualitative descriptions of erroneous gambling-
related beliefs. Over 10 surveys of gambling-related beliefs have been designed and 
validated, and the aim was to borrow items from the surveys in such a way that as 
many surveys as possible could be included in their entirety without there being 
identical items. The inclusion of entire surveys ensured that no particular beliefs were 
the focus of the survey, while the inclusion of multiple existing surveys ensured that a 
broad range of beliefs was represented. Additional items were written to represent 
beliefs documented in qualitative studies but missed by existing surveys. A survey of 
100 items was thus compiled, featuring full versions of the Drake Beliefs About 
Chance Inventory (Wood & Clapham, 2005), the Gambling Beliefs Questionnaire 
(Steenbergh et al., 2002) and the Predictive Control Scale of the Gambling-Related 
Cognitions Survey (Raylu & Oei, 2004). Notably, items were adjusted to refer 
specifically to slot-machine gambling, so that there was no risk of participants 
misinterpreting some of the beliefs expressed by items as being correct for partially 
skilled gambling games (e.g., Bridge).  
The next step, following the survey‟s administration to 329 participants, 
consisted of the removal of items that correlated only weakly with other items. 
Specifically, items that correlated with 60 or more other items at a magnitude of less 
than .3 were removed. This filtering process ensured that the survey did not contain 
references to beliefs held only by select individuals, beliefs not related to slot-machine 
gambling, and beliefs not related to gambling more generally. 
As a final step, relationships between retained items were analysed to test the 
prediction that there would be two broad types, one reflecting supernatural beliefs, and 48 
 
the other reflecting the gambler‟s fallacy and any other beliefs. Broader item types 
have, in some surveys, been uncovered through exploratory factor analysis (Jefferson 
& Nicki, 2003; Raylu & Oei, 2004; Steenbergh et al., 2002; Wood & Clapham, 2005). 
However, the exploratory approach is often poorly suited to hypothesis testing when 
some items load on more than one factor (MacCallum, Widaman, Zhang & Hong, 
1999), and, in this survey, items expressing the belief that luck is cyclical were 
expected to do so. Examples of the items are “Wins are more likely to occur on a hot 
machine” and “A series of losses is a sign that good luck is about to set in”. Within 
these beliefs, the notion of cyclical successes appears to reflect the gambler‟s fallacy 
while the notion of a force called „luck‟ appears to reflect broader beliefs in 
supernatural agents. Thus, instead of an exploratory factor analysis, a confirmatory 
factor analysis (CFA) was performed. This approach allows the researcher to identify 
cross-loading items a priori, but it is feasible only with a small number of items or 
scales (Floyd & Widaman, 1995). More specifically, CFA involves specifying one or 
more latent factors and the one or more items or scales that load on them. The 
specifications represent a model, which is assessed for how well it accounts for 
covariances between the items or scales (e.g., Kline, 2010). 
In specifying the CFA model, survey items were grouped into scales based on 
theoretical considerations. One scale, for example, consisted of items expressing the 
belief that luck is cyclical. Scores on this scale (the average of the constituent items) 
were modelled as loading on both postulated latent factors – the illusion of primary 
control and the illusion of secondary control. The illusion of primary control was 
additionally defined by scales referring to the negative recency of chance outcomes, to 
systems of play, and to the value of persistence. Beliefs in negative recency clearly 
stem from the gambler‟s fallacy, and the other two belief types also potentially reflect 
the fallacy in that a „system‟ of play can refer to a strategy based on expectations of 
negative recency and persistence in the face of losses is a valid slot-machine strategy if 
a loss on the next round is believed to be less likely with every experienced loss. The 
illusion of secondary control within the CFA model was, in addition to the „cyclical 
luck‟ scale, defined by scales capturing beliefs in (a) the omniscience and power of 
supernatural agents such as luck and fate, and (b) the effectiveness of ritual appeals to 
these agents. Atran and Norenzayan (2004) drew a distinction between these two belief 49 
 
types in their original article on the abstract structure of beliefs about the supernatural. 
The model‟s fit to the scale covariance matrix was examined. 
5. Minor inconsistencies across papers: theory and 
terminology 
The exegesis has, so far, related the papers‟ research questions and methodology to the 
explanation of the psychological processes underlying the illusion of control presented 
in Chapter 1. The explanation was, indeed, the driving force behind the research 
programme, but it was not fully formed at the time Paper 1 was written, so the paper 
introduces concepts not mentioned elsewhere. This section describes the theoretical 
inconsistencies in more detail before highlighting some minor terminological 
inconsistencies. 
5.1. Theory 
Paper 1 (on the effects of success-frequency) differs from the other papers in that its 
guiding theoretical framework did not involve defining the illusion of control as a by-
product of a problem-solving process. Instead, the illusion was speculated to be a by-
product of beliefs about control, with different beliefs being activated by different 
types of post-experimental questions. More specifically, it was speculated that asking 
about the effectiveness of various listed actions using the newly-developed measure 
activated „means-ends‟ beliefs, while asking about perceived control directly, as per 
the traditional measure, activated „agent-ends‟ beliefs (Skinner, Chapman & Baltes, 
1988).  
The theoretical framework of Paper 1 also differed from the theoretical 
frameworks of the other papers in that it did not make clear hypotheses regarding the 
source of the distinction between the illusions of primary and secondary control. That 
is, while the psychological explanation in Chapter 1 attributes the distinction to the 
existence of different types of abstract beliefs (supernatural, gambler‟s fallacy, etc.), 
this possibility was not considered at the time Paper 1 was written, and the paper is 
fittingly vague on the issue, attributing the distinction to a difference in “contexts 
governing the acquisition” of different types of „means-ends‟ beliefs (p. 66).  50 
 
A repercussion of the paper‟s general lack of clarity on the nature of the 
illusion of control is that, following a factor analysis of responses to the newly-
developed dependent measure, „disregard of the role of chance‟ was labelled a third 
possible variant of the illusion of control, even though the preliminary screening 
procedure (see Section 1.2) suggested that the relevant item (“It was all chance”) be 
excluded from the factor analysis. The item was retained because of its significance as 
the measure‟s “single objectively correct statement” (p. __).  In reminding participants 
that the soccer task was a game of chance rather than skill, the item did serve a 
methodological function. However, due to the absence of a fully-formed theoretical 
framework (i.e., lack of recognition of the role of problem-solving and abstract 
beliefs), the item‟s methodological function was not distinguished from its theoretical 
significance. Appendix 3B shows that the paper‟s findings regarding the effects of 
success-frequency were not affected by this error in analysing the dependent measure. 
5.2. Terminology  
One of the slight terminological differences across papers is that Paper 1 refers to 
“poker machines” instead of slot machines. The paper was written for a conference in 
Australia, where “poker machine” is a well-recognised term.  
Another noteworthy point is that, while Paper 1 refers exclusively to 
“perceived” control, Papers 2 and 3 also make references to “inferred” control. 
Technically, the latter term is more correct, especially with respect to the explanation 
of the illusion of control presented in Chapter 1. Inference refers to the drawing of a 
logical conclusion from information, and problem-solving, one of the psychological 
processes proposed to underlie the illusion of control, involves the drawing of 
conclusions from environmental cues and background beliefs. 51 
 
CHAPTER 3: Paper 1 
The illusion of control: structure, measurement and 
dependence on reinforcement frequency in the context of 
a laboratory gambling task 
Ejova, A., Delfabbro, P. H., & Navarro, D. J. 
School of Psychology, University of Adelaide 
Published: Proceedings of the 9th Conference of the Australasian Society 
for Cognitive Science (2010) 
Abstract: We present a new experimental method for studying the illusion of control 
in a gambling context, along with a new multi-item measure of the degree of perceived 
control. Responses to the measure were found to reflect a distinction between primary 
and secondary control – a distinction not recognised by traditional single-item 
measures. Furthermore, responses to the new measure were, in contrast to ratings on a 
concurrently administered traditional measure, found to be completely independent of 
the experienced reinforcement frequency. This finding highlights the purity of the 
newly-developed measure and calls into question the status of reinforcement frequency 
as a fundamental determinant of the degree of illusorily perceived control. 
Introduction 
In a seminal exposition of the cognitive theory of gambling, Walker (1992b) argues 
that most patterns of irrational thinking among gamblers essentially consist of the 
illusion that “one has more control over the outcome than is in fact the case” (pp. 139-
140) or the overestimation of one‟s chances of winning independently of any actions 
taken. In the context of poker machine gaming, roulette and dice – gambling forms 
where outcomes are completely random – any perceived control is necessarily illusory. 
Nevertheless, regular gamblers report the use of a wide variety of strategies (e.g., 
changing machines in a systematic fashion; see Joukhador, Blaszczynski & 52 
 
Maccallum, 2004; Livingstone, Wooley & Borrell, 2006) that make sense only on the 
assumption that the player can exert control over outcomes based on knowledge of the 
game. While many of these strategies can be termed products of illusorily perceived 
“primary” control because they rely on the idea that it is the player who has control, 
players also report employing “secondary” control strategies, in which they seek to 
achieve favourable outcomes by aligning themselves with influential higher or external 
forces (Rothbaum, Weisz & Snyder, 1982), such as luck (Keren & Wagenaar, 1985; 
King, 1990; Ocean & Smith, 1993; Duong & Ohtsuka, 2000), magic (Felson & 
Gmelch, 1979; Henslin, 1967), or justice (King, 1990). Although conceptually distinct, 
primary and secondary strategies tend to blend together: for instance, in Keren and 
Wagenaar‟s (1985) study, many of the interviewed regular blackjack players spoke of 
„changing-up‟ play, not as a mathematically appropriate strategy, but, rather, as the 
necessary response to a period of bad luck. Thus, a very broad range of gambling 
behaviours can be described as products of an illusion of primary or secondary control 
over objectively random outcomes. 
The basic experimental paradigm for studying the determinants of the illusion 
of control dates back to Langer (1975), and involves exposing people to uncontrollable 
events without explicitly indicating that the events in question are uncontrollable. 
While various elaborations on the design have yielded considerable insight into the 
illusion of control (e.g., Alloy & Abramson, 1979; Matute 1994, 1995), most work 
since Langer has employed very minimalist tasks that are often somewhat abstracted 
from the gambling context (e.g., involving the judgement of the degree of contingency 
between a button press and the onset of a light). Although a minimalist approach is 
often helpful from a scientific perspective, there is a noticeable difference in “feel” 
between a casino and a psychology experiment, which may limit the generalisability of 
the findings.  Additionally, there is the issue of instructional demand effects. The fact 
that minimalist tasks involve only a few abstract stimuli leads to the use of instructions 
that either reveal the research aim (e.g., Alloy & Abramson, 1979), or deliberately 
conceal it by directing participants to focus simply on obtaining the target outcome as 
often as possible (e.g., Matute, 1994). In the former case, participants proceed to carry 
out the somewhat unnatural task of monitoring their control levels without expressly 
seeking reinforcement. In the latter case, participants could come to expect that, since 53 
 
they have been given the task of maximising reinforcement levels, there must be a 
systematic way of obtaining the target outcome. 
It is in part due to such considerations that many studies have featured 
experimental tasks based on actual gambling activities, such as poker machines (e.g., 
Ladouceur & Sevigny, 2005), roulette (e.g., Dixon, 2000), and lotteries (e.g., Langer, 
1975; Wohl & Enzle, 2002). However, the use of existing gambling game formats can 
cause participants to base their post-experimental ratings of control not only on what 
they immediately experienced during the experiment, but also on their existing beliefs 
about that form of gambling. A partial solution to this problem is to gauge relevant 
beliefs at the start of the experiment. Recently-developed gambling-related belief 
questionnaires (Jefferson & Nicki, 2003; Joukhador, Blaszczynski & Maccallum, 
2003; Raylu & Oei, 2004; Steenbergh, Meyers, May & Whelan, 2002; Wood & 
Clapham, 2005) could be employed for this purpose. However, such self-report tasks 
may not capture many of the elements of decision-making that emerge when people 
are asked to make judgements in real time. Accordingly, there would appear to be a 
need to develop tasks that capture the important elements of gambling decision-
making, but which are more immune to contamination from variations in previous 
gambling experience as well as instructional sets.  
Apart from the appropriate design of these experiments, there is the issue of 
how the strength of the illusion of control might be determined. Some researchers have 
drawn inferences regarding the illusion of control based solely on participants‟ average 
bet amounts (e.g., Burger & Schnerring, 1982; Gilovich & Douglas, 1986), or 
estimates of the number of reinforcements expected in future rounds of the task (e.g., 
Budescu & Bruderman, 1995; Langer, 1975). However, these measures necessarily 
equate the illusion of control to the expectation or perception of success. As noted by 
Walker (1992b) in the quoted passage, confidence and control are not equivalent.  
Many other studies have adopted a simpler approach in asking people to rate 
the degree of perceived control over task outcomes on a visual analogue scale. Due to 
their brevity, measures of this kind invariably treat control as a unitary construct, 
making no distinction between primary and secondary facets. This is not a problem if 
people do not seek secondary control or fail to distinguish between the two types of 
control processes. However, should either of these conditions not hold, people may 54 
 
find a single question about “control” somewhat confusing. Another concern is that 
there is some evidence that rating scales of this kind conflate perceived success-
frequency with control. Jenkins and Ward (1965) found that responses to questions 
containing the word “control” were strongly positively related to reinforcement 
frequency, while responses to less transparent questions about contingency were not 
influenced by reinforcement frequency at all. Jenkins and Ward subsequently argued 
that people actually interpret “control” to mean „attainment of the target outcome‟. 
Accordingly, in answer to questions that refer explicitly to the degree of perceived 
“control”, people may not be giving a rating of perceived contingency at all.  
Despite this, most studies of the relationship between success-frequency and 
the illusion of control continue to employ explicitly worded measures as the sole 
measures of perceived control. Thus, although higher reinforcement frequencies are 
consistently found to produce higher perceived “control” (Alloy & Abramson, 1979; 
Tennen & Sharp, 1983), it is not clear whether reinforcement frequency is a 
fundamental determinant of the illusion of control (Thompson et al., 2007), or if the 
trend is an artifact of the wording of the questions. To address this issue, a more 
systematic approach is required. 
In view of these considerations, the aims of this paper are fourfold. First, we 
describe an experimental task that was designed to achieve a compromise between the 
incorporation of novel stimuli and the preservation of a gambling game format. Also 
described is an experimental procedure geared at minimising instructional demand 
effects, and, in fact, quantifying some of those effects through the pre-experimental 
assessment of gambling-related beliefs.  Second, we present a perceived control 
measure that we developed with a view to preserving the primary-secondary 
distinction and avoiding the potential confusion with reinforcement frequency that 
arises from explicit references to „control‟. Our third aim was to use the newly-
developed measure in determining whether people do in fact distinguish between 
primary and secondary control processes and, by implication, whether there are 
grounds for deploying a perceived control measure that conceptualises control as a 
multi-faceted construct rather than the general unitary construct gauged by traditional 
measures. Finally, we employ the new task, the new measure and a traditional 
explicitly worded measure in testing Jenkins and Ward‟s conjecture regarding the 55 
 
differential effects of reinforcement frequency on ratings of perceived “control” and 
responses to more subtle questions about perceived contingency. We subsequently 
seek to make a more general statement regarding the relationship between 
reinforcement frequency and the illusion of control. 
Method 
Participants 
One hundred students from the University of Adelaide participated in the study, but 
three participants who responded identically to all the items of the newly-developed 
measure of perceived control were excluded. A technical error resulted in the loss of 
another person‟s pre-experimental-questionnaire data, so some of the reported analyses 
contain only 96 data points, as will be made clear in the relevant tables and figures. 
Materials and procedure 
The overall design of the experiment was as follows. Upon completing a pre-
experimental questionnaire concerned with gambling-related beliefs, each participant 
played 100 compulsory rounds (i.e., shots) of the gambling task described later. This 
was done under one of five conditions, in which the average reinforcement frequency 
ranged from one win in every 16 rounds to one in every two. Participants were not told 
how many rounds they would be playing, but were informed that they could terminate 
the game and cash out on remaining credit at any point after completing an 
impressions-of-the-game questionnaire. This questionnaire appeared automatically 
after 100 rounds of play. 
The pre-experimental questionnaire contained the Drake Beliefs About Chance 
(DBC) Inventory (Wood & Clapham, 2005), which required participants to rate their 
degree of agreement with 22 erroneous statements about the nature of gambling (e.g., 
“Wins are more likely to occur on a hot machine”, “I can improve my chances of 
winning by performing special rituals”). Statements that referred to gambling in 
general were adapted to refer to the outcomes of poker machines, roulette and dice 
games. A DBC total score was calculated by summing the provided ratings.  56 
 
The experimental gambling task had a soccer theme. In each round, participants 
bet on a player pictured on the screen scoring (as opposed to missing) a goal from a 
free kick. Hence, each round involved the selection of a bet amount and bet structure 
from the seven options depicted in the Screen 2 pane of Figure 3.1. Each round also 
required the selection of a kick direction (Screen 3). Player profile choices (Screen 1) 
could be changed at any point but were not compulsory after the first round. Despite 
the abundance of play-related choices, the outcome of each kick was, as on poker 
machines, determined by a random number generator and the bet amounts and 
associated win-amounts were calibrated to produce a negative long-term winning 
expectancy (see Appendix 3A
5). The experiment was introduced to participants as an 
investigation of emotional responses to a new, sports-themed gambling game that 
“operates on the same principles as a poker machine”. In referring to the trial of a new 
game, this instructional set encouraged participants to „just play‟ without concerning 
themselves with the degree of control inherent in the task. The reference to poker 
machines served to guard against participants automatically assuming that the new 
sports-themed game possessed a video-game-like skill component. 
The third element of the experiment was the “impressions of the game” 
questionnaire. Placed amid filler items regarding emotional responses to the game, this 
questionnaire contained two questions about perceptions of control over game 
outcomes. One of the questions (Measure A in Figure 3.2) followed the traditionally 
employed single-item rating-scale-based form. The new measure (Measure B in Figure 
3.2) encompassed 13 randomly-ordered items, presented in the form of to-be-evaluated 
causal explanations for wins. Each explanation implicated a phenomenon associated 
either with primary control or secondary control. The objectively accurate account, “It 
was all chance”, was also among the items. 
                                                 
5 This appendix and Appendix 3B were not included in the published version of this paper. 57 
 
Figure 3.1. The first round of the experimental task58 
 
 
Figure 3.2. The two featured measures of the degree of illusorily perceived control59 
 
Results 
As an initial calibration check, we looked at whether responses to the various measures 
showed sufficient variability. For the gambling-related beliefs measure, the observed 
mean of 59.7 was slightly higher than those observed among in-treatment gamblers 
and members of the general community in the DBC Inventory‟s original validation 
study, but the standard deviation of 15.63 was in close agreement (Wood & Clapham, 
2005; Gamblers: M = 48.4, SD = 15.84; Community: M = 44.9, SD = 14.08).  
Responses to the traditional rating scale (Measure A in Figure 3.2) of perceived control 
also showed a reasonable degree of variability: 30 participants stated that they had no 
control, but a similar number (29) perceived a level of control that was moderate or 
higher (i.e., gave ratings of 3 to 6).  
The distribution of responses to the newly-developed perceived control measure is 
summarised in Table 3.1. Most statements, including the correct “It was all chance” 
statement, were awarded non-zero ratings by approximately 60% of participants. Only 
four participants provided ratings of zero on all of the primary- and secondary-control-
related statements while awarding maximal ratings to the „Chance‟ statement. 60 
 
Table 3.1. Distribution of responses to the newly-developed measure of the degree of 
perceived control (N = 97) 
Statement 
referring to: 
No. of participants providing an agreement 
rating of: 
0 out of 
10 
1 to 4 out 
of 10 
5 out of 
10 
6 or more 
out of 10 
Skill  37  32  10  18 
Strategy  23  29  17  28 
Practice  36  28  13  20 
Soccer 
knowledge 
46  27  10  13 
Computer 
games 
40  33  10  14 
Player 
profiles 
30  27  19  21 
Goal-keeper  38  36  16  7 
Lucky 
moments 
30  20  17  30 
Lucky play 
pattern 
30  28  20  19 
Knowledge 
of luck 
42  37  11  7 
Lucky 
person 
33  37  12  15 
Deserving to 
win 
40  23  20  14 
  10 out of 
10 
9 to 6 out 
of 10 
5 out of 
10 
4 or less 
out of 10 
Chance  42  31  12  12 
 
Primary and secondary control: factor analysis 
To test the validity of the theoretical distinction between primary and secondary 
control built into the newly-developed measure a factor analysis of statement rating 
patterns was conducted. However, following the observation of a relatively large 
number of zero ratings at baseline (see Table 3.1), we prefaced the factor analysis with 
a data screening procedure aimed at the identification and removal of statements that 
correlated with other statements due solely to overlapping (that is, inter-correlating) 
zero ratings.  61 
 
Data screening  
Starting with the statement that produced the most “zeros” (soccer knowledge), we 
excluded all participants who provided a zero rating for that statement. If, following 
that exclusion, the correlations of other statements with that statement became largely 
non-significant, we deemed the statement to be unsuitable, and removed it from 
subsequent analysis on the grounds that the zero vs. non-zero distinction must have 
been responsible for the entirety of the original correlations.  
The application of this procedure led to the removal from further analysis of the 
statements pertaining to soccer knowledge and deservingness. The lack of correlation 
between these statements and other statements is illustrated in Table 3.2, where the 
shaded squares in each column denote the correlation coefficients that remained 
significant among participants who provided ratings greater than zero on the statement 
specified in the column heading. Non-zero responses to the „Chance‟ statement were 
expected to correlate with responses to a range of different statements, but were 
discovered to be independent of other responses. The statement was, however, retained 
for use in subsequent analyses to allow for the possibility that, as the scale‟s single 
objectively correct statement, it would form a separate factor altogether. Notably, the 
second-stage (shaded) correlations revealed a „perceived primary control‟ cluster 
consisting of agreement ratings for statements about skill, strategy, practice and 
computer game experience. Ratings on the remainder of the statements – statements 
relating largely to luck – inter-correlated substantially in forming a „perceived 
secondary control‟ cluster. Statements about player profile choices and goalkeeper 
movement represented a point of overlap between the two clusters, but did not share 
with the „perceived primary control‟ statements the feature of being uncorrelated with 
most of the other statements. Thus emerged the first traces of a multi-faceted perceived 
control construct involving a distinction between perceived primary control, perceived 
secondary control and acknowledgement of the role of chance. 62 
 
Table 3.2. Spearman correlations between ratings of agreement with the causal 
explanation statements of the newly-developed measure of the degree of perceived 
control. Note that the shaded squares are meaningful only in relation to the columns – 
not rows – of the table. See main text for details. 
 
Factor analysis  
Upon ascertaining the factorability of ratings on the retained 11 statements (KMO = 
.88; Bartlett‟s test: (
2 (55) = 428.82, p < .001; initial communalities shown in Table 
3.3), we conducted Principal Axis Factoring based on the criterion that a factor should 
be extracted if it has an eigen value of .7 or above – a value appropriate for small 
sample sizes (Jolliffe, 1972, 1976). The procedure resulted in the extraction of three 
factors with initial eigen values of 5.03, 1.26 and 0.99 – all lying above the inflection 
point of the scree plot. After extraction the factors accounted, respectively, for 42, 7 
and 4 percent of total variance in ratings. Table 3.3 shows the factor loadings of the 
statements following a direct oblimin rotation. The loadings were relatively strong, 
with the lowest loading (for „Computer games‟ on Factor 2) having a magnitude of .48.  
; see Table 3.1) 63 
 
Most crucially, the pattern of loadings corresponded to the clustering observed 
at the data screening stage. Factor 1 corresponded to „Perceived secondary control‟ in 
subsuming the four luck-related statements and the more stimulus-specific statements 
regarding player profile choices and goalkeeper movements. Factor 2 subsumed 
statements relating to direct – that is, primary – control: „Skill‟, „Strategy‟, „Practice‟ 
and „Computer games‟. Factor 3 contained the single „Chance‟ item (see Appendix 3B 
for a factor analysis not involving the „Chance‟ item). 
Table 3.3. Initial communalities and factor loadings and communalities produced by a 
PAF analysis with oblimin rotation for 11 retained statements of the newly-developed 
















.60  .89      .68 
Lucky person  .50  .66      .52 
Knowledge of 
luck 
.54  .65      .57 
Player profiles  .37  .63      .39 
Goal-keeper  .51  .57      .63 
Lucky 
moments 
.53  .55      .59 
Practice  .44    -.82    .46 
Skill  .19    -.62    .39 
Strategy  .58    -.62    .71 
Computer 
games 
.40    -.48    .43 
Chance  .38      .60  .45 
Cronbach‟s alpha of factor 
score  .856  .799     
Correlation of factor with  F2: -.59  F3: .33  F1: -.25   
 
Note: Factor loadings <.4 are suppressed 
Overall, then, the analysis of intercorrelations between components of the 
newly-developed measure of the illusion of control suggested that the illusion can be 
conceived of in terms of three facets: perceived primary control, perceived secondary 
control, and acknowledgement of the role of chance. This, in turn, highlights the 64 
 
advantages of the newly-developed measure over any measure of perceived control 
that refers to „control‟ as though it were a unitary construct.  
Reinforcement frequency and perceived control  
In further assessing the advantages of the newly-developed measure over the 
traditional measure, we set out to determine whether, in line with Jenkins and Ward‟s 
(1965) findings, the newly-developed measure would, by virtue of not referring 
explicitly to control, attract responses less reflective of the experienced win frequency. 
However, since participants were, from the outset, informed that the experimental task 
was designed to operate on the same principles as a poker machine, we expected that 
responses to both measures would additionally depend on participants‟ individual 
beliefs regarding the nature of poker machine gambling. Thus, we conducted 
hierarchical regression analyses to assess the degree to which indices of the three 
facets underlying the new measure and, by contrast, responses to the traditional 
measure, could be attributed to variability in the number of experienced wins over and 
above the effects of variability in DBC scores. The indices of the three facets of 
illusorily perceived control were factor scores calculated using the regression method. 
The Cronbach‟s-alpha levels associated with the perceived primary control and 
perceived secondary control factor scores are detailed in Table 3.3. 
For each of the four regression analyses, the DBC score was entered into the 
regression at Step 1, followed, at Step 2, by the index of win frequency – the 
percentage of compulsory rounds that resulted in wins. The results are summarised in 
Figure 3.3
6. 
As the adjusted R
2 values associated with Step 1 of each analysis indicate, 
existing gambling-related beliefs accounted for a substantial amount of variance in all 
the indices of perceived control. However, the traditional measure was the only 
measure of perceived control to also be influenced by the experienced win frequency 
(adj R
2 at Step 1 = .23; adj R
2 at Step 2 = .34).  
Consistently with Jenkins and Ward‟s observations, then, these results imply 
that the factor scores derived from the newly-developed measure constitute a purer 
                                                 
6 The standardised residuals in each analysis displayed only a slight tendency to increase in line with the 
values of the dependent variable. 65 
 
measure of perceived control. Moreover, the findings suggest that reinforcement 
frequency ceases to be a determinant of the degree of illusorily perceived control once 
the effects of existing task-related beliefs are controlled for and the degree of perceived 
control is measured as a multi-faceted construct associated with causal explanations for 
success. 
Discussion 
Motivated by a concern for the finer methodological points of investigating the 
determinants of the illusion of control, we used a novel experimental task, instructional 
set and pre-experimental belief assessment procedure to demonstrate two important 
advantages of a newly-developed measure of illusorily perceived control. Firstly, 
ratings of agreement with the various causal explanation statements comprising the 
measure were found to reflect a distinction between primary and secondary control – a 
distinction not recognised by the traditionally employed single-item measure. 
Secondly, responses to the newly-developed measure were, in contrast to responses to 
the traditional measure, found to be completely independent of the experienced 
reinforcement frequency. 
The present findings were additionally informative with respect to the 
definition of the illusion of control construct and the body of research on the person-
based and situational determinants of the illusion. 
Definition of the illusion of control 
Our factor analysis produced quantitative evidence for what has up to this point been 
the largely qualitative observation that illusions of control involve perceptions of 
secondary as well as primary control. The analysis also uncovered a third facet of the 
illusion: „acknowledgement of the role of chance‟. Subsequent regression analyses 
produced evidence of a differentiation, in terms of dependence on win frequency, 
between the perceived degree of “control” and the three facets of causal explanation 
for experienced successes.66 
 
 
Figure 3.3. Hierarchical regression analyses of the influence of gambling-related beliefs and win frequency on responses to the traditional 
measure of illusorily perceived control and the newly-developed measure (N = 96) 67 
 
This collection of findings accords with Skinner, Chapman and Baltes‟ (1988) 
proposition that, in perceiving control, agents draw upon beliefs about relations 
between themselves and ends (the available reinforcement), means (potential causes) 
and ends, and themselves and means, with each of these three types of relational 
beliefs being held independently of the others. Within this framework, ratings of 
control on the traditional measure could, in light of their positive relationship with win 
frequency, be considered reflective of agent-ends-type beliefs. Meanwhile, responses 
to the newly-developed causal explanations measure constituted expressions of means-
ends-type beliefs about the game. In fact, the three-faceted structure uncovered by our 
correlational analysis of responses on this measure corresponded to the structure 
obtained by Skinner, Chapman and Baltes (1988) in an analysis of children‟s 
agreement ratings for means-end-type statements about school performance. In that 
study, ratings pertaining to personal effort and attributes were found to form one 
cluster (analogous to our “primary control” facet) while ratings pertaining to powerful 
others and luck formed a second cluster (analogous to our “secondary control” facet). 
A third cluster was defined by ratings on statements about unknown causes, of which 
„chance‟ is an instance, at least from an intuitive point of view (Batanero, Henry & 
Parzysz, 2005), and most prominently among children (Biehl & Halpern-Felsher, 
2001; Green, 1984). 
While this correspondence between findings importantly demonstrates that 
illusions of control have the same etiology as perceived control in general, Skinner, 
Chapman and Baltes‟ framework does not account for the source of segmentation in 
control beliefs.  The adaptive advantages of possessing three independent belief types 
as opposed to an integrated representation of agent-means-ends relations remain 
unspecified. Lewandowsky and Kirsner (2000) proposed that contradictions in 
expressed beliefs stem from variations in the context of knowledge acquisition and 
utilisation. Whether the contexts governing the acquisition of information about 
primary strategies, as opposed to „higher forces‟, „chance‟ and „control‟, differ 
systematically is an open question.  68 
 
Determinants of the illusion of control  
Prior beliefs  
The results of our regression analyses highlighted the prominence of pre-
experimentally assessed gambling-related beliefs in shaping perceptions of control. 
One could argue that it is hardly surprising that beliefs about poker machine gambling 
were found to influence perceptions of a task introduced to participants as a “poker-
machine-type game”. However, in real gambling environments, all people – regardless 
of prior gambling experience – approach poker machines with precisely the knowledge 
that they are about to play something called a „poker machine‟ and a set of beliefs 
about the nature of poker machine gambling.   
At the same time, a legitimate question to pose is whether self-reported 
gambling-related beliefs precede and determine illusions of control over game-specific 
stimuli, or whether these beliefs simply covary with game-specific perceptions of 
control. The covariation could be underpinned by the optimal organisation of control 
beliefs suggested by Skinner, Chapman and Baltes (1988) or the variations in 
acquisition and usage postulated by Lewandowsky and Kirsner (2000). In the present 
study, the DBC Inventory was selected as a measure of gambling-related beliefs due to 
its brevity, focus on poker-machine-gambling, and relevance to a population without 
extensive gambling experience (namely, the university students in our sample). A 
disadvantage of the measure is that its items related principally to a priori beliefs about 
illusory control and superstition. Thus, future research should concern itself with 
tracking the determining effects of a broader set of gambling-related beliefs – most 
notably, those relating to what Walker (1992b) considered the second broad dimension 
of erroneous gambling-related cognitions: optimism or hopefulness about winning 
independently of control attempts. In general, the structure of gambling-related beliefs 
among members of the general community and frequent gamblers requires 
examination. 
Reinforcement frequency  
Crucially, reinforcement frequency, a situational feature that has long been considered 
a fundamental determinant of the degree of illusorily perceived control, was found to 
exert no influence on perceptions of control, as gauged by the newly-developed, more 69 
 
subtly worded measure. While this result requires replication, perhaps with a different 
range of reinforcement frequencies, ensuing studies could also explore the illusion-of-
control-elicitation effects of other, more gambling-specific outcome sequence features, 
such as the frequency of big wins (Aasved, 2002), the general ordering of wins and 
losses (e.g., whether wins are concentrated at the beginning or end of the sequence; 
Burger, 1986; Coventry & Norman, 1998; Langer & Roth, 1975), and the degree of 
„need for control‟ in the face of losses exceeding a certain threshold (Walker, 1992b).  
Whatever set of potential determinants is selected for further investigation, 
future research could fruitfully make use of the experimental task, procedure and 
multi-faceted outcome measure described and piloted in the present study. 70 
 
Appendices for Chapter 3  
Appendix 3A 






































































1/16  700*  1  14  2  30  5  78  10  140  4  32  30  164  4  992 
1/8  700*  1  7  2  15  5  39  10  70  4  17  30  87  4  248 
1/4  7000**  10  35  20  75  50  195  100  350  40  89  300  498  60  3760 
1/3  7000**  10  27  20  57  50  147  100  263  40  498  300  409  60  1587 
1/2  7000**  10  18  20  38  50  98  100  175  40  3760  300  1587  60  470 
 
* Credit value: 1 credit = 1 cent 
** Credit value: 10 credits = 1 cent 
ψ  The letters A to Z correspond to the annotation system adopted in describing the bet option 
selection screen – Screen 3 – in Figure 3.1 71 
 
Appendix 3B 
Given the criteria used for excluding weak items from the factor analysis, the „Chance‟ 
item should have been excluded instead of being left to form a third factor. Since 
factor scores were subsequently used as dependent measures, all results presented in 
the paper might have been affected by this oversight. This appendix presents the main 
results of the paper with the „Chance‟ item excluded. In the factor analysis of the 
newly-developed measure, distinct measures of the illusion of primary and secondary 
control still emerged and success-frequency still did not have an effect on either of 
them.   
Factor analysis  
With the „Chance‟ item excluded from analysis, the scree plot, mineigen (eigenvalue > 
1) and parallel-analysis criteria for how many factors to extract (e.g., Hayton, Allen & 
Scarpello, 2004) all suggested a two-factor solution. Table 3B.1 shows the factor 
loadings for a two-factor solution following a direct oblimin rotation. The factors 
correspond to the illusion of primary control and the illusion of secondary control in 
that they are defined by the same items as in the original factor analysis result. 
Communalities and Cronbach‟s alpha values, not reported here for the sake of brevity, 
were also similar to those in the original analysis. 
Reinforcement frequency and perceived control 
Consistently with the original results, factor scores on the two constructs derived in the 
above factor analysis were significantly predicted by DBC scores, but not success-
frequency. That is, once DBC scores were accounted for in the first step of a 
hierarchical regression, the introduction of success-frequency at the second step did 
not result in a significant F-value change in perceived primary control (p = .32) or 
perceived secondary control (p = .11). 72 
 
Table 3B.1. Factor loadings produced by a PAF analysis with oblimin rotation for 10 










.91   
Lucky person  .67   
Player profiles  .64   
Knowledge of 
luck 
.63   
Lucky 
moments 
.57   
Goalkeeper  .56   
Practice    .88 
Skill    .71 
Strategy    .61 
Computer 
games 
  .55 
Note: Factor loadings <.4 are suppressed 
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CHAPTER 4: Paper 2 
Success-slope effects on the illusion of control and on 
remembered success-frequency 
Ejova, A., Navarro, D. J., & Delfabbro, P. H. 
School of Psychology, University of Adelaide 
Submitted for publication 
Abstract: The illusion of control refers to the inference of action-outcome contingency 
in situations where outcomes are in fact random. The strength of this illusion has been 
found to be affected by the pattern of successes and failures experienced over time in 
what can be termed a „success-slope‟ effect. Previous studies have generated 
inconsistent findings regarding the nature of this effect. In this paper we present an 
experiment (N = 334) that overcomes several methodological limitations within this 
literature, employing a wider range of dependent measures (measures of two different 
types of illusory control, primary and secondary, as well as measures of remembered 
success-frequency). Results indicate that different dependent measures lead to different 
effects. On measures of (primary) control over the task, scores were highest when the 
rate of success increased over time. Meanwhile, estimates of success-frequency in the 
task did not vary across conditions and showed trends consistent with the broader 
literature on human memory. 
Introduction 
Participants asked to determine the degree of contingency between their press of a 
button and the onset of a light increase their ratings with light onset frequency even 
when the light is objectively uncontrollable (Alloy & Abramson, 1979; Jenkins & 
Ward, 1965). People place greater value on lottery tickets they have personally chosen 
than on tickets that have been handed out (Langer, 1975; Wohl & Enzle, 2002). Slot-
machine players choose machines that have not paid out in some time and make use of 74 
 
rituals and lucky charms (Henslin, 1967; Livingstone, Wooley & Borrell, 2006; 
Schippers & Van Lange, 2006; Wood & Clapham, 2005). All of these phenomena are 
considered instances of the „illusion of control‟, the overestimation of contingency 
between personal actions (strategies) and task outcomes in games of chance. The 
illusion is thought to be caused by situational factors (e.g., the availability of a choice 
between action alternatives) in interaction with held beliefs about these factors. In this 
sense, the illusion is an inference based on situational information and prior beliefs 
(Crocker, 1981; Harris & Osman, 2012). The illusion expresses itself in repeated 
behaviours (e.g., strategic errors, rituals) as well as explicit ratings of control over real-
world and laboratory gambling tasks.  
In light of the many potential real-world consequences of illusory control 
inferences, a large number of laboratory studies have addressed their situational 
determinants (for a review, see Thompson, Armstrong & Thomas, 1998). The studies 
typically involve a laboratory task with objectively random outcomes, and the task 
tends to be either familiar (e.g, roulette) or novel (e.g., a button-and-light device). A 
single situational determinant is manipulated and post-session estimates of control or 
success-frequency serve as the dependent measure. The most frequently investigated 
situational determinants have been success-frequency (e.g., Alloy & Abramson, 1979; 
Thompson et al., 2007) and opportunity for choice and physical involvement (e.g., 
Ayeroff & Abelson, 1976; Ladouceur & Sevigny, 2005; Langer, 1975). Other 
identified determinants include need for the outcome (e.g., Biner, Huffman, Curran & 
Long, 1998; Gino, Sharek & Moore, 2011) and the opportunity for practice (e.g., 
Benassi, Sweeney & Drevno, 1979).  
This paper aims to resolve conflicting findings regarding another identified 
situational influence, namely the „success-slope‟ (also known as „the sequence of 
outcomes‟; Langer & Roth, 1975). This term refers to how successes and failures are 
positioned relative to each other in a randomly-generated outcome sequence. A 
sequence with a descending success-slope begins with a string of successes and 
concludes with a string of failures. In contrast, a sequence with an ascending slope is 
characterised by a preponderance of successes at the end.  
It is not difficult to propose theoretical reasons for why these three conditions 
might lead to different judgments. For instance, it has been argued that in a 75 
 
„descending‟ condition, people are motivated to see themselves as effective agents in 
the task, and so focus heavily on early successes (Langer & Roth, 1975; Thompson, 
Armstrong & Thomas, 1998). On the other hand, it has been suggested that a run of 
late successes in the „ascending‟ condition acts to strengthen control inferences by 
creating the impression of learning (Matute, 1995). The difficulty, however, lies in the 
fact that the empirical findings on this effect are mixed.  
To date, five experiments have examined ratings of control and success-
frequency following the experience of 30 or so outcomes conforming to the 
„descending‟, „ascending‟, or „flat‟ structures. Their findings regarding the direction of 
the effect were not consistent. Four studies concluded that inferred control is greatest 
in the „descending‟ condition (Burger, 1986; Coventry & Norman, 1998; Ladouceur & 
Mayrand, 1984; Langer & Roth, 1975), but one study found that inferred control was 
larger in the „ascending‟ condition (Matute, 1995). Indeed, one study found that both 
the „descending‟ and „ascending‟ conditions showed a stronger effect than the „flat‟ 
condition (Burger, 1986). 
When one looks at the literature a little more closely, a number of difficulties 
present themselves. The first issue is the potential conflation of the illusion of control 
with memory effects; that is, the conflation of what is inferred with what is 
remembered. This issue arises when participants are asked to judge the number of 
successes that they have had, and these judgments are used as a measure of inferred 
control. To illustrate the problem, we note that the conclusions of Langer and Roth 
(1975) are based on observing that participants in the „descending‟ condition provided 
significantly higher estimates in response to the following three questions: “How many 
correct predictions did you have on the 30 trials?”, “How many correct predictions do 
you think you would have had on the next 100 trials?” and “How good do you think 
you are at predicting outcomes like these?”. None of these questions directly ask about 
the degree of control people perceive themselves to have. Responses to these questions 
could be influenced by factors other than one‟s beliefs about ability to control the 
outcome.  
A second problem pertains to the issue of what it actually means to measure 
“inferred control”. Even when inferred control is measured separately from estimated 
success-frequency, the literature on the success-slope effect tends to treat inferred 76 
 
control as a unitary construct that can be measured using a single question. As an 
example, Burger (1986) relied on a single question asking people to rate the “extent to 
which you believe that your correct answers were the result of your ability to correctly 
anticipate events”. There is some evidence to suggest that the illusion of control is a 
more complicated phenomenon. In a review of the illusion-of-control literature, 
Rothbaum, Weisz and Snyder (1982) distinguished between two different kinds of 
perceived control, „primary‟ and „secondary‟. Primary control refers to the belief that 
outcomes can be influenced through personal skill. In contrast, secondary control 
refers to the belief that external forces (e.g., luck, God) control the outcome, but one 
can be aligned with these forces. A statement like “I knew how to make my luck work 
for me” is a good example of a belief in secondary control, insofar as it implies that 
luck controls the outcome but is favouring the speaker. In the broader cognitive 
science literature, a similar distinction has been drawn between beliefs about physical 
entities and superstitious (or religious) beliefs about supernatural entities (e.g., Atran 
and Norenzayan, 2004; Wellman & Gelman, 1992). The illusion that physical (i.e., 
skilled) actions are effective in a game of chance would correspond to the illusion of 
primary control, while a belief in the effectiveness of superstitious or religious rituals 
would correspond to the illusion of secondary control.   
In view of the evidence that primary and secondary control are distinct 
constructs, it seems sensible to measure inferred primary and secondary control 
separately. To that end, we will follow a previous study (Ejova, Delfabbro & Navarro, 
2010) in adopting a factor-analytic approach. That is, we will treat primary and 
secondary control as latent variables, estimated by analysing a questionnaire that asks 
people to rate their agreement with a number of statements, such as “I got better with 
practice”, “My skill in playing the game [helped me win]”, “I‟ve always been a lucky 
kind of person”, and “A certain lucky way of playing just seemed to work for me”. 
Factor analysis of the responses is expected to reveal clusters of „primary‟ and 
„secondary‟ statements (Ejova et al., 2010). The factor scores recovered for individual 
participants can then be used as the measures of inferred control.  
A third issue that we consider is the choice of control conditions. As noted 
earlier, the success-slope literature uses the „flat‟ condition as a control for the two 
conditions that have success-slopes, namely the „descending‟ condition and the 77 
 
„ascending‟ condition. Not all studies have used all three conditions. In our study, we 
include all three, and include an additional „U-shaped‟ condition, in which there are 
clusters of wins at the beginning and at the end. If early wins and late wins have 
distinct effects on perceived control, this condition might be expected to lead to the 
highest levels of perceived control. Even so, the inclusion of this new condition is 
more exploratory than hypothesis driven.   
In sum, our study aims to test the direction of the success-slope effect in a way 
that addresses and demonstrates two methodological issues: the difference between 
inferred control and remembered win frequency, and the two-faceted nature of the 
illusion of control.  
Method 
Participants 
There were 334 participants (171 males), ranging in age from 18 to 80 (M = 25.0, SD = 
11.0) and incorporating members of the general community alongside undergraduate 
psychology students at the University of Adelaide. Recruitment was conducted 
through a newspaper advertisement, advertisements placed around campus, and 
through a research participation website accessible to undergraduate psychology 
students.  As is standard in studies of gambling, participation was conditional on being 
over the age of 18, having gambled at a licensed venue at least once previously, and 
not being in the process of receiving treatment for gambling-related problems. 
Psychology students received course credit for participating. 
Materials, measures and procedure 
The experiment was a self-contained 30-minute computerised exercise divided into 
four stages. These were: (1) a pre-experimental questionnaire, (2) 48 trials of the 
experimental task, a “soccer-themed gambling task”, (3) the post-experimental 
questionnaire, and then (4) additional trials of the experimental task, if the participant 
so desired
7. The four different success-slope conditions (the independent variable) 
corresponded to differences in the sequence of outcomes experienced during the 
                                                 
7 The total number of rounds played was recorded as part of a broader investigation into behavioural and 
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experimental task (stage 2), but in all other respects the conditions were the same. The 
dependent measures and covariates all derive from the two questionnaires. The 
description below gives a broad overview of the study: additional details can be found 
in the Appendices (4A and 4B). 
The pre-experimental questionnaire 
To maximise ecological validity, our experimental task resembled a real-world 
gambling task. To accommodate this, a pre-experimental questionnaire was used to 
measure participants‟ beliefs about gambling. The obtained scores were, in turn, used 
as covariates in analyses of the relationship between success-slope and inferred control 
and between success-slope and remembered success-frequency. Similarly, because the 
surface form of the task was based on soccer, the pre-experimental questionnaire also 
measured interest in soccer, which then served as a covariate in the major analyses. 
The measures used were as follows. For beliefs about gambling, we used the 
Drake Beliefs About Chance Inventory (DBC; Wood & Clapham 2005), a 22-item 
questionnaire that is organised into two scales, one relating to superstitious beliefs 
(DBC-Secondary) and the other to more conventional erroneous beliefs about chance 
events (DBC-Primary; see Appendix 4A.1). To measure interest in soccer, we asked 
people to rate their interest on a five-point Likert scale (see Appendix 4A.1).  
The experimental manipulation 
The independent variable, success-slope, was manipulated across four between-
subjects conditions. In the „descending‟ condition (N = 85), early wins were followed 
by a string of losses. For the „ascending‟ condition (N = 79), the opposite was the case, 
and in the „flat‟ condition (N = 84), wins were approximately evenly distributed across 
the playing session. The „U-shaped‟ condition (N = 86) featured a concentration of 
wins at the beginning and at the end. In all conditions, participants experienced a win 
on 8 of the 48 trials.   
The soccer-themed gambling task 
The experimental task was a soccer-themed computerised task modelled after a slot 
machine in several respects: the option to bet on the results of multiple trials 
corresponded to the option to vary the number of lines played on a slot machine; there 79 
 
were more near misses than far misses; sound effects corresponded to those heard on 
slot machines; and bet and win-amounts for each betting option were calibrated to 
result in a long-term loss of 10% of used money, the return rate on South Australian 
slot machines. 
The task instructions, issued verbally and in writing at the start of the session, 
emphasised that the task operated on the same principles as real slot machines, and that 
any credits won during the game would be exchanged for cash at the end. Participants 
played the game for a compulsory 48 trials, with any additional rounds being 
voluntary. Participants began the task with 5000 credits, which, they were informed, 
was equivalent to $AUD5. 
An overview of the experimental task is shown in Figure 4.1. Each trial of the 
task displayed an on-screen soccer player taking a free kick, and participants were 
required to bet on the player scoring a goal. Several betting options were available, 
including some options that involved betting on the results of multiple trials (e.g., that 
the player would score three times in a row; Screen 2 in the figure). Other choices were 
also required. First, at the start of the game, participants were required to choose from 
among four different real-world players, each of whom had an entertaining biography 
provided (Screen 1). A change of player profile could be made after any round.  Also, 
on each trial, participants chose which of the four corners of the goal the player kicked 
towards, a „random‟ option also being available (Screen 3). None of these choices 
influenced the outcome sequence, which was fixed for the first 48 trials in all four 
experimental conditions.  
The outcome itself was displayed as an animation showing a goal being scored 
or a miss (Screen 4). The ball was shown to move in the direction that the participant 
selected, with a random number generator determining, on a trial-by-trial basis, 
whether or not the outcome was shown to be „close‟. For example, for misses, the 
randomly-generated number determined whether the shot was shown to be a near-miss 
caught by the goalkeeper, or a far miss well clear of the goal posts. 80 
 
Figure 4.1. Experimental task interface 81 
 
The animation was followed by confirmation of the outcome, sounds of 
applause in the event of a goal, and adjustment of the credit count (Screen 5). Credits 
were subtracted in each round, and added whenever a goal or multiple goals were 
scored in line with the chosen betting option.  
The post-experimental questionnaire 
After participants completed the experimental task, we administered a questionnaire 
designed to elicit their conclusions about the task. It is from this questionnaire that our 
dependent measures were constructed.  
To measure perceived control, we presented participants with the 15 items 
outlined in Table 4.1, and used factor analysis to reduce these 15 manifest variables to 
two latent variables, which (as outlined in the Results) loosely correspond to illusory 
primary and secondary control. These two variables formed our dependent measures 
for the two kinds of illusory control. 
The other dependent measures related to success-frequency. The retrospective 
success-frequency item asked people to state the percentage of shots that resulted in 
goals, whereas the prospective success-frequency item framed the question in terms of 
the percentage of successes the participant would expect to see if the task were 
continued (see Appendix 4A.3). For the retrospective item, the question was framed in 
terms of number of wins for half the participants, and in terms of the number of losses 
for the other half (for data analysis, we converted all responses to the “wins” format by 
subtracting responses in the loss frame from 100). 
The final component of the post-experimental questionnaire was a 
manipulation check item, intended simply to verify that participants noticed the 
success-slope to which they were exposed. Responses to this question confirmed that 
the manipulation was successful, especially in the „descending‟ condition, where 78% 
of participants indicated that “noticeably more wins occurred at the beginning”  (see 
Appendix 4A.4 for more details).82 
 
 Table 4.1. The main measure of inferred control in the post-experimental 
questionnaire (Ejova, Delfabbro & Navarro, 2010) 
When thinking about your wins/goals, to what extent would you use each of the 
following statements to describe how they came about? Rate each of the statements 
using a number from 0 to 10. As a guide, give a rating of 0 if you think that the 
phenomenon described by the statement was not one of the reasons, a rating of 5 if 
you think the phenomenon was a moderately important reason, and a rating of 10 if 
you think that the phenomenon was one of the most important reasons. 
1.
~  I got better with practice. 
2.  I learned how to predict the movements of the goalkeeper. 
3.  My skill in playing the game  
4.  Experience at playing computer games 
5.  The kick directions I chose 
α  
6.  My knowledge of soccer  
7.  I developed a logical strategy for playing the game.  
8.  The player(s) I chose 
9.  The bet options I chose 
α 
10.  I deserved to win. 
11.  I‟ve always been a lucky kind of person.  
12.  A certain lucky way of playing just seemed to work for me. 
13.  I took advantage of moments when my luck was good. 
14.  I knew how to make luck go my way. 
15.  It was all chance. 
~ Statement order was randomised for each participant 
α Statements added to the set used by Ejova, Navarro and Delfabbro (2010) 
 
 Additional methodological details 
Three additional methodological details are worth noting. Firstly, we wished to check 
that participants understood the instruction that the task was a gambling game rather 
than a solvable video game. To this end, the post-experimental questionnaire 
contained a yes/no question about whether a strategy was used. Those answering 
affirmatively were asked to describe the strategy. Participants, on the whole, could be 
concluded to have understood the instruction if some of the described strategies 
reflected reasoning typically observed in the face of random outcomes – gambler‟s-
fallacy-type reasoning (e.g., increasing bet amounts after a number of losses in 
expectation of an imminent win; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). As a listing of the 
strategies in Appendix 4D
8 shows, a substantial number of described strategies 
appeared to be informed by the gambler‟s fallacy.  
                                                 
8 Presented as an online supplement in the submitted version of the paper. 83 
 
Secondly, to conceal the purpose of the experiment from participants, the pre- 
and post-experimental questionnaires contained distractor items in addition to the 
theoretically interesting ones mentioned earlier. A mood questionnaire (Lorr & 
Wunderlich, 1988) was included in both the pre- and post-experimental 
questionnaires, and the post-experimental questionnaire required Likert or 10-point-
scale-based ratings of enjoyment of the game, strength of experienced emotional 
responses, and the extent to which the player profile feature and sound effects added 
to or reduced enjoyment. For the sake of brevity, we do not describe or analyse these 
items.   
Finally, debriefing focused on explaining that none of the task‟s choice 
features (player profiles, kick directions, betting timing) influenced outcomes (see 
Appendix 4E
9). We also took care to check whether our participants were at risk of 
experiencing gambling problems. To that end, the pre-experimental questionnaire also 
included the Problem Gambling Severity Index (Ferris & Wynne, 2001). If a 
participant‟s responses indicated that a risk of problem gambling existed, this was 
surreptitiously communicated to the experimenter via the colour of the on-screen 
message displaying the cash-out amount to be paid to the participant. Debriefing for 
these participants additionally involved providing them with an information sheet with 
help-service contact numbers.  
Results 
Estimating inferred control  
As noted in the previous section, we used a 15-item question (Table 4.1) to assess 
participants‟ inferences about control, and used factor analysis to reduce responses to 
two theoretically interpretable latent variables. Ejova, Navarro and Delfabbro‟s (2010) 
procedure for doing this was followed, with the items first being screened for 
sufficient variability and intercorrelation. Given that this analysis was complex and is 
not the central topic of investigation, details are relegated to Appendix 4C, and only a 
brief overview is provided here. Two items (9 and 15)  were removed from the 
analysis because their correlations did not appear robust. The remaining 13 items 
                                                 
9 Not included in the submitted version of the paper. 84 
 
loaded naturally onto two factors. The first factor consists of items 1-8, and can be 
interpreted as primary control, insofar as it consists of statements that refer to 
strategies and game features. Items 10-14 form a factor that resembles secondary 
control, inasmuch as it is defined by statements referring to luck and its sensitivity to 
deservingness. The factors were highly correlated
10. 
In addition to estimating the factor loadings of each item on the two latent 
variables, we calculated the factor scores for each participant, corresponding to the 
score that each participant is estimated to have on those variables. Specifically, 
because our two latent variables were correlated, we computed regression factor 
scores, an aggregate score suitable for describing an individual‟s position on 
correlated factors (DiStefano, Zhu & Mîndrilă, 2009).  
For the purposes of subsequent analyses, note that the regression factor scores 
standardised to a mean of zero, so negative factor scores indicated lower ratings on the 
statements associated with the factor, while positive scores indicated greater 
endorsement (greater inferred control). The distributions of both primary and 
secondary control factor scores were highly positively skewed (skew = .73 and .67, 
respectively), and had standard deviations of .96 and .92, respectively. It is these 
factor score variables that we use as our measures of perceived control in subsequent 
analyses. 
Inferred control across success-slopes 
To test the direction of the success-slope effect, scores on the two perceived control 
measures produced by the factor analysis were examined across success-slope 
conditions. This involved analyses of covariance (ANCOVAs) with success-slope 
condition as the predictor and two covariates: soccer interest and slot-machine beliefs 
as measured by the DBC. The „Primary‟ scale of the DBC, relating to non-
superstitious beliefs about chance, was the covariate in the analysis of the perceived 
primary control measure. Correspondingly, the DBC‟s „Secondary‟ scale, concerned 
                                                 
10 This is to be expected, given that numerous researchers have remarked that, in gambling contexts, 
beliefs in personal skill at predicting chance outcomes and some beliefs about luck (namely, the 
common belief that good luck comes in „cycles‟) might have the gambler‟s fallacy as a common source 
(Keren & Wagenaar, 1985; Livingstone, Wooley & Borrell, 2006). 85 
 
with superstitious and supernatural beliefs, was the covariate in the analysis of 
perceived secondary control
11.  
The degree of perceived primary control was found to vary as a function of 
success-slope (F(3,328) = 1.95, p = .03 pη
2 = .03) once the substantial effect of slot-
machine beliefs (DBC-Primary) was controlled for (F(1,328) = 120.21, p < .001, pη
2 = 
.27)
12. Figure 4.2 shows the estimated means for primary control when DBC-Primary 
was set to a constant (mean) value
13. As the distribution of means suggests, and as was 
confirmed by post-hoc tests with Bonferroni adjustment of the familywise α-level to 
.05, the estimated primary control mean was greater in the „ascending‟ condition 
relative to the „descending‟ condition (p = .04).  
Perceived secondary control was not affected by success-slope, but was 
predicted by slot-machine beliefs (F(1,328) = 114.63, p < .001, pη
2 = .26). Thus, the 
crucial result pertained to perceived primary control, with the „ascending‟ condition 
producing stronger inferences than the „descending‟ condition. 
                                                 
11 All three covariates were checked for homogeneity of variance across experimental conditions using 
univariate analysis of variance (all F(3,330) < 1). DBC-Total, used as a covariate in some later 
analyses, was also homogenous across conditions (F(3,330) < 1). 
12 Since the distribution of perceived primary control scores was highly skewed, a generalised linear 
model suitable for ordinal data was also fitted. The independent variable and covariates were the same 
as for the ANCOVA, but the model assumed a multinomial distribution and used a cumulative logit link 
function. The effect of success-slope was found to be marginally significant (Wald χ
2(3) = 7.35, p = 
.06). 
13 The marginal means for perceived primary control across experimental conditions were as follows. 
Descending: M = -.2, SD = .8; U-shaped: M = .04, SD = 1.0; Ascending: M = .2, SD = 1.1; Flat: M = 
.02, SD = 1.0.  
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Figure 4.2. Estimated means (and 95% CIs) of inferred primary 
control across success-slope conditions when covariates were 
evaluated at their mean values 
Figure 2. Estimated means (and 95% CIs) of inferred natural control 
across success slope conditions when covariates are evaluated at their 
mean values 
 
Inferred control vs. remembered success-frequency 
To formally test the widespread methodological assumption that estimated success-
frequency is a suitable proxy for control, success-frequency estimates (retrospective 
and prospective) were examined for their pattern across success-slope conditions. This 
pattern could then be compared to that observed for inferred primary control.  
Since success-frequency estimates on both measures were not normally 
distributed (as is typical with count data), the analysis of responses to each measure 
across success-slope conditions involved fitting a generalised linear model with an 
assumed negative binomial distribution and log link function. Gambling-related 
beliefs (DBC-Total) and soccer interest served as covariates in both analyses, and the 
analysis of retrospective frequency estimates had question framing (frequency of 
„goals‟ vs frequency of „misses‟) as an additional predictor. The analyses were 
conducted using IBM SPSS Statistics 19. 
Estimates of retrospective success-frequency were found to be influenced by 
question framing (Wald χ
2(1) = 21.32, p < .001) but not success-slope (Wald χ
2(3) = 
5.23, p = .16) or the interaction between framing and success-slope (Wald χ
2(3) = 87 
 
6.82, p = .08). Table 4.2 shows the estimates across success-slope conditions, broken 
down according to question frame. It can be seen that, across all conditions, estimates 
were higher when the question referred to „misses‟. As far as the effect of success-
slope itself is concerned, the table shows that there was a trend towards higher 
estimates in the „descending‟ condition relative to the „ascending‟ condition. This 
trend is in the opposite direction to that observed for inferred control ratings. To 
highlight this contrast, Figure 4.3 complements Figure 4.2 in showing mean 
retrospective success-frequency estimates across conditions, adjusted for covariates. 
Table 4.2. Mean remembered success-frequency estimates across success-slope 
conditions  
Estimate type 
„Descending‟  „U-shaped‟  „Ascending‟  „Flat‟ 
M 
(SD) 
CI95  M 
(SD) 
CI95  M 
(SD) 





























































> CI contains only values above the objective baseline success-frequency (16.7%), suggesting 
general overestimation 





Estimates of prospective success-frequency also did not differ significantly 
across experimental conditions (Wald χ
2(3) = 1.31, p = .72), but showed the same 
general trend of higher estimates in the „descending‟ condition. The means of the 
prospective estimates across conditions are shown in Table 4.2. 
Success-frequency estimates showed additional notable regularities across 
conditions, as can be seen in Table 4.2. Namely, answers to the retrospective question 
in the „miss‟ framing were largely overestimations of the objective success-frequency 
(1/6 = 16.7%). A further regularity was a general tendency towards overestimation in 
the „descending‟ and „flat‟ conditions. 
Figure 4.3. Estimated means (and 95% CIs) of retrospective success-
frequency estimates across success-slope conditions when covariates 
were evaluated at their mean values 
Mean retrospective success-frequency (and 95% CIs) across success-






The success-slope effect 
The main goal of this study was to determine which success-slopes produce stronger 
post-experimental inferences of illusory control. The results suggested that perceived 
primary control is largest in the „ascending‟ condition and lowest in the „descending‟ 
condition, with the „flat‟ and „U-shaped‟ conditions lying in the middle.  
The fact that the „ascending‟ condition produced the strongest inferences of 
control is broadly consistent with Matute‟s (1995) proposal that experiencing an 
increasing rate of successes can create the false impression of learning the correct 
strategy. The findings can alternatively be interpreted as evidence that experiencing a 
decreasing win rate in the „descending‟ condition leads to an accurate perception that 
no learning is occurring. Specifically, the „descending‟ condition might provide 
participants with a strong signal that whatever strategy they are attempting to employ 
does not work. After all, the participant is presumably trying to produce the successes, 
but in the „descending‟ condition the rate of such successes declines over time, making 
it very clear that these attempts have been unsuccessful. 
Primary and secondary control 
A second goal of the study was to employ more refined measures of the extent to 
which people perceived themselves to be in control of the outcome. In this respect, the 
outcomes are a little more mixed. On the positive side, the factor analysis did suggest 
that there are two distinct (but correlated) kinds of beliefs about control involved, 
consistent with Rothbaum et al. (1982) and Ejova et al. (2010). Moreover, it is 
reassuring to see that our measure of primary control within a complicated and realistic 
task produced a success-slope effect consistent with the results of a previous study that 
used a simpler design (Matute, 1995).  These results suggest that the success-slope 
effect is not an artefact of a particular way in which questions about perceived control 
are worded, nor is it restricted to simplistic experimental designs. 
On the negative side, part of our motivation for using richer measures of 
perceived control in the context of a rich and complicated task was to see if we could 90 
 
detect any interesting effects for secondary control. As noted in the Introduction, in 
real world gambling situations, people do make claims about secondary control. 
People often refer to „luck‟ as an entity that can be on the gambler‟s side, for instance 
(e.g., Keren & Wagenaar 1985). This is partly reflected in our results, to the extent that 
the degree of secondary control that participants reported in our task did correlate with 
their score on the relevant scale of the Drake Beliefs about Chance questionnaire. 
However, we did not uncover any evidence for a success-slope effect with respect to 
secondary control. 
Memory versus inferred control 
One of our major concerns outlined in the Introduction was the possibility that asking 
people what they remember about outcome frequency is not a good substitute for 
asking them about the amount of control they perceived over that outcome. This 
concern was borne out, in that, unlike ratings of inferred control, estimates of 
remembered success-frequency were found not to be affected by success-slope. 
Moreover, the success-frequency estimates displayed trends consistent with those 
observed in the memory literature. For instance, studies of memory point to a „spacing 
effect‟ – consistently better memory for stimuli more distributed across time (e.g., 
Glenberg, Bradley, Kraus & Renzaglia, 1983; Varey, Mellers & Birnbaum, 1990). The 
fact that we observed higher estimates in response to the „miss‟ framing of the 
retrospective success-frequency question (“What percentage of the shots you kicked 
over the course of the game resulted in misses?”) is consistent with this effect. 
Specifically, misses might have been remembered more poorly than goals because they 
were less widely spaced, with reverse-scoring of responses, therefore, producing 
overestimations.  
Similarly, what has been termed an „over-under effect‟ might have been 
operating in all conditions, manifesting itself in overestimation rather than accurate 
recall in the „descending‟ and „flat‟ conditions, and in accuracy rather than 
underestimation in the other two conditions. The effect refers to the tendency to 
overestimate low event frequencies and underestimate high ones (e.g., Begg, 1974; 
Erlick, 1964; Fiedler & Arbruster, 1994; Lichtenstein et al., 1978). Background beliefs 
about the task determine what constitutes „low‟ and „high‟ frequencies (Lichtenstein et 
al., 1978), so, given participants‟ beliefs about gambling and soccer, it is possible that 91 
 
the success-frequency of 1/6 was low in the context of the soccer task. The resultant 
upwards-adjustment of estimates in all conditions could have produced the observed 
pattern in the following ways. In the „flat‟ condition, the „spacing effect‟ could have 
produced accurate estimates, which were adjusted upwards to result in the observed 
overestimation. In the „descending‟ condition, the well-known „primacy effect‟, 
involving better memory for items and events at the beginning of a sequence (e.g., 
Murdock, 1962), could have resulted in accurate estimates, which were then adjusted 
upwards to produce the observed overestimation. In the „U-shaped‟ condition, the 
„primacy effect‟ would have been weaker because there were fewer target items 
(successes) to remember at the beginning of the sequence. Likewise, in the „ascending‟ 
condition, there were no target items at the beginning of the sequence, so a „primacy 
effect‟ could not occur. Thus, in these conditions, memory for successes might have 
been poorer but estimates might have been adjusted upwards as part of the „over-under 
effect‟, resulting in the observed accuracy.  
A „recency effect‟, involving better memory for the last items in a sequence, 
has also been widely documented and might have been expected to manifest itself in 
higher estimates in the „U-shaped‟ and „ascending‟ conditions. However, the „recency 
effect‟ is easily disrupted by interference tasks (e.g., Glanzer & Cunitz, 1966), which, 
in this experiment, occurred between the end of the experimental session and the time 
when the success-frequency question was answered. 
Of course, these memory-based explanations for the success-frequency findings 
are only speculative and require formal testing. However, the extent to which our 
results appear to agree with the memory literature does suggest that success-frequency 
estimates in illusion of control studies have, to date, reflected memory of the number 
of obtained wins rather than inferences about how wins can be obtained. 
Directions for future research 
One direction for future research could involve testing competing explanations for our 
main result – the finding that the „ascending‟ condition had higher associated inferred 
control levels than the „descending‟ condition. Matute (1995) obtained a similar 
finding and interpreted it to mean that participants in the „ascending‟ condition 
believed that they had learned the „correct‟ response. An alternative interpretation is 92 
 
that experiencing a declining success rate in the „descending‟ condition caused 
participants to accurately perceive that no learning was occurring. Testing Matute‟s 
explanation would involve observing behavioural patterns over time, as Matute did in 
finding that participants in the „ascending‟ condition were more likely to repeat the 
same response or response sequence during the last trials of the task. Analogously, in 
our experimental task, if Matute‟s interpretation is correct, the „ascending‟ condition 
should give rise to declining rates of player-profile change and kick-direction 
variability over time. 
Our findings also raise questions regarding the illusion of secondary control. 
One issue is that the fine details of the factor analysis used to establish the illusion of 
secondary control as a separate construct differed slightly from those in the study by 
Ejova et al. (2010; see Appendix 4C). The task for future research is to adjust the 
wording of the perceived-control measure to form a measure of inferred primary and 
secondary control that can be applied consistently across studies. Since the illusion of 
secondary control was found not to vary as a function of success-slope, another task 
for future research is to identify other factors that might influence this variant of the 
illusion. The degree of choice available in the gambling task has been suggested as a 
possibility.  Specifically, it has been suggested that greater opportunities for choice 
allow for a wider range of magical or superstitious beliefs to be applied in generating 
playing strategies (Rothbaum, Weisz & Snyder, 1982; Wohl & Enzle, 2002). For 
example, in our experimental task, the availability of a player profile choice option 
featuring famous soccer players allowed participants to select a „lucky‟ player. 
Removing this feature or using less well-known players should, by this logic, lead to a 
reduction in perceived secondary control.  
Future research could also set out to test our speculative claims about the 
memory effects underlying the observed pattern of success-frequency estimates across 
success-slope conditions. Specifically, one hypothesis was that an „over-under effect‟ 
(the tendency to overestimate the baseline success-frequency because it was only 1/6) 
operated in all conditions. This claim needs to be verified by obtaining success-
frequency estimates across different objective success frequencies within the soccer-
themed task and observing (a) whether lower frequencies are consistently 
overestimated while higher frequencies are consistently underestimated, and (b) 93 
 
whether 1/6 is among the „lower‟ (i.e., overestimated) frequencies. A second claim was 
that „recency effects‟ (better memory for events late in the sequence) disappeared in 
the „ascending‟ condition due to the time that elapsed between the end of the task and 
the presentation of success-frequency questions. This hypothesis can be tested by 
investigating whether the „ascending‟ condition produces higher success-frequency 
estimates when questioning is immediate rather than delayed. 94 
 
Appendices for Chapter 4 
Appendix 4A: Measures and procedure 
4A.1: Pre-experimental questionnaire 
Drake Beliefs About Chance Inventory (DBC; Wood & Clapham, 1995) 
Illusion of Control scale (DBC-Primary) 
1.  Wins are more likely to occur on a hot machine. 
2.  The more familiar I am with a slot machine game, the more likely I am to win. 
3.  It is good advice to stay with the same pair of dice on a winning streak. 
4.  Show me a gambler with a well-planned system and I'll show you a winner. 
5.  If a coin is tossed and comes up heads ten times in a row, the next toss is more 
likely to be tails. 
6.  There are secrets to successful slot machine, roulette and dice gambling that can be 
learned. 
7.  One should pay attention to lottery numbers that often win. 
8.  A good slot machine, roulette or dice gambler is like a sportsperson who knows 
winning plays and how to use them. 
9.  Some gamblers are just born lucky. 
10. The longer I've been losing, the more likely I am to win. 
11. I will be more successful if I have a system to play the slot machines. 
Superstition scale (DBC-Secondary) 
12. There may be magic in certain numbers. 
13. I can improve my chances of winning by performing certain special rituals 
14. There is useful information in my daily horoscope. 
15. Playing slot machines is a form of competition between the player and the 
machine. 
16. I believe that fate is against me when I lose. 
17. A game of chance is a contest of wills between the game and the player. 95 
 
18. When I take a test (or took them in the past) I use a lucky pen or pencil. 
19. When I need a little luck I wear lucky clothes or jewellery. 
20. I consider myself to be a superstitious person. 
21. I like to carry a coin, charm or token when I'm doing something important. 
22. I have a special system for picking lottery numbers. 
Soccer Interest 
To what extent are you interested in soccer? (0) Very strongly, (1) Strongly, (2) 
Mildly, (3) Very little, (4) Not at all 
 
4A.2: Task instructions 
Verbal and written instructions issued to participants upon arrival 
“There has been some speculation about the nature of psychological responses to 
themed gambling tasks, such as slot machine games based on well-known board games 
or sports. This study is concerned with your impressions of a soccer-themed gambling 
task we have designed for use in future research on this issue. The task operates on 
exactly the same principles as a slot machine, but looks slightly different because it has 
been adapted for the university laboratory, a setting that lacks the lights, sounds, and 
social atmosphere of real gambling venues. 
Participation in the experiment will involve completing a preliminary 
questionnaire about your gambling-related and soccer-related experiences, playing the 
computerised soccer-themed gambling game, and completing a questionnaire about 
your impressions of the gambling task.” 
On-screen instructions presented after completion of the pre-experimental 
questionnaire 
“You are now ready to play the soccer-themed gambling game itself! The game 
possesses the essential features of a slot machine game, but these features are 
embedded in a gaming environment that is thematically more interesting than standard 
slot machine games. 96 
 
Here are the basic rules of the game... You will start the game with $5 worth of 
credit. In each round, you will be able to choose how much credit to bet on whether a 
goal (or a set of goals) will be scored by a soccer player shown on the screen. Apart 
from the bet amount, you will also be asked to choose a player profile and the direction 
in which the ball will be kicked.” 
4A.3: Post-experimental questionnaire 
Inferred control 
Supplementary yes/no strategy measure:  
“Did your experience of the game suggest to you that you could draw on a strategy to 
produce goals when you needed them?  
If yes, briefly describe your strategy.” 
 
Remembered success-frequency  
Retrospective goals (for a random half of participants) 
“As far as you can remember, what percentage of the shots you kicked over the course 
of the game resulted in goals?” 
Retrospective misses (for a random half of participants) 
“As far as you can remember, what percentage of the shots you kicked over the course 
of the game resulted in misses?” 
Prospective 
“If you were allowed to kick another 100 shots in the game, on how many of those 
shots do you think you would score a goal?” 
4A.4: Post-experimental questionnaire: manipulation check 
Item 
As far as you can remember, what is the best way to describe the overall sequence of 
kick outcomes you experienced during the game?  
  Wins were relatively evenly spaced out across rounds;  
  Noticeably more wins occurred at the beginning;  97 
 
  Noticeably more wins occurred during the middle rounds;  
  Noticeably more wins occurred at the end;  
  Noticeably more wins occurred at the beginning AND at the end. 
  Other (please specify) 
Findings 
In the „descending‟ condition, the correct answer of “Noticeably more wins occurred at 
the beginning” was offered by 78% of participants. In the „ascending‟ condition, 55%  
reported experiencing most wins at the end, and 24% in the middle rounds. Among 
participants in the „flat‟ condition, 42% correctly recalled that “wins were relatively 
evenly spaced across rounds” and 25 % reported the wins to have been concentrated in 
the middle rounds. In the „U-shaped‟ condition, 47% reported seeing most wins in the 
beginning, 26% reported an even spread, and 15% correctly identified their sequence 
as having featured “more wins at the beginning AND at the end”.  98 
 
Appendix 4B: The experimental manipulation 
Participants experienced one of three possible outcome sequences in each success-
slope condition. In generating the „descending‟ sequences, it was decided that the four 
12-trial blocks comprising 48 trials would feature four, three, one, and zero wins, 
respectively. Numbers from one to 12 were then randomly generated without 
replacement to determine the exact position of the winning trials. Three different 
sequences were created in this way and Table 4B.1 shows one of them. 
The „flat‟ and „U-shaped‟ sequences were created in a similar manner, subject 
to the constraint that „flat‟ sequences would be characterised by two wins per 12-trial 
block, while the „U-shaped‟ sequences would feature three wins in the first and last 
blocks, and one in each of the middle blocks. The „ascending‟ sequences were 
obtained, simply, by flipping the „descending‟ sequences.  
Table 4B.1. An example of the outcome sequences experienced in the four success-
slope conditions 
  Success-slope condition 











































Appendix 4C: Factor analysis and preliminary screening of inferred 
control measure 
Before submitting responses on the inferred control measure (“To what extent would 
you use each of the following statements to describe the reason for your successes?”) 
to a factor analysis, two preparatory steps were taken. First, responses were checked 
for sufficient variability, as reflected in the frequency of non-zero ratings. The 
distribution of responses is summarised in Table 4C.1 and is almost identical to that 
obtained in our earlier study (Ejova, Delfabbro & Navarro, 2010). On average, 
approximately 60 percent of the ratings provided for each statement were not zero. The 
newly-introduced „Bet options‟ statement (9) was distinct in attracting non-zero ratings 
from 80 percent of participants. 
The second preparatory step, also conducted in the pilot study, was a screening 
procedure aimed at identifying statements correlating with other statements due solely 
to inter-correlating zero ratings. The procedure is as follows. Starting with the 
statement that attracted the most zero ratings, select only those participants who did 
not provide a zero rating for that statement. If, in this select dataset, the Spearman 
correlations of the statement with other statements become largely non-significant, 
exclude the statement from the subsequent factor analysis. The application of this 
procedure led to the exclusion of the „Chance‟ statement (15). While non-zero ratings 
on other statements correlated with ratings on a minimum of four statements (p < .01), 
non-zero ratings on this statement did not correlate with any statement ratings.  
For the 14 retained statements, an examination of initial communalities led to 
the further exclusion of the „Bet‟ statement (9) from the factor analysis. For the 
remaining statements, a Principal Axis Factoring (PAF) analysis was carried out upon 
ascertaining factorability (KMO = .94; Bartlett‟s test: 
2 (78) = 2130.11, p < .001; 
initial communalities shown in Table 4C.2.). Various criteria for extracting factors 
(eigenvalues greater than one, point of inflection on the scree plot and parallel 
analysis
14) suggested a two-factor solution (Hayton, Allen & Scarpello, 2004), so two 
factors were extracted. 
                                                 
14 The parallel analysis was carried out using the nFactors package (Raiche & Magis, 2010) in R 
Version 2.15.0. IBM SPSS Statistics 19.0 was used for all other analyses. 100 
 
Table 4C.1. Distribution of responses to statements comprising the inferred control 
measure (N = 334) 
# 21 of these Ss provided zero ratings on all other statements. 
 
Statement 
No. of participants providing an agreement 
rating of: 
0 out of 
10 
1 to 4 out 
of 10 





1.  I got better with 
practice.  156  84  44  50 
2.  I learned how to 
predict the movements 
of the goalkeeper. 
176  103  22  33 
3.  My skill in playing the 
game  145  117  35  37 
4.  Experience at playing 
computer games  150  87  43  54 
5.  The kick directions I 
chose  91  93  58  92 
6.  My knowledge of 
soccer    189  90  27  28 
7.  I developed a logical 
strategy for playing the 
game.  
114  96  46  78 
8.  The player(s) I chose  115  93  52  74 
9.  The bet options I chose  66  74  78  116 
10.  I deserved to win.  157  75  39  63 
11.  I‟ve always been a 
lucky kind of person.   141  104  52  37 
12.  A certain lucky way of 
playing just seemed to 
work for me.  
130  113  45  46 
13.  I took advantage of 
moments when my 
luck was good. 
131  87  30  86 
14.  I knew how to make 
luck go my way.  186  98  25  25 
  10 out of 
10 
9 to 6 out 
of 10 
5 out of 
10 
4 or less 
out of 10 
15.  It was all chance  143
#  116  47  23 
         









The factor loadings of statements following direct oblimin rotation (Costello & 
Osborne, 2005) are shown in Table 4C.2. In line with the pilot findings, statements 
relating to practice (1), skill (3), computer games (4), and strategy (7) clustered 
together in loading on a primary control factor (Factor 1). This factor also came to be 
defined by the „Goalkeeper‟ (2) and „Player profile‟ (8) statements, which had loaded 
on secondary control in Ejova et al. (2010). The newly-introduced statement about 
kick direction choices (5) also loaded on this factor, and the final statement comprising 
the factor was the „Soccer knowledge‟ statement (5), which was excluded from Ejova 
et al.‟s (2010) factor analysis because it attracted the highest number of zero ratings. 
Factor 2 corresponded to an inferred secondary control latent variable in consisting of 
the four luck-related statements (11-14) and the „Deserving to win‟ statement (10). The 
two factors were strongly correlated (r = .73).102 
 
Table 4C.2. For the 13 retained statements of the inferred control measure, initial 
communalities and factor loadings and communalities after extraction produced by a 
PAF analysis with oblimin rotation (N = 344) 





Factor loadings  Commu- 






1.  Practice  .66  .99    .74 
2.  Goalkeeper 
movements 
.55  .78    .57 
3.  Skill   .65  .72    .66 
4.  Computer games  .52  .68    .54 
5.  Kick direction   .37  .60    .37 
6.  Soccer 
knowledge  
.40  .57    .39 
7.  Strategy   .40  .55    .37 
8.  Player profiles  .36  .53    .34 
10.  Deserving to 
win 
.47    .84  .60 
11.  Self as lucky 
person  
.44    .69  .50 
12.  Lucky play 
pattern 
.49    .63  .54 
13.  Lucky moments  .45    .58  .49 
14.  Knowledge of 
luck 
.56  .40  .41  .57 
Variance accounted for after 
rotation: 
46%  5%   
Cronbach‟s alpha:  .88  .84   
 
Note: Factor loadings <.3 are suppressed 
 103 
 
Appendix 4D: Gambler’s-fallacy-based strategies 
Table 4D.1. Strategy descriptions of those who responded affirmatively to the post-
experimental-questionnaire item, “Did your experience of the game suggest to you that 
you could draw on a strategy to produce goals when you needed them?” Gambler‟s-
fallacy-based strategies are italicised. (N = 66) 
  Described strategy 
1.    Use the smallest bet (10) for three or four trials and then use the 100 
to win the credit. 
2.    After you spend around $1 you win a kick. But each time you spend 
more, so even if you win, you will still end up losing money. 
3.    Betting smaller bets during periods when there hadn‟t been a goal 
for a while, until there was a goal, and then increase bets. 
4.    Change bet, change player, and go for random [kick direction] 
occasionally. 
5.    Sometimes it worked just going for one side (e.g., the top right to 
score a goal) and eventually you would win using 100 credits to win 
535 credits. So the losses were won back usually. 
6.    Choose the same shot. 
7.    Top right every time. 
8.    Not really, but since most times there was no goal, after a long space 
of time without scoring, I upped the bet conservatively in the 
expectation that the people who design these things have to let you 
win sometimes. 
9.    Don‟t choose the random kick direction; choose to kick in only one 
direction every time, then approximately every second or third kick 
you‟ll get a goal and you can bet more on the second and third but 
bet a little on the first kick. 
10.    Go for the same spot over and over and eventually it will go in. 
11.    I had two or three goal streaks. I guess I could stick with betting the 
lowest amount until I got a goal or two, then start betting 50 or 100. 
12.    I think that once I changed players, I would score in the first two or 
three shots of the new player. I found that if I didn‟t change players 
for a while, I didn‟t score, so I changed players after every goal. 
13.    I thought if I bet low for a few kicks the next I would bet higher and 
get a goal, but I think this was all just luck. 
14.    I thought it was always best to start low, go easy on the money. Then 
later try higher amounts. I also tried to do random kicks. 104 
 
15.    I tried to reduce the amount I was betting after I had won for a few 
rounds so I wouldn't lose a lot since it was unlikely I would win twice 
in a row. 
16.    I would place a higher bet after 5-7 goals, as I thought a goal would 
most likely occur. 
17.    Invest 10 for the same direction three times and then invest 100 for 
this direction. 
18.    Keep kicking the same direction, regardless of misses. 
19.    Keep trying the same kick direction until you win. 
20.    Keep staying on the „1 goal in 2 trials‟ bet option with random 
kicking direction. 
21.    Choose Kaka; start small and increase bet; goalie weakest on top left 
but can surprise with change to top right. 
22.    Top corners seemed to result in more goals. If hit a dry streak, hit 
random a few times in a row. 
23.    Never stick to one particular formula. If Plan A doesn‟t seem to work 
out, try Plan B! I switched between betting on the next shot  and on 
one goal in two shots”. 
24.    A certain player could score a goal in the left hand of the goals every 
second shot. 
25.    By changing the player profile. 
26.    I started using top left or top right because that‟s when I was scoring 
goals. 
27.    After several shots, choose “random” [kick direction]. 
28.    Bet 100 credits three times in a row and pick a particular way to 
shoot that three times in a row. 
29.    Two times top right kick will lose; third time will be a goal. 
30.    Choose a strong player. 
31.    Choose the right down, then right up, the last may get score. 
32.    Choose Beckham? 
33.    Beckham scores more goals. 
34.    Cristiano Ronaldo top right. 
35.    At least with the Ronaldo profile, there didn‟t seem to be any point in 
shooting to the right or top right. 105 
 
36.    Playing with Ronaldinho, I felt there was a higher chance of him 
kicking a goal if I picked the top left corner as the kicking direction. 
37.    Right-footed players tend to curl the ball to the top left corner if on 
the left side of the goal. So, when kicking left side of goal outside the 
box [as in the task], use a player like Beckham and shoot to the top 
right-hand corner. 
38.    I thought the left sides seemed to do better than the right sides for 
goal shot options. 
39.    Use the best player. 
40.    Keep rotating the players and some players appear to be good at 
scoring by kicking in some directions. 
41.    It was more favourable to select kicks on goal on the left-hand side. 
Another factor was the penalty taker [player profile]. Kaka seemed to 
score more goals than the rest of the players. Ronaldinho did not 
score any. 
42.    Watch the keeper to kick the ball in the right place. 
43.    The higher the bet is, the higher the chance of scoring after a few 
shots in the same direction. 
44.    Beckham got more goals than the other players I used. Most goals 
happened lower left and right. 
45.    Try to use different patterns of shooting choices (first top left then 
top right; top left then bottom right; a few of random shooting or 
same direction of shoots for 2 to 3 times). 
46.    Deliberately kick in one direction, then in the next round kick in the 
complete opposite direction. 
47.    Kick up the top seemed to go in more than along the bottom. 
48.    Make two shots to the same angle and there is likely to be a goal. 
49.    Moving from sector [kick direction] to sector. If without score, 
change value of bet. 
50.    Kicking to the left and bottom directions produced goals. 
51.    Pay attention to the movement of goalkeeper. 
52.    The kicking tactics used by the four players to shoot goals – knowing 
these (i.e., knowing the players‟ style) can determine how to gamble. 
53.    Maybe there was some connection between the role of player 
designed in the game and the chance of winning the game. But it 
does not always happen. 
54.    Concentrate more. 106 
 
55.    This is not really a strategy for producing goals. I divided the 
potential winnings by how much it cost to play for each type of bet, 
to determine which bet was best to make. 
56.    Bet on one goal out of two kicks, as this option provided the best 
odds to win (approximately 1:5 return). If I can score one goal in less 
than 10 kicks, I will be winning money. 
57.    Choose to bet 40 credits because I think it gives more chance to win 
the prize. 
58.    The bet on 40 for one goal in two rounds is the best choice because I 
played several times on it and it seemed the chance is equal. It is 
worth choosing because you can get 127 on one bet. 
59.    I wanted to prove that the psychology department does not provide 
enough money to fund research, so I used bet options that had large 
but unlikely winnings on offer. Turns out, my hypothesis was 
proven. 
60.    Unsure really but I was trying to figure out some kind of strategy. 
However I am not convinced that it would have helped at all anyway. 
61.    When you are playing the cards, if you have a good memory, you 
will win easily. 
62.    Observe other players and be familiar with the game before playing 
it. 
63.    To aim for  a goal in order to get back the credit. 
64.    It's all about luck. 
65.    Randomness. 
66.    Yes. 107 
 
Appendix 4E: De-briefing 
To cement and expand on a verbal de-briefing, participants were issued a brochure 
with the following information. 
De-briefing: Some cautionary points about gambling 
The soccer-themed-gambling game you played was, in many respects, similar to a slot 
machine game, although it clearly lacked many of the features of slot machine games 
in a realistic setting, including the pub or casino atmosphere, the special slot machine 
music, and the sound of coins being won on neighbouring machines. However, there is 
always the danger that even after taking part in a game of chance as basic as the one 
presented in this experiment, you could come to find gambling more attractive – 
particularly if, say, you found yourself winning more towards the end of the session (as 
though you had „learned‟ something) or winning something at even intervals (as 
though chance was really being „fair‟). This sheet outlines a couple of facts about the 
nature of games of chance that should make you leave here convinced that there is 
absolutely nothing you can do to become more successful – that is, more likely to win 
money – at such games.  In fact, frequent gambling can lead to nothing but loss of 
money. 
Common misconceptions about gambling 
Studies in which participants verbalised their thoughts while playing slot-machine-type 
games revealed that people tend to erroneously think that they can exert control over 
the outcomes of such games. This „illusion of control‟ in relation to gambling 
outcomes has been observed not only among people with gambling problems, but also 
among people who gamble only recreationally. The illusion comes in two forms: 
(1) Illusion of natural control: The belief that there exist skills and strategies for 
increasing one‟s chances of success in gambling-related games 
When gambling, many people tend to devise skill-based strategies in an attempt to 
control the uncontrollable. Most commonly, players attempt to predict when the next 
win is due based on the preceding sequence of outcomes. On slot machines, for 
example, they believe that the occurrence of a long string of losses heralds a win 
because the random nature of the outcomes implies that there must be a fair degree of 108 
 
random alternation between wins and losses. Guided by this conviction, people playing 
slot machines tend to increase their bets after a series of losses, believing that in doing 
so they maximise the amount of the win that (they think) is due any second. The same 
type of reasoning motivates slot machine players to begin their gambling session on a 
machine that has not paid out much during the day. It is also why roulette players 
believe that the ball is highly likely to fall on a red number after falling on black 
numbers eight consecutive times.  
Other strategies reported by slot machine gamblers include thinking that free 
spins mean something, thinking that near-misses mean something, and not playing on 
days when pub owners might tamper with machines to make them pay out less. 
A popular explanation for why people develop these erroneous strategies in 
gambling contexts is that people have a natural capacity for learning and planning 
when looking for solutions to challenging problems. In most environments, solutions 
to the problems are available – just not immediately evident. Gambling environments, 
however, are very unique. They are intentionally structured so as to present humans 
with problems (that is, games) to which there are no solutions (that is, no strategies for 
ensuring success). This means that in gambling contexts the usually helpful ability to 
learn manifests itself as the erroneous illusion of control, causing people to try out 
various skill-based strategies for improving their performance when, in reality, 
performance is completely unrelated to personal skill. 
Many explanations also exist for why people‟s strategies in gambling contexts 
so commonly revolve around the idea that „chance is fair even in the short-term‟. One 
explanation is that most of the cycles people encounter in life do come to an end. For 
example, the longer a rainy period continues, the closer a sunny period. Readings 
outlining the different theories are listed in the „Further reading‟ section at the end of 
this document. 
(2) Illusion of supernatural control: The belief that luck/god is an ally that can be relied 
on to produce winning outcomes 
While some people succumb to the natural impulse to view gambling outcomes as 
being controllable through skill, many are prepared to acknowledge that gambling 
outcomes are chance-determined and, thus, not subject to skill-based control. 109 
 
However, the latter group can fall into a different trap – the trap of thinking that, 
during gambling, the forces of chance are „with them‟ because they were born lucky, 
because they deserve to win, because they said a prayer prior to gambling or because 
they are wearing their lucky socks. Slot machine players who entertain this conception 
of gambling may always play on one machine, considering it their „lucky‟ machine. 
Roulette players who perceive chance as their ally may bet on favourite or lucky 
numbers.  
According to an article by Atran and Norenzayan (2004; see „Further reading‟) 
modern superstitious/religious beliefs are offshoots of beliefs humans have held for 
four million years (i.e., over the course of human evolution). The beliefs are likely to 
have evolved due to a combination of factors acting together – factors such as fear of 
death/illness, the tendency to react to every rustling of leaves as though it might signal 
the approach of a predator, and the tendency to hold separate theories about 
„substances‟, „plants‟, „animals‟ and „humans‟. 
Features of gambling environments that maintain people‟s misconceptions 
about gambling 
Games of chance on slot machines and at casino tables are, in fact, designed to 
enhance players‟ perceptions of the game outcomes as being controllable through skill, 
alignment with supernatural forces, or both of these factors. For example, consider slot 
machine games and roulette: 
  Slot machines: When playing on slot machines, players can choose how their 
screen looks, how fast the reels spin and how much money to bet in each round. 
Free spins are occasionally awarded, and many machines now feature „bonus 
games‟. Also, the reels are designed in such a way that many near-misses are 
experienced. This is done by making a symbol common on four reels, but not on 
the fifth. All of these game features provide ample opportunities for learning 
different playing rules, or finding „lucky‟ playing options, even though, really, 
there are no rules for playing. 
  Roulette: In many casinos, the winning numbers of previous rounds of roulette are 
shown on a screen near the roulette table. This suggests to players that studying the 
sequence of preceding outcomes is in some way related to success in the game. 110 
 
Making available such a results summary, thus, only encourages players to put into 
practice the irrational strategy of determining what number or colour to bet on 
based on how often the number or colour has won in the past. 
Overcoming the common misconceptions about gambling: two things everyone 
should know about games of chance 
Games of chance have a negative winning expectancy 
The winning expectancy in a game of chance corresponds to the amount of money that 
is, in the long term, redistributed among players (in the form of wins) from the pool of 
money that the players, as a collective, put into the game when placing their bets. For 
the individual gambler, the winning expectancy determines what he or she can gain 
from playing the game over a long period of time. Games in gambling environments 
have a negative winning expectancy. That is, they are designed in such a way that 
players who take part in them inevitably lose money as a group, and – for those who 
bet repeatedly – as individuals. The gambling industry generates profits by giving back 
less money than it collects. Back to our good old examples – slot machine games and 
roulette… 
In South Australia, State law prescribes that slot machines should, on average, 
return as wins 85 to 87% of the money that is put in them. This means that, in the long 
run, players lose 15% of the money they put in. As an illustration, imagine that Luis 
has one million dollars that he is prepared to spend playing slot machines. Given that 
the winning expectancy in slot machine games is -15%, Luis should have roughly 
$850,000 left after putting one million dollars into the machines. If he then decides to 
play his $850,000, he will lose another 15% of that, and so on. 
In roulette, the casino collects 5.26% of the money that is bet on a wheel that 
contains two zeros, and 2.7% of the money that is bet on a single-zero wheel. 
The messages to take away based on this information about the negative 
winning expectancy: 
  Players taking part in games of chance tend to believe that the greater the number 
of losses they experience, the closer they are to a win. In reality, however, time acts 
against the gambler. The winning expectancy in gambling-related games is always 111 
 
negative, which means that it is mathematically impossible for players who bet 
repeatedly to consistently recover or recuperate losses. Regular gamblers 
inevitably lose more than they win. It is only by playing very infrequently that 
one can actually avoid losing the amount of money prescribed by the negative 
winning expectancy.  
  Awareness of the fact that there is a negative winning expectancy associated with 
gambling-related games should also limit the extent to which you may endorse the 
idea that consistent wins are possible if you take steps to align yourself with luck or 
god. A person would have to have very tight control over luck and god in 
order to consistently win in a game that is designed to make you lose in the 
long run. 
 
Games of chance are based on the principle of the independence of turns 












If you found yourself analysing the first nine outcomes even for an instant before 
making your prediction, you committed a logical error. The probability of Heads or 
Tails landing face up is always 50% (one in two). This probability is the same for 
every individual throw regardless of the outcomes of any preceding throws because the 
coin has neither a „memory‟ of previous turns, nor an „intention‟ to create a sequence 
of outcomes that looks „appropriately‟ random. This „independence of turns‟ means 
that an observer cannot make use of any kind of strategy in predicting the outcome of 
any particular turn. Actually, independence from preceding outcomes is what makes an 
outcome purely chance-determined or random. 
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The outcomes of gambling-related games are independent of each other in 
exactly the same way as the outcomes of coin tosses. In fact, if you think about it, 
betting on whether the next winning number on a roulette table will be black or red is 
equivalent to betting on the outcome of a coin toss. The probability of a black or red 
number winning is 50% and the outcomes are independent of each other because the 
table does not have any memory for preceding outcomes. Slot machines are also 
programmed in such a way that the outcomes of individual rounds are completely 
independent of each other. The various sizes of bets and the number of ways in which 
the combination of winning symbols can be obtained are set in accordance with the 
long-run winning expectancy of -15%. Within these parameters, outcomes are 
completely randomly generated. Every turn is a unique and final game in itself. 
It is within the interests of the gambling industry to ensure that the outcomes of 
gambling-related games are fully chance-determined. If there actually were strategies 
for winning that could be detected through careful observation of the game‟s 
outcomes, the gambling industry‟s profits would be eroded by the wins of players who 
manage to discover the strategies. That is why it is actually not profitable for pubs and 
casinos to program the machines to pay out less on certain days. In other words, games 
in a gambling setting are purposefully designed in such a way that players do not need 
any intelligence or skill to participate. Players are encouraged to think that there is skill 
involved. That‟s how the gambling industry keeps them coming back. But, hopefully, 
after reading this, you will not be one those people! 
The study you took part in 
The study you took part in our laboratory consisted of a survey about slot-machine-
related beliefs followed by a gambling session involving a soccer-themed slot-
machine-type game. 
You played a slot-machine-like game under one of four outcome sequence 
conditions before indicating the extent to which you thought game outcomes were 
controllable (in a natural and supernatural sense). The four conditions were as follows: 
  An „end‟ condition, where most wins occurred at the end of the session. 
  An „even‟ condition, where wins were evenly spaced across the session. 113 
 
  A „beginning‟ condition, where wins were concentrated at the beginning of the 
session. 
  A „U-shaped‟ condition, where wins were concentrated at the beginning and at the 
end. 
 
Results showed that (natural) control ratings were highest in the „end‟ 
condition, most likely because that condition made participants feel as though they had 
learned some way of playing. This perception of learning emerged despite there being 
no objectively correct way of playing the game. 
Further reading 
  Much of the material presented here was drawn from Ladouceur, Sylvain, Boutin 
and Doucet‟s (2002) book, Understanding and treating the pathological gambler. 
The book provides an excellent, easily-readable introduction to theories of 
gambling and the therapies available for treating problem gambling. 
  The first laboratory-based investigation of the illusion of control was by Ellen 
Langer and it was described in an article titled, The illusion of control, in the 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 32, 311–328 (1975). 
  For various theories about why erroneous beliefs in the fairness of short chance 
sequences are so widespread, see: 
  Estes,W. K. (1964). Probability learning. In A.W. Melton (Ed.), Categories of 
human learning (pp. 88–128). New York: Academic Press. 
  Hahn, U., & Warren, P. A. (2009). Perceptions of Randomness: Why Three 
Heads Are Better Than Four. Psychological Review, 116, 454-461. 
  Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1974). Judgement under Uncertainty: Heuristics 
and Biases. Science, 185, 1124-1131. 
  The article about the evolution of beliefs in luck, god and other supernatural forces 
was by Scott Atran and Ara Norenzayan. It was titled, Religion‟s evolutionary 
landscape: Counterintuition, commitment, compassion, communion, and published 
in Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 27, 713-770 (2004). 
Useful phone numbers 
Gambling Helpline  
1800 060 757 (Freecall) 114 
 
24 Hour, 7 Day, Free, Anonymous and Confidential Telephone Counselling, 
Information and Referral Service  
Other gambling help services 
  Relationships Australia (Break Even and Gamblers‟ Help): (08) 8223 4566 
  Anglicare SA: (08) 8301 4200 (Western suburbs): 8256 2160 (other suburbs) 
  OARS Gambling Support Service: (08) 8218 0700 115 
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Abstract: A number of psychometric instruments have been developed to measure 
people‟s susceptibility to erroneous beliefs relating to gambling. Few of these have, 
however, been based on a conceptual framework that examines the relationship 
between different belief types and common processes underlying these beliefs. In this 
paper, we report the findings of a confirmatory factor analysis that examines the 
proposal that most erroneous gambling-related beliefs can be defined in terms of 
Rothbaum et al.‟s (1982) distinction between „primary‟ and „secondary‟ illusory 
control, with the former being driven to a large extent by the well-known gambler‟s 
fallacy and the latter being driven by a complex of beliefs about supernatural forces 
such as God and luck. A survey consisting of 100 items derived from existing 
instruments was administered to 329 participants. The analysis confirmed the existence 
of two latent structures (beliefs in primary and secondary control), while also offering 
support to the idea that gambler‟s fallacy-style reasoning may underlie both perceived 
primary control and beliefs about the cyclical nature of luck, a form of perceived 
secondary control. The results suggest the need for a greater focus on the role of 
underlying processes or belief structures as factors that foster susceptibility to specific 
beliefs in gambling situations. Addressing and recognising the importance of these 
underlying factors may also have implications for cognitive therapy treatments for 
problem gambling. 116 
 
Introduction 
Erroneous beliefs about gambling have long been thought to play a role in the 
development and maintenance of problem gambling (e.g., Ladouceur et al., 2001; 
Walker, 1992b). The beliefs have been documented in therapy case studies, interview 
data, and transcripts of gambling sessions in which players verbalise their thoughts 
(Griffiths, 1994; Keren & Wagenaar, 1985; Ladouceur, Sylvain, Boutin & Doucet, 
2002; Livingstone, Wooley & Borrell, 2006; Toneatto et al., 1997; Walker, 1992a). 
Based on this data, numerous surveys for measuring erroneous gambling-related 
beliefs have been developed. The surveys consist of largely erroneous statements about 
gambling (e.g., “My choices or actions affect the game on which I‟m betting”), and an 
agreement rating is required for each statement. The most commonly used surveys are 
the Drake Beliefs About Chance Inventory (Wood and Clapham, 2005), the Gamblers‟ 
Beliefs Questionnaire (Steenbergh, Meyers, May & Whelan, 2002), the Informational 
Biases Scale (Jefferson & Nicki, 2003), and the Gambling Related Cognitions Scale 
(Raylu & Oei, 2004). These surveys have been not only validated within various 
populations (e.g, students, wider community, people who gamble), but also subjected 
to exploratory factor analysis to gain insight into categories of erroneous gambling-
related beliefs. 
Central to all of the gambling-beliefs surveys is the concept of „illusory 
control‟. Most commonly ascribed to Langer (1975), this bias refers to the tendency for 
people to over-estimate the amount of control they believe they can exert in chance-
determined situations. In Langer‟s view, the illusion occurs as a result of the confusion 
of chance and skilled activities in chance activities characterised by particular 
situational factors, including the availability of choice, practice and physical 
involvement. In a subsequent literature review by Rothbaum, Weisz and Snyder 
(1982), illusory control was divided into two categories: „primary‟ and „secondary‟. 
Primary control relates to strategies aimed at physically changing the game 
environment, whereas secondary control involves attempts to influence outcomes 
through alignment with higher forces such as luck and God. In general this distinction 
has not been recognised in most of the factor solutions developed in gambling-beliefs 
surveys, although the two sub-scales of Wood and Clapham‟s (2005) survey appear, in 
general terms, to correspond to the two dimensions of illusory control postulated by 
Rothbaum and colleagues.  117 
 
Conceptual complexities 
Although the illusion of control has often been referred to in factor analytic gambling-
beliefs studies, other belief categories have also been considered. One of the most 
common of these is the gambler‟s fallacy, a belief about the sequencing of chance-
based outcomes. Specifically, this is the belief that random sequences tend to self-
correct even in the short-term, producing a „head‟ after a series of „tails‟ in a coin toss 
game, a „red‟ after a series of „blacks‟ in roulette, and a win after a series of losses on 
slot machines (Nickerson, 2002; Oskarsson, Van Boven, McClelland & Hastie, 2009). 
The fallacy is commonly expressed in behaviours such as the seeking out of slot 
machines that are „due‟ for a win (e.g., “One‟s chances of winning are better if 
gambling on a [slot] machine that has not paid out in a long time”; Jefferson & Nicki, 
2003).  
In general, the gambler‟s fallacy and the illusion of control have been discussed 
as separate belief categories in a number of factor analyses. However, a potential 
difficulty with this approach is that many of the beliefs relating to systems and 
strategies in gambling (often considered instances of the illusion of control) are likely 
to be related to the gamblers‟ fallacy. For example, people who have a strategy for 
picking machines, knowing when to stop playing, or which numbers to pick in roulette 
or lotteries will often refer to outcomes being more (or less) likely because of previous 
sequences of events (e.g., Livingstone, Wooley & Borrell, 2006). As a result, there is a 
danger of a conceptual confusion between items relating to illusory control and the 
gambler‟s fallacy in existing survey instruments. Conceptually, it may be that 
correlations between items relating to various strategies for gambling may be 
explained by the very strong influence of gambler‟s-fallacy-style reasoning.  
Another potential difficulty in gambling-beliefs surveys relates to the concept 
of luck. In the wider literature on gambling and in introductions to gambling-beliefs 
survey studies, it is often implied that luck is a supernatural force with which players 
attempt to engage through rituals and objects (e.g., lucky charms; Henslin, 1967; 
Joukhador, Blaszczynski & Macallum, 2004; Toneatto, 1999). Appealing to luck in 
this way is a form of illusory secondary control under Rothbaum et al.‟s (1982) 
definition. However, it is evident that luck is a more complex concept. Wohl and Enzle 
(2002, 2009) have, for example, also argued that people believe luck to be a stable 118 
 
personal quality, possessed by individuals to various degrees. Luck may also be linked 
to the gambler‟s fallacy in that those who subscribe to the fallacy may reason that luck 
comes in cycles. Indeed, people have reported believing that a skilled player is one 
who is able to know when their luck is „in season‟ and who can anticipate when luck is 
no longer available (Keren & Wagenaar, 1985).   
Given complexities of this nature, we argue that there is a need for greater 
conceptual thinking relating to the design of gambling-related belief measures. At 
present, most of these measures are set out in the form of a typology, often without any 
overall underpinning conceptual framework. Little attempt is made to examine the 
conceptual relationship between different types of beliefs (e.g., the illusion of control, 
beliefs about luck and the gambler‟s fallacy). In our view, it is important to: (a) 
distinguish between the two forms of illusory control, (b) understand to what extent 
broader biases such as the gambler‟s fallacy influence more specific gambling-related 
beliefs, and (c) understand whether items relating to the gambler‟s fallacy can easily be 
distinguished from measures of illusory control. Such conceptual issues are important 
in determining the construct validity of measures and the potential belief structures that 
should be addressed in treating problem gamblers.  
Our interest in this topic is informed by recent developments in cognitive 
science, most notably an emerging literature that has drawn attention to the important 
role played by existing general belief structures in influencing how people might 
respond to situations, including gambling situations. In other words, rather than seeing 
instances of the illusion of control as merely the result of situational factors (choice, 
personal involvement, etc.) as Langer suggested, it is proposed that erroneous beliefs 
may result from the interaction between situational factors and existing belief 
structures. Not only can existing belief structures cause particular situational factors to 
be noticed, but apparent situational factors can be interpreted in light of the structures 
(Harris & Osman, 2012; Murphy & Medin, 1985). For example, in relation to the 
illusion of secondary control, it is likely that there are broader belief structures that 
make people susceptible to beliefs of this nature. As Atran and Norenzayan (2004) 
point out, three broad interconnected belief structures about supernatural beings are 
observed across cultures and mostly likely to be by-products of the evolution of 
adaptive cognitive faculties. These are beliefs in supernatural agents (e.g., gods, 119 
 
ghosts, luck), beliefs in the power and omniscience of these agents with regard to 
important events (e.g., death and calamity), and beliefs about rituals directed at the 
agents (e.g., wearing lucky socks).  
Other general belief structures (again, very likely evolved) are likely to 
underlie people‟s susceptibility to illusions of primary control. However, whereas the 
illusion of secondary control may be influenced by a structure of beliefs about 
supernatural entities, the illusion of primary control must be the product of belief 
structures relating to non-supernatural (i.e., natural/physical) phenomena. We propose 
that, in games of chance, the gambler‟s fallacy is a particularly relevant general belief 
structure. It is general in that it has been argued to be unavoidable in games of chance 
due to the operation of the representativeness heuristic (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974).  
A summary of the implications of these conceptual complexities for emerging 
belief categories in gambling-beliefs surveys is presented in Figure 5.1 and Table 5.1. 
The illusions of primary and secondary control are presented as belief categories 
expressed through agreement with the survey statements. Sub-categories of survey 
statements are shown as arising, at least in part, from the gambler‟s fallacy and/or 
supernatural beliefs as defined by Atran and Norenzayan (2004). The joint influence of 
these broader belief structures results in the belief that luck appears and disappears in 
cycles. Otherwise, the gambler‟s fallacy gives rise to sub-categories of the illusion of 
primary control while general supernatural beliefs give rise to sub-categories of the 
illusion of secondary control. We elaborate on the sub-categories below, with example 
statements being presented in Table 5.1. 120 
 
 
Fig 5.1. A proposed basis for distinguishing between the illusions of primary and 
secondary control: the general belief structures that give rise to them. Notably, in a 
gambling context, where luck is a particularly relevant supernatural agent, the 
gambler‟s fallacy contributes to shaping the belief that luck is cyclical. 
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Table 5.1. Examples of statements from sub-categories of the illusions of primary and 
secondary control 
Illusion of primary control 
Beliefs in „negative recency‟ strategies 
  If I‟m experiencing a losing streak, the thought that a win has to be coming 
soon keeps me gambling.
1 
  I should keep the same bet even when it hasn‟t come up lately because it is 
bound to win.
2 
  Sometimes I feel that I can keep winning because I have learned to predict the 
next random, new thing the machine is going to do.
3 
Beliefs in „systems of play‟ (i.e., strategies generally) 
  Show me a gambler with a well-planned system and I‟ll show you a winner.
4 
  I know I can win if I follow my strategies.
5 
Beliefs in a „persistence‟ strategy 
  If I continue to gamble, it will eventually pay off and I will make money.
2 
  Those who don‟t gamble much don‟t understand that gambling success requires 
dedication and a willingness to invest some money.
2 
 
Illusion of secondary control 
Beliefs in the „power and omniscience‟ of supernatural agents 
  I believe that fate is against me when I lose.
4 
  Some gamblers are just born lucky.
4 
Beliefs in „ritual‟ appeals to supernatural agents 
  There are certain things I do when I am betting (for example, tapping a certain 
number of times, holding a lucky coin in my hand, crossing my fingers, etc.) 
which increase the chances that I will win.
2 
  I can improve my chances of winning by performing special rituals.
4 
Belief that „luck is cyclical‟ 
  There are times that I feel lucky and thus gamble those times only.
1 
  It is good advice to stay with the same pair of dice on a winning streak.
4 
 
1 The Informational Biases Scale (Jefferson & Nicki, 2003) 
2 Gamblers‟ Beliefs Questionnaire (Steenbergh et al., 2002) 
3 Newly-written for this study 
4 Drake Beliefs About Chance Inventory (Wood & Clapham, 2005) 
5 Thoughts and Beliefs About Gambling Questionnaire (Joukhador, Maccallum & 
Blaszczynski, 2003) 122 
 
Operationalising the illusion of primary control 
With respect to perceived primary control, an inspection of existing gambling-beliefs 
survey items points to three principal sub-categories, all potentially reflecting the 
gambler‟s fallacy in some way. The first consists of strategies arising directly from the 
fallacy; that is, directly from the „negative recency‟ expectation that, in games of 
chance, the most recent outcome types will fail to repeat (Oskarsson et al., 2009). 
Strategies in this category include waiting for a win that is due, betting progressively 
higher amounts on one colour in roulette in expectation that the colour will be the 
winning one eventually, and alternating between colours in line with expectations of 
what outcome the random roulette wheel will produce next. Use of the two latter 
strategies has been observed in field settings (Walker, 1992b) and empirically 
demonstrated in a laboratory roulette game (Ayton & Fischer, 2004). 
A second set of statements in gambling-beliefs surveys contain references to 
systems of play (i.e., strategies) more generally. Since the gambler‟s fallacy is central 
to human (or, at least, Western) concepts of chance, it is possible that many strategies 
in gambling are informed by the fallacy. However, it is possible that playing systems 
are additionally informed by beliefs less general than the gambler‟s fallacy – beliefs 
about specific situational aspects of the task. Some of these situational factors were 
identified by Langer. For example, the free spin feature on slot machines, a choice and 
physical-involvement factor in Langer‟s terms, gives rise to numerous strategic beliefs 
(Livingstone, Wooley & Borrell, 2006). Another way of defining these more-situation-
specific beliefs is as rules for playing acquired through learning, problem-solving, or 
conditioning (e.g., Anderson, 1990; Skinner, 1948). 
The third natural sub-category is a set of beliefs about the effectiveness of a 
persistence strategy in gambling. It follows from the gambler‟s fallacy that, after a 
series of losses, persistence in playing on a particular chosen option or slot machine 
makes a win imminent in the short-term. However, the belief in an imminent win can 
also proceed from a general adaptive sense of optimism (Cummins & Nistico, 2002), 
and from a feeling of entrapment in a losing investment (Walker, 1992b). Overall, 
then, the illusion of primary control expresses itself in three belief categories, shaped 
by the gambler‟s fallacy, learning and motivational factors. 123 
 
Operationalising the illusion of secondary control 
Beliefs constituting the illusion of secondary control in a gambling context appear to 
fall into the sub-categories prescribed by the existing characterisation of supernatural 
beliefs (Atran & Norenzayan, 2004). Table 5.1, once again, provides examples of 
representative survey statements. The first sub-category of supernatural control beliefs 
pertains to the omniscience and power of supernatural agents. With regard to one 
supernatural agent, luck, the fact that people believe it to be influential in important 
life events (e.g., escape from negative consequences) has even been demonstrated 
empirically (Wagenaar & Keren, 1988). Also indicative of belief in the omniscience 
and power of luck is the belief that luck is a personal quality (e.g., Wohl & Enzle, 
2009). This belief is consistent with the general belief that omniscient divine agents are 
inclined towards rewarding „good‟ people (Atran & Norenzayan, 2004). 
The second sub-category refers to ritual appeals to supernatural agents. 
Sociologists Henslin (1967) and King (1990) made note of the abundance of rituals 
and lucky charms in craps and bingo. For example, Henslin observed that, since 
dropping the dice in craps is considered a bad omen, “without exception, each shooter, 
after dropping the dice, rubs both dice on the ground or playing surface” (p. 323)
15. 
The third sub-category of illusory secondary control consists of variations on 
the belief that the supernatural agent luck is cyclical. As Keren and Wagenaar (1985) 
reported in summarizing interviews with 150 blackjack players: 
Most of our subjects (some of them explicitly) perceived luck as having a wave form. 
The art of the game is to catch the crest of the wave, that is, the lucky periods. (p. 152; 
see also Duong and Ohtsuka (2000) and King (1990)) 
On the one hand, believing in a cyclical luck implies believing that luck is an agent – 
an entity capable of varying its intentions, or „moods‟. In this sense, the belief 
proceeds from the general supernatural beliefs structure. At the same time, the belief 
proceeds from the gambler‟s fallacy in implying that runs of positive (and negative) 
outcomes are bound to end in the short-term. Notably, cyclical properties tend to be 
                                                 
15 While many rituals in gambling contexts may result form broader supernatural beliefs, others might 
be more situation-specific in arising through simple conditioning processes (Jahoda 1969; Skinner 
1948). In other words, gambling rituals and beliefs in their effectiveness could arise through the same 
conditioning processes as some „systems of play‟ (instances of illusory primary control). How learning 
and conditioning might have been reflected in the findings of this study is considered in the Discussion. 124 
 
attributed to luck and not other supernatural agents (e.g., God, Fate). This could be due 
to the fact that beliefs about luck are particularly relevant to gambling and therefore 
more likely to be influenced by a gambling-related belief structure – the gambler‟s 
fallacy. Beliefs in the cyclical nature of luck, thus, appear to be shaped by supernatural 
beliefs and the gambler‟s fallacy simultaneously. 
The present study 
This study aimed to determine whether a psychometric analysis of a comprehensive 
gambling-beliefs survey could reveal primary and secondary illusory control constructs 
with their respective sub-categories. The survey consisted of 100 statements, largely 
from existing surveys. Statements were adapted to refer specifically to a purely 
chance-based form of gambling – slot-machine play. In light of a well-documented 
trend for participants to disagree with most erroneous survey statements about 
gambling, participants were selected in such a way various levels of slot machine 
gambling experience were represented.  People who gamble regularly were expected to 
be more likely to agree with statements, thereby providing variability in responses. 
Each of the belief sub-categories described above was expressed in terms of a unique 
set of statements. For example, degree of belief in the „omniscience and power‟ of 
supernatural agents was calculated by averaging agreement ratings for the sample 
statements in Table 5.1 and the statements: “Following lucky signs can help me win”, 
“Bad vibes from people around me cause me to lose”, “I make the right choice because 
I‟m generally lucky”, “It‟s possible for the good or bad luck of other players to rub off 
on me”, “I have the psychic ability to predict a winner”, and “There is useful 
information in my daily horoscope”.  
Confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) was used to determine whether 
relationships between the belief sub-categories could be accounted for by higher-order 
primary and secondary illusory control constructs. In CFA, models are fitted to a 
matrix of covariances between observed (i.e., measured) variables, termed „indicators‟. 
Higher-order „latent‟, or unobserved, factors predicted by the model can then be 
derived through multiple regression (see, for example, Kline, 2010). In our model, the 
belief sub-categories served as the indicators, and Figure 5.2 outlines model 
predictions regarding latent constructs. Beliefs in „negative recency‟, „systems of play‟, 
and „persistence‟ were predicted to be indicators of the illusion of primary control. 125 
 
Meanwhile, the illusion of supernatural control was predicted to express itself in 
beliefs in the „omniscience and power‟ of supernatural agents, as well as in beliefs 
about „rituals‟. Beliefs about „the cyclical nature of luck‟ were predicted to be a further 
expression of the illusion of secondary control, but also an expression of the illusion of 
primary control. Overall, the study is geared at providing a much-needed conceptual 
framework for refining gambling-beliefs surveys. 
Method 
Design 
The data were drawn from the survey component of a larger study in which a 
laboratory gambling session was attended two weeks after survey completion.  
Participants 
There were 329 participants
16 (140 males), with a mean age of 24.8 (SD = 11.88). 
Among them were members of the general community, first-year Psychology students 
at the University of Adelaide, and other students at the university. Participation was 
only open to people who (1) were over the age of 18, (2) had gambled at a licensed 
venue at least once previously, and (3) were not in treatment for gambling-related 
problems. Recruitment processes were geared at ensuring that various levels of slot-
machine gambling experience were represented. The end result was that, in the 12 
months preceding participation, 13.7% of participants had not played on slot machines 
at all, 46.5% played a few times but not regularly, 14% played approximately once a 
month, 17.6% played two to three times a month, and 8.2% played weekly or more 
often. 
                                                 
16 Of an original 330 participants, one was removed after providing the same answer to all survey items. 126 
 
Fig 5.2. The CFA model of erroneous gambling-related beliefs, based on the proposed 
definition of primary and secondary illusory control. The six belief sub-categories are 
indicator variables, while the two forms of the illusion of control are higher-order 
latent variables. 
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Measures: Slot-machine beliefs survey 
Apart from demographic questions, a question regarding degree of involvement in 
various forms of gambling in the past 12 months, and a Problem Gambling Severity 
Index (Ferris & Wynne, 2001), the survey contained 100 statements describing beliefs 
about slot-machine gambling. The statements are presented in Appendix 5A. For each 
statement, agreement was rated on a seven-point Likert scale, anchored at (-3) Strongly 
disagree, (0) Neither agree nor disagree, and (3) Strongly agree.  
The survey was designed to incorporate as many existing surveys as possible in 
their entirety without substantial overlap between items. To this effect, two surveys 
and a scale were included in full. These were the Drake Beliefs About Chance 
Inventory (Wood and Clapham 2005; 22 items), the Gamblers‟ Beliefs Questionnaire 
(Steenbergh et al., 2002; 21 items
17), and the Predictive Control Scale of the 
Gambling-Related Cognitions survey (Raylu & Oei, 2004; 6 items).  
In the interests of including references to a wide variety of erroneous strategies, 
the complete surveys were supplemented by items selected from other existing surveys 
(17 items). Seventeen new items were also written to reflect additional experimental or 
observational findings, listed in Appendix 5A. 
A final objective was to include a broader range of negatively-worded (i.e., 
objectively correct) statements, since there was only one such statement in the 
complete surveys. Eight negatively-worded items were sourced from existing surveys 
and nine were newly-written. Notably, all negatively-worded items were reverse-
scored. 
Procedure 
Members of the general community who played slot machines regularly (once a month 
or more often) were recruited through an advertisement in a local newspaper. First-
year Psychology students who met the basic participation requirements (see 
„Participants‟) were recruited through a departmental research participation website. 
All other participants were students from other departments at the university who 
                                                 
17 Two items from this survey were excluded because they did not express erroneous beliefs: “Gambling 
is the best way for me to experience excitement”, “When I lose at gambling, my losses are not as bad if I 
don‟t tell my loved ones”. 128 
 
responded to poster advertisements around campus. Community and wider-university 
participants were reimbursed with a department store voucher, while the first-year 
Psychology students received course credit. 
All advertisements directed potential participants to a website where the larger 
study was explained and the survey could be completed online. Alternatively, 
participants could contact the researcher (first author) with questions and requests for a 
posted hardcopy of the survey. 
In the online version of the survey, the order of the 100 erroneous statements 
was randomised for each participant. Participants opting to complete hardcopies 
received one of three versions, each with a different random ordering of the items. 
De-briefing occurred by post or e-mail at the end of data collection. De-
briefings contained a copy of the survey, emphasised the erroneous nature of the 
survey‟s positively-worded statements, and encouraged participants to contact the 
researcher if they were unclear about why any particular statement was erroneous. 
Results 
Fitting the described CFA model of relationships between sub-categories of the 
illusions of primary and secondary control (Figure 5.2) required a number of steps. 
After the removal of problematic survey statements, the model‟s indicators, measures 
of the belief sub-categories, could be constructed. The model was then fitted, and 
models without key features of the proposed model were tested as a follow-up. 
Removal of weak items 
As recommended by some authors (Hooper, Coughlan & Mullen, 2008; MacCallum, 
Widaman, Zhang & Hong, 1999), measurement error was reduced by removing items 
that did not correlate substantially with most other items. Specifically, items that 
correlated with 60 or more other items at a magnitude of less than .3 were identified 129 
 
for removal
18. There were 27 such items. Among them were 14 of the 17 negatively-
worded items, so the remaining three negatively-worded items were also removed, 
leaving a total of 70 items for further analysis. Removed items are identified in 
Appendix 5A. 
Measures of belief sub-categories 
The retained statements were grouped according to which belief sub-category 
(„negative recency‟, „rituals‟ etc.) they reflected. Table 5.2 lists the items selected to 
represent each sub-category. Measures of agreement with each sub-category (i.e., the 
indicators in the CFA model) were calculated by averaging the agreement ratings for 
constituent items (DiStefano, Zhu & Mindrila, 2009). For two participants who 
accidentally omitted some items when filling out hardcopies of the survey, sub-
category scores were calculated using a reduced set of items. 
For each sub-category score, Table 5.2 presents means, standard deviations, 
and distributional information (skew and kurtosis). The Cronbach‟s alpha coefficients 
presented in the table imply internal consistency among the items comprising each 
measure. As Table 5.3 shows, however, almost all pairwise score correlations were 
greater than .80, suggesting that the measures had poor discriminant validity. This 
issue was addressed through the fitting of an alternative theoretically meaningless CFA 
model (see below). 
                                                 
18 The value of .3 was chosen because correlations of .3 mean that less than 10% of variance is shared 
between items. The cut-off point of 60 such correlations was set based on the inspection of the items 
containing various amounts of low correlations. Items with 60 or more problematic correlations 
appeared qualitatively unrelated to most survey items. For example, the item “If a coin is tossed and 
comes up heads ten times in a row, the next toss is more likely to be tails” lowly correlated with 65 
items and appeared to be a sensible candidate for removal because it does not refer to slot machine 
gambling. 130 
 
Table 5.2. Belief sub-categories: constituent items, descriptive statistics, distributional 
information and Cronbach‟s alpha 
  Constituent 
items 
(Appendix 5A) 




Skew.  Kurt. 
Negative 
recency 
1-10  -1.1 (1.11)  -.01  -1.00  .87 
Systems of 
play 
11-41  -1.1 (1.01)  0  -.86  .95 
Persistence  42-46  -1.6 (1.09)  .53  -.52  .77 
Cyclical nature 
of luck 
47-54  -1.2 (1.07)  -.02  -.90  .84 
Omniscience 
and power 
55-62  -1.3 (1.13)  .13  -1.03  .83 
Rituals  63-70  -1.4 (1.20)  .24  -1.18  .87 
 
 
Table 5.3. Pearson correlations between belief sub-category scores 
  Neg. rec.  Systems   Persist.  Cyclical luck  Omnisc. 
Systems of 
play 
.87         
Persistence  .72  .77       
Cyclical nature 
of luck 
.84  .86  .71     
Omniscience 
and power 
.82  .84  .72  .84   
Rituals  .72  .74  .63  .75  .83 
 
All p < .001. 131 
 
Model fit 
The CFA model shown in Figure 5.2 was fitted using maximum likelihood estimation 
in the sem package (Fox, Nie & Byrnes, 2012) in R version 2.15.2. All fit indices 
indicated good fit (χ
2(7) = 5.75, p = .56; RMSEA = 0, CI90 [0, .06]; SRMR = .006; CFI 
= 1; BIC = 87)
19. Standardised and unstandardised parameter estimates are presented 
in Table 5.4.  
Table 5.4. Standardised and unstandardised coefficients for the fitted CFA model  
  β  B  SE 
Illusion of primary control  Negative recency  .92  1.00   
Illusion of primary control  Systems of play  .95  .94  .03 
Illusion of primary control  Persistence  .80  .86  .04 
Illusion of primary control  Cyclical luck  .66  .71  .09 
Illusion of secondary control  Cyclical luck  .26  .26  .09 
Illusion of secondary control  Omnisc. and power  .97  1.07  .04 
Illusion of secondary control  Rituals  .85  1.00   
e1  Negative recency  .16  .20  .02 
e2  Systems of play  .10  .11  .01 
e3  Persistence  .35  .43  .04 
e4  Cyclical luck  .17  .20  .02 
e5  Omnisc. and power  .06  .08  .02 
e6  Rituals  .27  .39  .04 
Ψ (Latent construct correlation)  .93  .96  .09 
 
R
2 for indicators: Negative recency: .84, Systems of play: .90, Persistence: .64, 
Cyclical nature of luck: .83, Omniscience: .94, Rituals: .73. 
Alternative models 
Aspects of the model were tested further by examining whether their removal or 
modification reduced model fit. Among the tested components was the prediction that 
beliefs about the cyclical nature of luck are an indicator of both types of illusory 
control. The test involved fitting a simpler model in which beliefs in the cyclical nature 
of luck were an indicator of the illusion of secondary control only. Obtained fit indices 
suggested that this model had a poor fit (χ
2(8) = 39.64, p < .001; RMSEA = .11, CI90 
[.08, .14]; SRMR = .016; CFI = .99; BIC = 115). A model in which beliefs in the 
                                                 
19 Mardia‟s tests of multivariate skew and kurtosis (Mardia, 1970; Ullman, 2006), conducted using the 
psych package (Revelle, 2012), indicated violation of the multivariate normality assumption (b1, p = 
2.4, skew = 131.43, p < .001; b2, p = 52.97, kurtosis = 4.6, p < .001). However, the effect of this violation 
is inflation of the χ
2 statistic (Curran, West & Finch, 2006), which was still non-significant in this case. 132 
 
cyclical nature of luck were an indicator only of the illusion of primary control also fit 
slightly worse than the original model (χ
2(8) = 12.86, p = .12; RMSEA = .04, CI90 [0, 
.08]; SRMR = .009; CFI = .99; BIC = 88). 
A further assumption of the model is that beliefs in systems of play pertain only 
to natural systems, and not supernatural ones (e.g., rituals). The assumption was tested 
by fitting a model with a hypothesized additional relationship between the illusion of 
secondary control and the „systems of play‟ score. Incorporating this relationship did 
not improve model fit (χ
2(6) = 4.51, p = .60; RMSEA = 0, CI90 [0, .06]; SRMR = .006; 
CFI = 1; BIC = 91), implying that „systems of play‟ are commonly understood to refer 
to conventional strategies rather than rituals. 
 The observed high correlation between the model‟s latent constructs, the 
illusions of primary and secondary control (βψ = .92; see Table 5.4), necessitated the 
testing of a model in which these constructs were amalgamated into a single latent 
construct. Again, however, the fit of this modified model was poor (χ
2(10) = 63.88, p < 
.001; RMSEA = .13, CI90 [.10, .16]; SRMR = .023; CFI = .97; BIC = 128). 
Finally, in light of the poor discriminant validity of the belief sub-category 
measures (see Table 5.3), we tested the possibility that any equivalent model could 
capture the relationships between them. The fitted equivalent model featured two latent 
constructs, L1 and L2. „Negative recency‟, „Omniscience and power‟, „Rituals‟ and 
„Systems of play‟ served as indicators of L1, while L2 was expressed in terms of the 
other two sub-category scores and the shared indicator, „Systems of play‟. The 
parameter-value search for the model failed to converge in 5000 iterations, providing 
evidence of non-equivalence among the sub-category measures. 
Discussion 
The aim of this study was to examine the construct validity of a conceptual model that 
postulates that measures of gambling-related beliefs converge around two broader 
belief structures relating to the illusion of control. The first of these structures, primary 
control, is postulated to involve behaviours and beliefs based, to a large extent, on the 
gambler‟s fallacy. A second construct, secondary control, is assumed to involve 
behaviours and beliefs relating to general beliefs about supernatural agents and forces. 133 
 
In light of these assumptions, six sub-categories of beliefs were defined and measured, 
and a CFA model of latent primary and secondary illusory control constructs relating 
the sub-categories was specified. On the whole, it was found that model predictions 
about the relationships between belief sub-categories were supported.  
Our results support the earlier work of Rothbaum, Weisz and Snyder (1982), 
who argued that the illusion of control is not a one-dimensional construct. The results 
are also consistent with an earlier study by Ejova, Delfabbro and Navarro (2010), who 
provided evidence of the illusion‟s bi-dimensionality using a multi-item perceived 
control question presented after experience with a laboratory gambling task. The 
question consisted of 13 statements, each rated form 0 to 10 in terms of the degree to 
which it might have accounted for experienced wins. Apart from “It was all chance”, 
the statements included, (1) “My skill in playing”, (2) “I developed a logical strategy”, 
(3) “I deserved to win”, and (4) “I took advantage of moments when my luck was 
good”. Factor analysis revealed a statement cluster consisting of statements such as 1 
and 2, and a statement cluster consisting of statements such as 3 and 4.  
The present findings extend this work by providing evidence for an explanation 
of why the illusion of control has two dimensions. Specifically, the CFA model‟s good 
fit serves as evidence for the proposal that one dimension (secondary) is the result of 
general beliefs about supernatural agents, whereas the other (primary) is the result of 
non-supernatural beliefs, including the general gambler‟s fallacy.  
Most research on the illusion of control has followed Langer‟s (1975) lead in 
seeking to identify situational factors that give rise to what is assumed to be a 
unidimensional effect: an over-estimation of personal skill.  We argue that the effect is 
likely to be more complex than this. For example, Wohl and Enzle (2002) found that, 
prior to a lottery drawing, participants who were allowed to choose a lottery ticket 
instead of simply being assigned one by a computer expressed greater confidence of 
winning. Our CFA results suggest that a person allowed to choose her lottery ticket 
might feel more confident of winning because she was able to choose numbers that 
haven‟t appeared for some time, or because she was able to choose her „lucky‟ 
number. More generally, our findings imply that the same situational factor can give 
rise to different kinds of illusory control, depending on what pre-existing beliefs are 
applied in reasoning about the factor. 134 
 
In light of the explanation of the illusion of control advanced in this study, we 
propose that greater conceptual clarity might be achieved by exchanging the terms 
„primary‟ and „secondary‟ for „natural‟ and „supernatural‟, respectively. Rothbaum et 
al. (1982) meant for the original terms to indicate that, in instances of perceived 
secondary control, a higher force rather than the individual takes the controlling action. 
In this study, the illusion of control is defined as a theory-driven belief in an effective 
personal action, be it a strategy or ritual. In the case of a ritual, the theory (belief 
structure) driving the action concerns supernatural agents and their powers. In the case 
of a strategy, the underlying theory pertains to natural phenomena. It, therefore, seems 
more appropriate to distinguish between variants of the illusion of control based on the 
belief structures that potentially inform them. 
From a psychometric perspective, these findings are generally consistent with 
the broad two-factor structure observed by Wood and Clapham (2005) in the 
development of Drake Beliefs About Chance Inventory. One of the observed factors 
expresses beliefs that winning odds can be improved through supernatural means 
(illusory secondary control), whereas the other expresses beliefs that winning odds can 
be improved through natural means, including strategies based on the gambler‟s 
fallacy (illusory primary control). Other similar distinctions are observed in the 
Gambler‟s Beliefs Questionnaire (Steenbergh et al., 2002) that captures a distinction 
between the same illusion of primary control factor and a „Luck/Perseverance‟ factor. 
In combining statements about the value of persistence with statements about luck, the 
latter factor captures the „cyclical luck‟ component of the illusion of secondary control 
– the belief that one should persevere in waiting for a period of good luck. On the other 
hand, there are items in the often cited Gambling Related Cognitions Scale (Raylu & 
Oei, 2004) that appear ambiguous in that it is unclear how the beliefs they express 
might have emerged from the gambler‟s fallacy or supernatural beliefs: “Relating my 
losses to bad luck and bad circumstances makes me continue gambling”, “Relating my 
losses to probability makes me continue gambling”, and “Remembering how much 
money I won last time makes me continue gambling”.  
Clinical and policy implications 
Many modern treatment programs and community education initiatives for problem 
gambling are aimed at correcting erroneous gambling-related beliefs. Our work can be 135 
 
seen as evidence about internal theories of the world that are a cause of such beliefs. 
The evidence can be used to develop more coherent typologies of beliefs for discussion 
with patients. At the same time, the evidence suggests that explaining why various 
types of beliefs are erroneous is only one component of therapy and education. The 
other must address the internal-theory-based causes of the beliefs: the gambler‟s 
fallacy and beliefs in the supernatural.  As general theories of the world which may 
have an evolutionary history, these causes might not be reversible through therapy. 
Instead, therapists might need to explain to patients that humans have two ingrained 
broader belief structures or information processing tendencies that make them prone to 
developing erroneous beliefs in gambling settings, which are to be avoided for this 
reason. 
As a working example, our findings have implications for an influential belief-
correction procedure developed in the last two decades by Ladouceur and colleagues 
(e.g., Toneatto & Ladouceur, 2003; Ladouceur, Sylvain, Boutin & Doucet, 2002).  A 
clinically trialled version of this procedure (Ladouceur et al., 2001) had four 
objectives, the first two of which are quoted below: 
a) understanding the concept of randomness: the therapist explained the concept of 
randomness, that each “throw of the dice” is independent, that no strategies exist to 
control the outcome, that there is a negative expectation of gain, and that it is 
impossible to control the game; b) understanding the erroneous beliefs held by 
gamblers: this component mainly addressed the difficulty of applying the principle of 
independence of random events: the therapist explained how an illusion of control 
contributes to the maintenance of gambling habits, and then corrected these erroneous 
beliefs... (pp. 776-7) 
The procedure‟s emphasis on explaining the „independence‟ of random events is 
consistent with our conceptual framework. Many erroneous beliefs stem from the 
gambler‟s fallacy, so explanation of the principle of independence should alert the 
patient to the error of many of their beliefs.  
Where Ladouceur‟s approach is inconsistent with our results is in its 
presentation of the illusion of control as another underlying cause of erroneous beliefs. 
In our framework, this underlying causal role is played by the gambler‟s fallacy, while 
the illusion of control is a descriptive term for expressed erroneous beliefs. In other 136 
 
words, our results suggest that a more coherent approach would involve explaining 
that erroneous beliefs are illusions driven by the general gambler‟s fallacy.  Treatment 
could, further, involve outlining various explanations for why the gambler‟s fallacy is 
so widespread. Tversky and Kahneman‟s (1974) notion of a representativeness bias is 
one explanation and it was mentioned earlier in this paper. Another explanation, put 
forward by Estes (1964), describes the gambler‟s fallacy as a branch of the rational 
belief that many real-world outcomes follow a law of sampling without replacement. 
Given the way weather systems work, for instance, it is rational to assume that a sunny 
period draws nearer with each day of rain (see Hahn and Warren 2009 for a third 
theory). The next step would be to explain that gambling environments are dangerous 
and need to be avoided because they take advantage of the human proneness to the 
gambler‟s fallacy and ensuing erroneous beliefs. 
According to our results, Ladouceur and colleagues‟ approach could also 
benefit from greater emphasis on common gambling-related beliefs about luck, rituals 
and other supernatural phenomena. Since, according to Atran and Norenzayan (2004), 
these beliefs share evolutionary and conceptual roots with religious beliefs, explaining 
why they are erroneous could present difficulties. For example, explaining why a 
certain ritual is ineffective could involve challenging the existence of God. Once the 
erroneous nature of some of the patient‟s specific supernatural gambling beliefs is 
established, the therapist can explain that these beliefs are the product of a more 
ingrained belief structure that is, like the gambler‟s fallacy, likely to be evolved. Atran 
and Norenzayan (2004) present a comprehensive evolutionary account of how beliefs 
about supernatural agents, their power and their responsiveness to rituals came to be 
related. 
In sum, our findings help distinguish between gambling-related beliefs and 
their causes, and between two causes. This should allow therapists to work from a 
more coherent typology of beliefs and should encourage them to warn patients about 
the potential immutability of the causes – an immutability that makes gambling 
environments highly dangerous. 137 
 
Limitations 
A clear limitation of the study is that our hypotheses regarding the hierarchical 
structure of gambling-related beliefs could feasibly only be tested through CFA, which 
is customarily performed on scale scores. Therefore, our model accounted for variance 
in averaged rather than raw agreement scores. In addition, the averaged scores 
(expressing the six belief sub-categories) were calculated based on purely theoretical 
grounds rather than exploratory statistical ones. However, with a cross-loading 
„cyclical nature of luck‟ sub-category, the belief sub-categories were not detectable 
through exploratory factor analysis. 
Apart from the cross-loading of the „cyclical luck‟ sub-category, a source of 
blurred factor boundaries would have been the high correlation between the latent 
primary and secondary illusory control constructs. A potential source of this 
correlation is the fact that both primary (natural) systems of play and secondary 
(supernatural) rituals are sometimes acquired through a common mechanism – 
reinforcement learning (e.g., Skinner, 1948). The removal of weak items would have 
ensured that some beliefs held only by experienced participants as a result of extensive 
reinforcement learning were not analysed, however. 
Conclusion 
We attempted to reconcile three frequently cited concepts in factor-analytic research 
on erroneous gambling-related beliefs. These are the illusion of control, the distinction 
between illusions of primary and secondary control, and the gambler‟s fallacy. 
Groupings for gambling-beliefs survey statements were suggested based on the 
proposal that the illusion of control, a set of beliefs about effective gambling action 
patterns, is caused by general belief structures such as the gambler‟s fallacy, in 
interaction with situational factors. The gambler‟s fallacy gives rise to the illusion of 
primary (natural) control while a general set of beliefs about supernatural agents gives 
rise to the illusion of secondary (supernatural) control. Seventy survey statements were 
then categorised in line with the suggested groupings, and CFA was used to 
demonstrate that category intercorrelations expressed higher-order natural and 
supernatural illusion-of-control constructs. The findings have implications for research 
on the illusion of control and for how erroneous gambling-related beliefs are discussed 138 
 
in treatment settings. More broadly, the findings provide preliminary evidence for a 
perspective that gambling-related beliefs are, at least in part, a function of broader 
belief systems that people bring to the session and which come to act as information 
processing filters. 139 
 
Appendices for Chapter 5  
Appendix 5A 
Participant instructions 
Below are 100 statements about gambling. Read each statement carefully and indicate 
the degree to which you agree or disagree with it. Unless a statement explicitly refers 
to a particular type of gambling (e.g., dice, lotteries) consider it a statement about 
poker machine gambling. Don't spend too long thinking about any particular statement. 
Just go with your initial reaction. Spend approximately 20 seconds on each statement. 
Scale 
Strongly disagree (-3), Disagree (-2), Moderately disagree (-1), Neither agree nor 
disagree (0), Moderately agree (1), Agree (2), Strongly agree (3) 
Sources 
  Drake Beliefs About Chance Inventory (DBC; Wood & Clapham, 2005) 
  Gamblers‟ Beliefs Questionnaire (GBQ; Steenbergh, Meyers, May & Whelan, 
2002) 
  The Predictive Control Scale of the Gambling Related Cognitions Scale 
(GRCS; Raylu & Oei, 2004) 
  The Informational Biases Scale (IBS; Jefferson & Nicki, 2003) 
  Thoughts and Beliefs About Gambling questionnaire devised by (TBAG; 
Joukhador, Maccallum & Blaszczynski, 2003) 
  Questionnaire developed by Moore and Ohtsuka (1998) 
  Weinstein Event Characteristics (W; included in Moore and Ohtsuka, 1999) 
  Primary and Secondary Control Beliefs Scale (PSCB; Williams, 2007, 
unpublished Honours thesis) 
  Belief in Good Luck Scale (BIGL; Darke & Freedman, 1997) 
Terminology 
In South Australia, where the survey was administered, slot machines are typically 
referred to as “poker” machines. 140 
 
Items 
1.  The longer I‟ve been losing, the more likely I am to win. (DBC) 
2.  I should keep the same bet even when it hasn‟t come up lately because it is bound 
to win. (GBQ) 
3.  If I am gambling and losing, I should continue because I don‟t want to miss a win. 
(GBQ) 
4.  Even though I may be losing with my gambling strategy or plan, I must maintain 
that strategy or plan because I know it will eventually come through for me. (GBQ) 
5.  I have some control over predicting my gambling wins. (GRCS) 
6.  If I keep changing my responses, I have less chances of winning than if I keep the 
same response every time. (GRCS) 
7.  Losses when gambling are bound to be followed by a series of wins. (GRCS) 
8.  If I‟m experiencing a losing streak the thought that a win has to be coming soon 
keeps me gambling. (IBS) 
9.  Sometimes I feel that I can keep winning because I have learned to predict the next 
random, new thing the machine is going to do. (Newly-written, Ayton and Fischer 
2004)  
10. Winning in poker machine gambling is a matter of knowing how random patterns 
work. Each time, the machine is bound to do something different to what it did in 
the previous round. (Newly-written, Ayton and Fischer 2004)  
11. I will be more successful if I have a system for playing poker machines. (DBC) 
12. A good poker machine, roulette or dice gambler is like a sportsperson who knows 
winning plays and when to use them. (DBC) 
13. There are secrets to successful poker machine, roulette and dice gambling that can 
be learned. (DBC) 
14. Show me a [poker machine] gambler with a well-planned system and I‟ll show you 
a winner. (DBC) 
15. The more familiar I am with poker machine gambling, the more likely I am to win. 
(DBC) 
16. One should pay attention to lottery numbers that often win. (DBC) 
17. A game of chance is a contest of wills between the game and the player. (DBC) 
18. Playing poker machines is a form of competition between the player and the 
machine. (DBC) 
19. My choices or actions affect the game on which I am betting. (GBQ) 141 
 
20. My gambling wins are evidence that I have skill and knowledge related to 
gambling. (GBQ) 
21. My knowledge and skill in gambling contribute to the likelihood that I will make 
money. (GBQ) 
22. I have more skills and knowledge related to gambling than most people who 
gamble. (GBQ) 
23. I am pretty accurate at predicting when a win will occur. (GBQ) 
24. I should keep track of previous winning bets so that I can figure out how I should 
bet in the future. (GBQ) 
25. When I am gambling, “near misses” or times when I almost win remind me that if I 
keep playing I will win. (GBQ) 
26. I think of poker machine gambling as a challenge. (GBQ) 
27. When I have a win once, I will definitely win again. (GRCS) 
28. A series of losses will provide me with a learning experience that will help me win 
later. (GRCS) 
29. I believe I can beat the system. (TBAG) 
30. If I lose it‟s because something unforseen has happened. (TBAG) 
31. I know I can win if I follow my strategies. (TBAG) 
32. Identifying a pattern helps me predict a winner. (TBAG) 
33. The chances of winning improve after a near win. (TBAG) 
34. When I've lost it's because I've made a hasty decision or didn't concentrate. 
(TBAG) 
35. The way in which I press the buttons on the poker machine can influence the 
outcome. (PSCB) 
36. Winning on poker machines is all about knowing the right time to get on the 
machine. (PSCB) 
37. There is a definite type of person who has big wins at gambling. (W) 
38. To be successful in poker machine gambling it is important to know how to 
maintain a winning streak when one comes around. (Newly-written based on 
Ocean and Smith, 1993) 
39. To be successful in poker machine gambling it is important to know how to change 
the flow of the game when facing a losing streak. (Newly-written based on Ocean 
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40. The machines pay out more at different times of day. (Newly-written based on 
Livingstone, Wooley and Borrell, 2006) 
41. You can win more money overall if you know how to make good use of free spins. 
(Newly-written Livingstone, Wooley and Borrell, 2006) 
42. Where I get money to gamble doesn‟t matter because I will win and pay it back. 
(GBQ) 
43. In the long run, I will win more money than I will lose gambling. (GBQ) 
44. If I continue to gamble, it will eventually pay off and I will make money (GBQ) 
45. If I lose money gambling, I should try to win it back. (GBQ) 
46. Those who don‟t gamble much don‟t understand that gambling success requires 
dedication and a willingness to invest some money. (GBQ) 
47. Wins are more likely to occur on a hot machine (i.e. a machine that has just paid 
out). (DBC) 
48. It is good advice to stay with the same pair of dice on a winning streak. (DBC) 
49. There are times that I feel lucky and thus gamble those times only. (GRCS) 
50. Luck works in cycles and is, therefore, predictable to some extent. (Newly-written 
based on Keren and Wagenaar, 1985) 
51. A series of losses is a sign that good luck is about to set in. (Newly-written based 
on Duong and Ohtsuka, 2000) 
52. You should make at least one bet every day. Otherwise, you might be walking 
around lucky and not even know. (Newly-written based on Aasved, 2002) 
53. It is important to bet big when you feel that you‟ve come across a lucky way of 
playing the machine. (Newly-written based on King, 1990) 
54. Luck sometimes hides all the wins behind a certain response pattern, so it‟s always 
worth sticking with a response pattern that has just produced a win to check 
whether you‟ve stumbled upon a lucky way of playing. (Newly-written based on 
King, 1990) 
55. I believe that fate is against me when I lose. (DBC) 
56. There is useful information in my daily horoscope. (DBC) 
57. Some gamblers are just born lucky. (DBC) 
58. Following lucky signs can help me win. (TBAG) 
59. I have the psychic ability to predict a winner [in poker machine gambling]. 
(TBAG) 
60. Bad vibes from people around me cause me to lose. (TBAG) 143 
 
61. I make the right choice because I'm generally lucky. (TBAG) 
62. It's possible for the good or bad luck of other players at the gambling venue to rub 
off on me. (Newly-written based on Duong and Ohtsuka, 2000) 
63. There may be magic in certain numbers [or actions]. (DBC)  
64. When I need a little luck I wear lucky clothes or jewellery. (DBC) 
65. I can improve my chances of winning by performing special rituals. (DBC) 
66. I like to carry a lucky coin, charm or token when I‟m doing something important. 
(DBC) 
67. I have a “lucky” technique that I use when I gamble. (GBQ) 
68. There are certain things I do when I am betting (for example, tapping a certain. 
number of times, holding a lucky coin in my hand, crossing my fingers, etc.) which 
increase the chances that I will win. (GBQ) 
69. Sometimes I think I might have the power to „will‟ my desired outcomes to come 
up [during poker machine play]. (Moore & Ohtsuka, 1998) 
70. You never know what might happen if you don't perform certain rituals while 
gambling. (Newly-written based on Rudski and Edwards, 2007) 
 
--- Removed prior to model fitting:  
71. I do not consider myself to be a superstitious person. (DBC) 
72. Winning in poker machine gambling is based entirely on chance. (TBAG) 
73. The outcome of one poker machine event has no effect on the outcome of the next. 
(TBAG) 
74. It's a mistake to base any decisions on how lucky you feel. (BIGL) 
75. Luck is nothing more than random chance. (BIGL)  
76. The likelihood of winning a large amount of money in poker machine gambling is 
so small, it‟s not worth bothering. (Moore & Ohtsuka, 1998) 
77. I do not expect to win at gambling. (Moore & Ohtsuka, 1998) 
78. There is no way of predicting when a win will occur in poker machine gambling. 
(Newly-written) 
79. There is nothing the player can do to influence the outcome of poker machine 
gambling. (Newly-written) 
80. In poker machine gambling there is no place for any kind of special knowledge. 
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81. No matter what system of play you adopt in poker machine gambling, your 
chances of winning are no different to anyone else‟s. (Newly-written) 
82. Near-misses in poker machine gambling are not a sign that a win is close by. 
(Newly-written) 
83. It is true that any run of losses eventually comes to an end, but this does not mean 
that I can predict when to raise my bet amounts ahead of a win. (Newly-written 
based on Delfabbro, 2004) 
84. Luck does not follow a pattern. (Newly-written) 
85. A gambler can‟t be lucky or unlucky by nature. (Newly-written) 
86. Lucky items or charms can‟t help a person when playing poker machines. (Newly-
written) 
87. Once you have lost money on poker machine gambling, there is no point playing 
on to win it back. (Newly-written) 
88. I have a special system for picking lottery numbers. (DBC) 
89. If a coin is tossed and comes up heads ten times in a row, the next toss is more 
likely to be tails. (DBC) 
90. When I take a test (or took them in the past) I use a lucky pen or pencil. (DBC) 
91. Gambling is more than just luck. (GBQ) 
92. If I win on a certain machine, I am more likely to use that machine again at a later 
date. (IBS) 
93. After a long string of wins on a machine, the chances of losing become greater. 
(IBS) 
94. A run of losses must come to an end sooner rather than later. (TBAG) 
95. There is a definite type of person who has big losses at gambling. (W) 
96. A person's chances of winning are better if they gamble on a machine that has not 
paid out in a long time. (PSCB) 
97. I try to bet on the maximum number of lines because I don‟t want to miss out on a 
big win on a line I didn't gamble. (Newly-written based on Livingstone, Wooley 
and Borrell, 2006) 
98. Since poker machines are a game of chance and chance distributes wins evenly 
across different possible responses, the only way to win is to keep „changing up‟ 
your play pattern. (Newly-written based on Keren and Wagenaar, 1985) 
99. Luck works in a different way to chance. (Newly-written based on Wagenaar and 
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100.  It can't hurt to perform little rituals during gambling – just in case. (Newly-
written based on Rudski and Edwards, 2007 146 
 
CHAPTER 6: Conclusion 
The opening chapter reviewed research on factors that might influence the illusion of 
control and proposed an explanation for the psychological processes that give rise to 
the illusion and cause it to increase with increasing choice, need for the outcome, and 
so on. The chapter concluded that research needed to be conducted to address a 
number of gaps in findings relating to factors that influence the illusion, success-
frequency and success-slope in particular. The chapter also called for research aimed at 
testing the proposed psychological-process explanation. These suggestions for further 
research became the basis for four research questions addressed in this thesis. The first 
two relate to factors influencing the illusion of control: 
1.  Is success-frequency among the factors that influence the illusion of control? 
2.  Is success-slope an influencing factor, with the illusion of control being highest 
following a descending success-slope (i.e., when participants experience most 
wins early in the playing session)?  
The other two research questions relate to the proposed explanation for the 
psychological processes underlying the illusion: 
3.  Do people in gambling tasks engage in problem-solving in pursuit of a sizeable 
win, with this then giving rise to the illusion of control – some degree of belief 
in various playing strategies?  
4.  Does the illusion of control have two discernable variants, reflecting the 
gambler‟s fallacy and beliefs about supernatural forces such as luck?   
This chapter summarises the findings of this the thesis in relation to each of the 
four research questions identified above. It also presents additional relevant findings 
that could not be included in the papers because of length restrictions. Further research 
questions arising from the main findings and supplementary findings are also 
discussed. Section 1 is concerned with factors influencing the illusion of control. More 
specifically, the section presents a summary of Paper 1, which investigated the 
success-frequency effect. A summary of Paper 2, which investigated the success-slope 
effect, is also provided, along with additional findings and future research questions 
relevant to both investigations. Section 2 describes findings, additional analyses and 147 
 
future research questions relating to the present psychological-process explanation for 
the illusion of control. The experiment in Paper 2 made possible an investigation of 
whether people engage in problem-solving in gambling tasks. More specifically, the 
experiment made possible an investigation of whether participants in the ascending 
success-slope condition (i.e., those experiencing a concentration of wins at the end of 
the playing session) perceived themselves to have learned the correct playing strategy 
through trial-and-error. Paper 3 was concerned with the other research question 
relating to the explanation: the question regarding the two variants of the illusion of 
control and the abstract beliefs underpinning them. 
Section 3 of this chapter is concerned with the methodological implications of 
this work, whereas Section 4 focuses on practical applications, which largely have to 
do with the clinical treatment of problem gambling. 
1. Influences on the illusion of control 
1.2. Success-frequency 
In Paper 1, ratings of inferred control on the traditional single-scale measure of 
perceived control increased with success-frequency, but ratings of illusory primary and 
secondary control on the newly-developed measure did not. The paper‟s implicit 
interpretation of the finding was that the two measures assessed different phenomena. 
According to this interpretation, the traditional measure assessed the number of 
remembered successes, whereas the new measure assessed the illusion of control, the 
strength of the inferred causal relationship between personal actions and successes. 
The paper, in effect, concluded that success-frequency does not influence the illusion 
of control. This appears to run contrary to the psychological-process explanation of the 
illusion presented in Chapter 1. According to the explanation, a high success-frequency 
should suggest effective problem-solving and, thus, increase the illusion of control. 
However, problem-solving involves not simply repeating previously successful 
actions, but assessing whether an action has brought one closer to the end goal (i.e., 
„hill-climbing‟; Anderson, 1993). In gambling contexts, the end goal is a substantial 
win, so high success-frequency might only have an effect to the extent that it results in 
larger wins (i.e., greater proximity to the end goal). In this study, the final win-amount 148 
 
after 100 trials was kept constant across success-frequency conditions, potentially 
explaining the lack of effect. 
The paper‟s finding has three alternative interpretations, not discussed in the 
original paper due to length restrictions. One possibility is that success-frequency does 
influence the illusion of control independently of win-amount but the new measure did 
not show the effect because it was invalid or not reliable. A second possibility is that 
the effect exists independently of the effect of win-amount but neither measure was 
suitable for gauging it. Scores on the traditional measure might have varied in line with 
success-frequency only because they reflected remembered success-frequency rather 
than perceived control. A third possibility is that the success-frequency effect exists 
independently of win-amount but cannot be gauged using the soccer task. The task 
contains many choice alternatives (bet options, player profiles and kick directions), and 
the illusion of control is known to increase with the number of such alternatives (see 
Chapter 1). It is, therefore, possible that perceived control levels in the task were at 
ceiling-level and not subject to variation across any manipulated independent variable 
including success-frequency. 
Appendix 6A describes a partial test of some of these interpretations based on 
the available data. The test involved examining the extent to which variations in the 
amount won at the end of the session predicted ratings of perceived control. It was 
found that the illusions of primary and secondary control as gauged by the new 
measure increased with win-amount, whereas ratings on the traditional measure 
remained constant. These results rule out the possibility of the illusion of control being 
at ceiling, since the illusion, as gauged by the new measure, did vary in line with an 
independent variable – win-amount. The results also run counter to the interpretation 
that the new measure was too unreliable to show systematic variability. Instead, the 
results suggest that the traditional measure and the new measure behave differently 
depending on what variable is manipulated. The traditional measure appears more 
sensitive to success-frequency manipulations, consistently with Jenkins and Ward‟s 
(1965) proposal that it reflects remembered success-frequency rather than perceived 
control.   
Overall, then, the findings in Appendix 6A leave open two possibilities. One is 
that the illusion of control is influenced not by success-frequency per se, but by the 149 
 
size of winnings, which can sometimes be related to success-frequency. This proposal 
might appear counterintuitive, since high success-frequency is a typical hallmark of 
solving a problem or at least being close to the desired goal state. However, as 
Anderson (1993) notes, for the researcher, assessing what it means to be „close‟ to a 
goal state in different problem-solving domains is not trivial. In gambling contexts, 
where the end goal is a win of a large size, it makes some sense that closeness to the 
goal state is conceived of in terms of the size of wins rather than their frequency. 
An alternative interpretation is that success-frequency influences the illusion of 
control independently of win-amount but has a weaker effect than win-amount. The 
new measure, with its reliance on factor analysis, might be too unreliable to detect the 
success-frequency effect with this sample-size.  
To test these two interpretations against each other, a future study could 
manipulate success-frequency and win-amount in a 2 x 2 design (low/high success-
frequency x low/high win-amount). The soccer task could be used, with participants 
experiencing a success-frequency of 1/16 or 1/2. As is indicated in Figure 2.1, the 
soccer task can be programmed to show each goal and miss (i.e., each win and loss) as 
being „close‟ or „far‟, with „far‟ goals involving wrong-footing of the goalkeeper. 
Given this feature, win-amount could be manipulated by informing participants that a 
goal that wrong-foots the goalkeeper results in a doubling of the winnings for that trial, 
and participants in the high win-amount condition could be pre-programmed to 
experience more wrong-footing goals than participants in the low win-amount 
condition. The new measure could be used as the measure of perceived control. With 
larger cell counts (e.g., 40 participants in each group), any existing independent effect 
of success-frequency should come to be reflected in a main effect of success-
frequency. If the success-frequency effect is, instead, an effect of win-amount, the 
results should point to a main effect of win-amount without a main effect of success-
frequency. 
1.3. Success-slope 
In Paper 2, inferred (primary) control was found to be highest following an ascending 
success-slope and lowest following a descending one. This result could reflect raised 
perceived control in the „ascending‟ condition due to perceived learning. Alternatively, 150 
 
it could reflect lowered perceived control in the „descending‟ condition due to the 
absence of perceived learning. It is also possible that both of these effects were 
present. In either case, the result contradicts what has, to-date, been considered the 
standard finding in relation to success-slope effects. 
Records of behaviour on each trial in the success-slope study can be used to 
determine which of these two interpretations is correct. More specifically, as suggested 
in the Discussion section of Paper 2, behaviour across success-slope conditions could 
be examined for signs of participants settling on fewer player-profile and kick-
direction options over time, as though settling on a learned strategy for playing. Under 
the hypothesis that experiencing an ascending success-slope creates the impression of 
learning, decreasing behavioural variability over time should be observed in the 
„ascending‟ condition only. Under the alternative hypothesis that a perception of 
learning is created by all but a descending success-slope, the „descending‟ condition 
should be unique in not exhibiting decreasing behavioural variability. If both of the 
interpretations are valid, all but the „descending‟ condition should give rise to 
decreasing behavioural variability with the pattern being more pronounced in the 
„ascending‟ condition. Appendix 6B presents analyses in which the number of player 
profile changes in the first 24 trials was compared to the number of such changes in the 
last 24 trials. On the whole, the findings favoured the first interpretation in showing 
that the „ascending‟ condition was the only one in which participants decreased their 
player-profile-change propensity over time. The same was the case for variability in 
kick-direction choices, as quantified by an entropy measure. Thus, participants in the 
„ascending‟ condition showed a tendency to settle on fewer player-profile and kick-
direction options over time, as though they were settling on a „learned‟ strategy for 
playing.  
The results of Paper 2 also showed that estimates of remembered success-
frequency did not vary across success slopes and showed a number of trends consistent 
with those observed in the memory literature. For example, the fact that higher goal 
frequency estimates were observed when the question referred to „misses‟ rather than 
„goals‟ was consistent with a „spacing effect‟, which refers to better memory for items 
more widely dispersed across time (e.g., Glenberg, Bradley, Kraus & Renzaglia, 
1983). In addition, the overestimation of the objective success-frequency (1/6) in the 151 
 
„descending‟ and „flat‟ conditions might have been due to the combination of the 
„primacy‟ and „spacing‟ effects with an „over-under effect‟, in which low event 
frequencies are systematically overestimated (e.g., Lichtenstein et al., 1978). These 
analogies with the memory literature suggest that past studies of the effects of success-
slope might have been concerned with the factor‟s effect on memory for events (in this 
case, wins) rather than inferred control. However, all of these proposals regarding 
evident memory effects require formal testing. 
Existing data, albeit not from the same study, can also be used to test one of 
these assertions regarding memory processes underlying success-frequency estimates. 
The assertion is that overestimation in the „descending‟ and „flat‟ conditions was a 
potential instance of an „over-under effect‟, which refers to the consistent 
overestimation of lower frequencies and the underestimation of higher ones.  It has 
been suggested that the effect is driven by background beliefs about the domain, in that 
people have beliefs about what the event frequency in a particular domain is and 
anchor their estimates to that value. For example, if they believe that slot machines 
should deliver a win once in x rounds but experience a higher win frequency, they 
adjust success-frequency estimates in the direction of x (i.e., downwards; Lichtenstein 
et al., 1978).  
In this case, it was speculated that 1/6, the objective success-frequency, was a 
low event frequency subject to overestimation across all conditions. Without this 
overestimation, participants‟ estimates in the „descending‟ and „flat‟ conditions would 
have been accurate or nearly so, due to the „primacy‟ and „spacing‟ effects present in 
those conditions. Meanwhile, estimates in the „U-shaped‟ and „ascending‟ conditions 
would have been underestimates. Presumably, as discussed above, the systematic 
upwards-adjustment occurred due to certain regularities in participants‟ prior beliefs 
about the frequency of wins in gambling and soccer. If this interpretation is valid, 
evidence should suggest that, in the context of the soccer-themed gambling task, 1/6 is 
indeed a success-frequency level subject to overestimation, unlike some higher 
frequencies.  
As is shown in Appendix 6C, data from the study on success-frequency (Paper 
1) provide preliminary evidence in support of this proposition. The study featured five 
success-frequency conditions, and the data of interest concerned prospective and 152 
 
retrospective success-frequency estimates across conditions. These estimates were 
obtained alongside ratings of perceived control but have not been discussed up to this 
point because they were not relevant to the issues considered in Chapter 1. The pattern 
of estimates across conditions (see Appendix 6C) constitutes evidence for the „over-
under effect‟ in that it suggests that (a) participants systematically overestimated lower 
frequencies while accurately estimating higher ones, and (b) 1/6 was among the 
overestimated frequencies. These conclusions are only preliminary, however, in that 
they are advanced based on somewhat suboptimal statistical tests (see Appendix 6C for 
further discussion). 
Another of the paper‟s proposals regarding the memory processes underlying 
success-frequency estimates was that the „recency effect‟ (better memory for events 
late in the sequence) disappeared in the „ascending‟ condition due to the time that 
elapsed between the end of the task and the presentation of success-frequency 
questions. The proposal remains to be tested, and the test would involve additionally 
manipulating the length of time interval before the presentation of success-frequency 
questions. When the time interval is close to zero, estimates in the „ascending‟ 
condition should resemble those in the „descending‟ condition. That is, at a 1/6 
success-frequency, assuming the operation of an „over-under effect‟, estimates in both 
conditions should involve overestimation of the objective success-frequency. 
1.4. Number of action alternatives 
As outlined in Chapter 1, much of the literature on the illusion of control has been 
concerned with the effects of providing additional action alternatives – additional 
opportunities for choice, physical involvement, stimulus familiarity, thinking time, 
practice, competition, and foreknowledge, or extra need for the outcome. While the 
studies in this thesis did not follow up on these findings, the featured experimental 
methodology can be applied in investigating the effects of the listed factors. 
Existing experiments on the effects of these factors have left open a number of 
questions. Apart from the effects of choice and need for the outcome, all of the effects 
have been observed in so few studies that they are in need of replication. The effects of 
stimulus familiarity, foreknowledge and practice are additionally unclear, in that the 
former two effects could represent effects of suspicion while the latter could represent 153 
 
a demand effect (see Chapter 1). Furthermore, for all factors, the only evidence of their 
effect on the illusion of secondary control comes from studies of lotteries, where the 
factors have been found to be influential despite the absence of opportunity for any 
kind of physical action. The factors‟ effects on the illusion of secondary control are yet 
to be investigated in games of chance other than lotteries. 
As was suggested in the Discussion section of Paper 2, manipulating choice 
and stimulus familiarity in the soccer-themed experimental task would involve 
removing task features. For example, choice could be manipulated by creating a 
version of the task without kick-direction choices for the group with less choice. 
Similarly, stimulus familiarity could be manipulated by making the soccer players 
featured in the game unknown or less recognisable in the version of the task presented 
to the „low familiarity‟ group. As in any other experimental task, thinking time, degree 
of opportunity for practice, and opportunity for competition can also be manipulated 
over the course of the playing session. 
A particular advantage of the soccer-themed task is that it allows stimulus 
familiarity to be manipulated without creating suspicion. Past research on stimulus 
familiarity has been inconclusive as to whether „low familiarity‟ groups perceived less 
control because of fewer available strategies or because of suspicion that the game‟s 
strange stimuli were a sign that the game was rigged in some way. For example, in a 
card-drawing task in one experiment (Bouts & Van Avermaet, 1992), participants in 
the „low familiarity‟ group might have been suspicious of the strangely-shaped cards 
and Egyptian symbols used in that group. In the soccer-themed task and in any 
analogous partially novel gambling task, participants would have fewer preconceptions 
about the task stimuli. Another advantage of the featured methodology is that it 
enables the factors‟ effects on the illusion of secondary control to be examined in a 
task other than a lottery. 
2. The psychological processes underlying the illusion 
Papers 2 and 3 tested the main hypotheses of a proposed explanation for the 
psychological processes underlying the illusion of control. The first of these 
hypotheses, tested in Paper 2, is that the illusion of control is a by-product of attempted 
problem-solving in gambling tasks. The paper‟s main findings and the supplementary 154 
 
findings discussed above suggest that people in gambling tasks do have a problem-
solving orientation in that they consider an ascending success-rate to be indicative of 
them having learned the „correct‟ way of playing.  
Paper 3 tested the explanation‟s hypothesis that the problem-solving solutions 
people arrive at in gambling settings are of two types – solutions based on beliefs 
about supernatural forces, and solutions based on other beliefs, including the gambler‟s 
fallacy. In the paper, the model fitted using CFA displayed good fit to the scale 
covariance matrix, suggesting that, to the extent that it was captured by scores on the 
six created scales, the illusion of control contains two variants, reflecting the gambler‟s 
fallacy and beliefs about the supernatural. As pointed out in the paper‟s Discussion, the 
chief limitation of the study was that the CFA model‟s good fit might have been due to 
the manner in which items were grouped into scales. Indeed, as described in the 
paper‟s Introduction, the groupings were informed by the hypothesis being tested. 
The hypothesis examined in the study can, however, be tested on the raw data 
set rather than a set of arbitrary scale scores. Appendix 6D presents an exploratory 
factor analysis (EFA) of the survey items in order to determine how many latent item 
groupings best describe them (e.g., Costello & Osborne, 2005; Floyd & Widaman, 
1995). In an EFA, the study‟s hypothesis would be that the items are best-described by 
two latent groupings, reflecting the gambler‟s fallacy and supernatural beliefs, 
respectively. The „cyclical luck‟ items were excluded from the EFA because EFA is 
difficult to apply when items load on multiple factors, as the „cyclical luck‟ items did 
in the main study (MacCallum et al., 1999). As the appendix shows, the hypothesised 
two-factor structure was obtained. 
The conducted EFA is useful not only as an alternative test of the thesis‟ 
arguments regarding the belief structures influencing the illusion of control, but also as 
a mechanism for identifying further weak items for potential exclusion in future 
surveys of erroneous gambling-related beliefs. Candidates for exclusion are items with 
weak factor loadings (e.g., item 22 in Appendix 6D) and items with similar loadings 
on both factors (e.g., items 14 and 61 in Appendix 6D). 
The thesis‟ arguments regarding the psychological processes driving the 
illusion of control leave open at least one question about the structure of the illusion. 155 
 
The question relates to the distinction between the gambler‟s fallacy and beliefs about 
non-supernatural phenomena. Problem-solving involves an interaction between 
background beliefs and situational factors, such as the number of available action 
alternatives. Beliefs can cause certain situational factors to be noticed and situational 
factors can, upon being noticed, cause certain beliefs to be activated (Murphy & 
Medin, 1985). It is, in turn, feasible that the gambler‟s fallacy and beliefs about other 
physical entities do not draw attention to, and are not activated by, the same situational 
factors. The question is, however, whether non-supernatural beliefs other than the 
gambler‟s fallacy are applied often enough in gambling contexts to warrant the 
associated problem-solving being labelled a separate variant of the illusion of control. 
To answer this question, it is necessary to examine whether any factors found to have 
an influencing effect in the present soccer task have the same effect in a task where 
gambler‟s-fallacy-based strategies are the only possible form of primary control. 
Roulette is such a task, for example, since it allows for the gambler‟s-fallacy-based 
selection of numbers and colours that have not won in some time but does not feature 
themes (e.g., soccer) that could form the basis for other strategies. If success-frequency 
and success-slope effects in the context of this task show a different pattern to those in 
the soccer task, there would be reason to distinguish between the illusion of gambler‟s-
fallacy-based control and other types of the illusion of primary control. 
3. Methodology for researching influencing factors 
As discussed in Chapter 1, assuming the illusion of control to be a problem-solving 
phenomenon with gambler‟s-fallacy-based and supernatural variants has a number of 
implications for the methodology used in examining influences on the illusion. 
Following the successful testing of these base assumptions, studies on factors 
influencing the illusion should consider including the following features. First, the 
experimental task should be recognisable as a gambling task. This should 
automatically facilitate problem-solving and encourage application of the gambler‟s 
fallacy, the driving force behind the illusion of primary control. The experiments in 
this thesis used a task that was only partially recognisable, and such tasks have the 
advantage of being representative of a variety of gambling tasks rather than one 
specific task.  156 
 
The second methodological guideline for future experimental work is that the 
illusions of primary and secondary control should be measured separately, since they 
may reflect strategising based on different belief structures (gambler‟s fallacy vs. 
beliefs about supernatural forces). In light of confirming evidence for the assumption 
that the illusion of control is a problem-solving phenomenon (see Section 2), it is also 
desirable for the measure to consist of a listing of potential problem-solving solutions 
(i.e., methods of obtaining wins) that participants evaluate as being representative or 
not representative of the solutions they might be considering at that moment. The 
measure used in Papers 1 and 2 implements these guidelines but is a work-in-progress 
in terms of the constituent listed problem-solutions and their wording. 
4. Applications 
In Australia, national surveys have concluded that of the 80 to 92% of adults who have 
gambled at some time in their lives (Australian Productivity Commission, 1999, 2010; 
Griffiths & Delfabbro, 2001), approximately 2% are „problem gamblers‟. Problem 
gamblers have a genuine desire to stop gambling but continue to gamble regularly, 
experiencing heavy financial losses, chasing those losses, often with borrowed money, 
and, in general, dedicating to gambling more time and money than intended 
(Blaszczynski & Nower, 2002). Of all gambling forms, slot-machine play is most 
strongly associated with problem gambling, in that approximately 15% of people who 
gamble on machines weekly or more often report symptoms indicative of problem 
gambling (Australian Productivity Commission, 1999, 2010). Other developed 
countries report similar statistics (e.g., Bakken et al., 2009; Ladouceur, 1996; Shaffer, 
Hall & Vander Bilt, 1999; Wardle et al., 2007).  
Numerous explanations of problem gambling have proposed that erroneous 
gambling-related beliefs play a principal role in the development of problem gambling 
(Walker, 1992b; Ladouceur et al., 2002), or are at least sufficient causes (Blaszczynski 
& Nower, 2002). This thesis, in turn, identifies abstract belief structures that give rise 
to considered problem-solutions in gambling settings, and, with that, most erroneous 
gambling related beliefs. Essentially, the thesis provides a theoretically-grounded 
typology of these beliefs, tracing each belief back to more abstract beliefs about 
supernatural agents, the gambler‟s fallacy, other beliefs about the physical world (e.g., 157 
 
beliefs about how slot machines are programmed), or some combination of these. Not 
only is this typology theoretically-motivated, it also specifies fewer belief categories 
than existing typologies (e.g., Toneatto et al., 1997). Both of these features make the 
typology highly suitable as the basis for classifying and correcting a person‟s 
erroneous beliefs in treatment settings. 
At the same time, however, the present findings regarding the abstract beliefs 
underpinning the illusion of control raise questions about the feasibility of „correcting‟ 
beliefs that stem from such abstract belief structures. Given their evolutionary history, 
the abstract beliefs might not be reversible, implying that they might continue to 
generate erroneous problem solutions in gambling settings. Even if it is possible to 
reverse or weaken the abstract belief structures, the therapist is likely to face some 
difficulties in doing so, especially with respect to abstract beliefs about supernatural 
forces such as luck and fate. Many therapies have focused on correcting the gambler‟s 
fallacy by explaining the way in which commercial gambling environments are built to 
preserve the independence of outcomes from trial to trial (e.g., Ladouceur et al., 2002). 
However, approaches to countering beliefs about supernatural agents have not been 
investigated in relation to gambling, most likely because these beliefs are often related 
to personally and culturally significant religious belief structures. 
5. Summary 
Future investigations of the relationship between success-frequency and the illusion of 
control should focus on determining whether higher success-frequency augments the 
illusion only insofar as it leads to a higher accumulated win-amount. Investigations of 
success-slope should focus on ascertaining that estimates of remembered success-
frequency after various success-slopes show trends similar to those observed in 
research on human memory. Further evidence of this would add weight to the second 
paper‟s conclusion that estimates of remembered success-frequency are not suitable 
proxies for ratings of perceived control in experiments concerned with success-slope 
effects.  
Another set of open research questions pertains to the effects on the illusion of 
control of stimulus familiarity, thinking time, opportunity for practice, opportunity for 
competition, and foreknowledge. Each of these factors has been found to affect the 158 
 
illusion in only one or two studies, so replications are in order. These studies could be 
conducted using the same experimental task and perceived-control measure as the 
success-frequency and success-slope studies in this thesis. New tasks and measures 
could also be developed, as long as the experimental task is at least partially 
recognisable as a gambling game and the measure gauges the illusions of primary and 
secondary control separately. It is also advisable that the measure contain a listing of 
task strategies participants are likely to consider over the course of the gambling 
session. The effects of stimulus familiarity are best investigated in partially 
recognisable tasks such as the present soccer-task. 
A particular methodology is advocated for future research on factors 
influencing the illusion of control because the thesis produced supporting evidence for 
the theoretical explanation on which the methodology is based. According to this 
explanation, the illusion of control is a by-product of problem-solving in gambling 
environments and has two variants. When the problem-solving is informed by the 
gambler‟s fallacy and other beliefs about the physical world, the associated illusion of 
control can be termed an illusion of primary control. Correspondingly, when the 
problem-solving is informed by beliefs about supernatural agents such a luck and God, 
the associated illusion of control is „secondary‟. This conceptualisation of the illusion 
of control can inform the design of future surveys of erroneous gambling-related 
beliefs and has implications for the treatment of problem-gambling through the 
reversal of erroneous gambling-related beliefs. Most critically, the conceptualisation 
suggests that further research is needed into methods of reversing quasi-religious 
beliefs about supernatural phenomena.  
Empirical work needs to be carried out to examine the potential distinction 
between two sub-types of the illusion of primary control – the illusion based on the 
gambler‟s fallacy and the illusion based on other beliefs about non-supernatural 
phenomena. Experiments could seek to replicate the present finding of higher 
perceived control following an ascending success-slope using a roulette-style 
experimental task or any other task where the gambler‟s fallacy is the only source of 
relevant beliefs not relating to supernatural forces. If a different success-slope or set of 
success-slopes is found to be dominant with respect to the associated level of inferred 
control, there would be grounds for defining the illusion of gambler‟s-fallacy-based 159 
 
control as a separate construct. The effects success-frequency and win-amount on 
perceived control in roulette-type tasks need to be explored and compared to the 
present findings for the same reason. 160 
 
Appendices for Chapter 6 
Appendix 6A 
This appendix examines the effect of individual differences in win-amount on 
perceived control. As in the main paper, the analyses involved hierarchical regressions 
in which DBC score was the predictor variable at the first step and the variable of 
interest (final win-amount) was a predictor at the second step. Three regressions of this 
kind were conducted involving each of the following dependent variables: perceived 
primary control, perceived secondary control and score on the traditional measure. The 
results are presented in Table 6A.1, where it can be seen that perceptions of both 
primary and secondary control increased significantly with the final win-amount, 
whereas scores on the traditional measure were not affected.  
Notably, when the first two regressions were conducted with slightly different 
measures of perceived primary control and perceived secondary – measures derived 
from a factor analysis of an item set from which the „Chance‟ item was excluded (see 
Appendix 3B) – variations in win-amount affected perceived secondary control but not 
perceived primary control. The inconsistency might be due to the fact that the illusion 
of primary control was measured less reliably than the illusion of secondary control, 
which was defined by more items following the factor analysis. 
Table 6A.1. Hierarchical regression analyses of the influence of gambling-related 
beliefs and final win-amount on (a) ratings of perceived primary control, (b) ratings of 
perceived secondary control, and (c) scores on the traditional measure (N = 96) 
(a) Perceived primary control 
Step  Predictors  B  SE B  β  t  p  Adj R
2  Sig. F 
change 
1  Constant  -1.58  .69        .32   
DBC total  .07  .01  .56  6.63  <.001   
2  Constant  -2.27  .77       
.35  .05  DBC total   .07  .01  .56  6.73  <.001 
Win amt.  .00  .00  .17  1.97  .05 161 
 
(b) Perceived secondary control 
Step  Predictors  B  SE B  β  t  p  Adj R
2  Sig. F 
change 
1  Constant  -.66  .89        .16   
DBC total  .06  .01  .42  4.43  <.001   
2  Constant  -1.69  .97       
.20  .02  DBC total   .06  .01  .42  4.52  <.001 
Win amt.  .00  .00  .21  2.32  .02 
 
(c) Score on traditional measure 
Step  Predictors  B  SE B  β  t  p  Adj R
2  Sig. F 
change 
1  Constant  -1.23  .55        .24   
DBC total  .05  .01  .49  5.40  <.001   
2  Constant  -1.69  .62       
.26  .10  DBC total   .05  .01  .49  5.44  <.001 




Success-slope conditions were examined for signs of perceived learning, which might 
express itself in decreasing variability of responding as participants gradually identify 
and settle on what appears to be an effective strategy. Here, behavioural variability in 
the first 24 trials was compared to behavioural variability in the second 24 trials.  
One behavioural variable examined across time was the number of voluntary 
player profile changes. A Repeated Measures ANOVA was conducted, with Time 
(Trials 1-24 vs. Trials 25-48) as the repeated-measures predictor and Success-slope 
Condition as a between-subjects predictor. The analysis revealed a main effect of 
Time (F(1,330) = 5.44, p = .02, pη
2 = .01), and a significant Time x Success-slope 
interaction (F(3,330) = 10.41, p < .001, pη
2 = .09). As indicated in Figure 6B.1(a), the 
main effect of time was negligible, whereas the interaction reflected the „ascending‟ 
group‟s tendency to reduce the number of player profile changes made over time. A 
related samples t-test showed that the difference between the mean number of player 
profile changes in the first 24 trials of the „end‟ condition was significantly larger than 
the mean number of player profile changes in the second 24 trials of that condition 
(t(78) = 5.64, p < .001). Similar t-tests for the other conditions did not show 
significant results. 
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Figure 6B.1. Degree of variability in (a) player profile choices and (b) kick direction 
choices across time and success slope conditions. 164 
 
The other behavioural variable subjected to analysis across time was the 
entropy of kick direction choices. Entropy can be defined as an index of the amount of 
information needed to describe the values assumed by a variable (Shannon, 1948). The 
greater the variability in values, the more information is needed, and, thus, the greater 
the entropy. The formula for computing entropy, H(X), is as follows:   
 
In the case of kick direction choices, n equalled 5 because there were five possible 
directions. For each time period (Trials 1-24, Trials 25-48), p(xi) was the percentage of 
trials on which kick direction i was selected. Computing entropy for the time period 
involved summing p(xi) for all values of i (i.e., for all five kick directions). A log base 
(b) of 2 was selected to make the computed entropy interpretable in terms of binary 
„bits‟ of information. Higher kick direction entropy indicated higher rates of switching 
between the possible directions. 
The results pertaining to kick direction entropy largely mirrored those obtained 
for the number of player profile changes. The Repeated Measures ANOVA with Time 
as the repeated-measures predictor, Success-slope Condition as a between-subjects 
predictor and Kick Direction Entropy as the outcome variable revealed a significant 
Time x Success-slope interaction (F(3,330) = 19.64, p < .001, pη
2 = .15). As Figure 
6B.1(a) illustrates, decreasing entropy in the „ascending‟ condition was the source of 
the effect. 
In contrast to the player-profile-change results, Time had a main effect that 
was not negligible in terms of effect size (F(1,330) = 66.00, p < .001, pη
2 = .17). 
Follow-up t-tests correspondingly revealed significant time-based entropy decreases 
not only in the „ascending‟ condition (t(78) = 7.89, p < .001), but also in the „U-
shaped‟ and „flat‟ conditions (t(85) = 2.33, p = .02, and t(83) = 3.12, p = .002, 
respectively). The direction of the Time effect suggests that, alongside learning in the 





For the explanation of some success-frequency-estimate patterns in terms of the „over-
under effect‟ to hold, evidence is needed that, in the context of the soccer-themed 
gambling task, 1/6 is indeed a success-frequency subject to overestimation, unlike 
some higher frequencies. Unpublished data from the study on success-frequency 
(Paper 1) can be used for this purpose. The study featured five success-frequency 
conditions, and the data of interest concerns prospective and retrospective success-
frequency estimates across conditions. The pattern of estimates across conditions 
could be considered evidence for the „over-under effect‟ if it suggests that (a) 
participants systematically overestimated lower frequencies while underestimating 
higher ones, and (b) 1/6 was among the overestimated frequencies.  
Figure 6C.1 shows the mean deviation of retrospective
20 and prospective 
success-frequency estimates from the objective success-frequency level across 
conditions. The deviation levels were calculated by subtracting the true success-
frequency from the estimate in each case, meaning that positive numbers indicate 
overestimation, whereas negative numbers indicate underestimation. Even though the 
confidence intervals around the means suggest that, in all conditions, success-
frequency was neither overestimated nor underestimated, the means did follow an 
„over-under‟ pattern. Specifically, frequencies below 1/3 tended to be overestimated, 
whereas frequencies of 1/3 and above were estimated accurately. By implication, 1/6 
would be among the overestimated frequencies. 
                                                 
20 No consideration was given to the effects of whether the retrospective estimate pertained to „goals‟ or 
„misses‟ because, while this variable was manipulated in this study in the same way as in the success- 
slope study, the question‟s framing had no effect. 166 
 
Figure 6C.1. The extent to which estimates of (a) retrospective success-frequency and 
(b) prospective success-frequency deviated from the objective success-frequency 
across success-frequency conditions (N = 97; study described in Chapter 3) 167 
 
Next, a preliminary test of this „over-under‟ (or, more precisely „over-
accurate‟) pattern was conducted. The mean deviation level of participants in 
conditions with a success-frequency less than 1/3 (i.e., conditions featuring a success-
frequency of 1/4, 1/8 or 1/16) was calculated and compared to zero using a Wilcoxon 
signed-rank test. The same was done for the mean deviation level of participants in 
conditions featuring success frequencies of 1/2 and 1/3. Assuming a genuine „over-
accurate effect‟, a significant difference (overestimation) was expected in the lower 
frequency conditions, and no difference (accuracy) was expected in the higher 
frequency conditions. The results were broadly consistent with these expectations. For 
retrospective estimates, mean deviation in the lower frequency conditions represented 
a significant departure from zero (p = .004), and this was not the case in the higher-
frequency conditions (p = .73). For prospective estimates, mean deviation in the lower 
frequency conditions represented a marginally non-significant departure from zero (p 
= .06), while the difference between zero and estimates in the higher-frequency 
conditions was definitively non-significant (p = .22). 
This evidence that a success-frequency of 1/6 would be underestimated in the 
soccer task is a useful starting point for further testing but it is only preliminary. More 
formal analyses of accuracy across success-frequency conditions could be carried out 
in future, involving, for example, the fitting of a non-linear distribution that intersects 
with the line y = 0 (i.e., complete accuracy) at a point where x, the objective success-
frequency, equals 1/3. 168 
 
Appendix 6D 
This appendix uses exploratory factor analysis (EFA) to test predictions of the 
explanation with respect to the raw dataset in Paper 3. One prediction is that, once 
items relating to the belief that luck is cyclical are removed from the dataset, the 
remaining items should be described by two latent factors. The second prediction is 
that the factors should be defined by the same items that were predicted to define the 
two latent factors in the CFA – that is, items expressing the gambler‟s fallacy and 
beliefs in the supernatural, respectively. 
Prior to the analysis, it was ascertained that the 62 survey items of interest (all 
but the eight items in the „cyclical luck‟ sub-category) satisfied the assumptions of the 
analysis (KMO = .96; Bartlett‟s test: χ
2(1891) = 10966, p < .001; all initial 
communalities > .4). When the items were subjected to Principal Axis Factoring, 
visual inspection of the scree plot suggested a two-factor solution. Table 6D.1 shows 
the items that came to define each factor after a direct oblimin rotation. Factor 1 
appeared to reflect the illusion of primary control, in that it included nine of the 10 
items the main paper categorised as relating to „negative recency‟ considerations, 27 of 
the 31 items labelled expressions of a belief about „systems of play‟, and three out of 
five „persistence‟ items. Meanwhile, Factor 2 corresponded to the illusion of secondary 
control in that it was defined by all eight items relating to the use of „rituals‟ and four 
of the eight items relating to the „omniscience and power‟ of supernatural agents.  
This result was consistent with the explanation‟s predictions, except that, as the 
table also indicates, some item loadings were inconsistent with assumptions made in 
the main paper. Namely, the factor expressing the illusion of primary control (Factor 1) 
was defined by four items that were, in the main paper, classified instances of the 
„omniscience and power‟ belief associated with the illusion of secondary control. 
Likewise, the illusion-of-secondary-control factor (Factor 2) was defined by seven 
items assumed to be instances of the illusion of primary control in the main paper. 
Even with these minor inconsistencies, the explanation‟s proposal regarding the two 
variants of the illusion of control received broad support from the EFA. 169 
 
Table 6D.1. Factor loadings produced by a PAF analysis with oblimin rotation for the 















1.    The longer I‟ve been losing, the 




.62   
2.    I should keep the same bet... 
because it is bound to win. 
.62   
3.    ...I don‟t want to miss a win.     .44   
4.    ...I must maintain that strategy or 
plan because I know it will 
eventually come through for me. 
  .70   
5.    I have some control over 
predicting my gambling wins.  
  .34   
6.    If I keep changing my responses, I 
have less chances of winning...  
  .70   
7.    Losses... are bound to be followed 
by a series of wins.  
  .44   
8.    The thought that a win has to be 
coming soon keeps me gambling... 
  .73   
9.    Sometimes I feel that I can keep 
winning because I have learned to 
predict the next random thing the 
machine is going to do.  
    -.47 
10.   Winning in poker machine 
gambling is a matter of knowing 
how random patterns work. 
  .55   
11.   I will be more successful if I have 





.59   
12.   A good poker machine, roulette or 
dice gambler is like a sportsperson 
who knows winning plays and 
when to use them. 
  .43   
13.   There are secrets to successful 
gambling that can be learned. 
  .48   
14.   Show me a gambler with a well-
planned system and I‟ll show you 
a winner. 
  .34   
15.   The more familiar I am with poker 
machine gambling, the more likely 
I am to win. 
  .69   
16.   One should pay attention to lottery 
numbers that often win. 
  .49   
17.   A game of chance is a contest of 
wills between the game and the 
player. 
  .59   
18.   Playing poker machines is a form 
of competition between the player 
and the machine. 






















.47   
20.   ... gambling wins are evidence that 
I have skill and knowledge... 
.56   
21.   My knowledge and skill in 
gambling contribute to the 
likelihood that I will make money. 
  .46   
22.   I have more skills and 
knowledge... than most people 
who gamble. 
  .26  -.22 
23.   I am pretty accurate at predicting 
when a win will occur. 
    -.50 
24.   I should keep track of previous 
winning bets... 
  .52   
25.   ...  “near misses” or times when I 
almost win remind me that if I 
keep playing I will win.  
  .67   
26.   I think of poker machine gambling 
as a challenge. 
  .55   
27.   When I have a win once, I will 
definitely win again. 
  .53   
28.   A series of losses will provide me 
with a learning experience... 
  .40  -.32 
29.   ... I can beat the system.    .36   
30.   If I lose it‟s because something 
unforseen has happened. 
    -.49 
31.   ... I can win if I follow my 
strategies. 
  .53   
32.   Identifying a pattern helps...    .57   
33.   The chances of winning improve 
after a near win... 
  .51   
34.   When I've lost it's because I've 
made a hasty decision or didn't 
concentrate. 
    -.39 
35.   The way in which I press the 
buttons... can influence the 
outcome. 
    -.36 
36.   Winning... is all about knowing 
the right time to get on the 
machine.  
  .67   
37.   There is a definite type of person 
who has big wins at gambling. 
  .58   
38.   ... it is important to know how to 
maintain a winning streak when 
one comes around.  


















39.   ... it is important to know how to 
change the flow of the game when 




.52   
40.   The machines pay out more at 
different times of day.  
  .44   
41.   You can win more... if you know 
how to make good use of free 
spins.  
  .74   
42.   Where I get money to gamble 
doesn‟t matter because I will win 
and pay it back. 
Primary: 
Persistence 
  -.54 
43.   In the long run, I will win more 
money than I will lose gambling. 
    -.41 
44.   If I continue to gamble, it will 
eventually pay off and I will make 
money 
  .50   
45.   If I lose money gambling, I 
should try to win it back. 
  .50   
46.   ... gambling success requires 
dedication and a willingness to 
invest some money.  
  .40   
47.  55.  ...fate is against me when I lose.  Secondary: 
Power and 
omniscience 
.43   
48.  56.  There is useful information in my 
horoscope. 
    -.47 
49.  57.  Some gamblers are just born 
lucky. 
  .57   
50.  58.  Following lucky signs can help 
me win. 
    -.58 
51.  59.  I have the psychic ability to 
predict a winner. 
    -.64 
52.  60.  Bad vibes from people around me 
cause me to lose. 
  .42  -.33 
53.  61.  I make the right choice because 
I'm generally lucky. 
  .32  -.34 
54.  62.  ... the good or bad luck of other 
players could rub off on me. 
  .40  -.35 




  -.66 
56.  64.  ... I wear lucky clothes or 
jewellery. 
    -.63 
65.  I can improve my chances of 
winning by performing special 
rituals. 
    -.75 
57.  66.  I like to carry a lucky coin, charm 
or token... 
    -.73 
58.  67.  I have a “lucky” technique that I 
use... 
  .31  -.43 172 
 














60.  68.  There are certain things I do when 
I am betting; for example, tapping 
a certain. number of times, 




  -.64 
61.  69.  ... I have the power to „will‟ my 
desired outcomes to come up.  
    -.40 
62.  70.  You never know what might 
happen if you don't perform 
certain rituals... 
    -.57 
63.  Variance explained after rotation  21%  18% 
64.  Correlation between factors  -.73 
65.   
66.  Note: Factor loadings of magnitude <.3 are suppressed (except for item 22) 
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